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Undoing Miranda 
Michael Edmund O’Neill∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
You have the right to remain silent. If you choose to waive that right, 
anything you say may, and likely will, be used against you. You have 
the right to consult with an attorney. If you cannot afford to retain 
counsel, the state will provide you with legal assistance at no cost to 
you.1 
How are the mighty fallen . . . !2 
Icons sometimes fall. And when they do, they tend to fall hard. 
While not yet toppled, Miranda v. Arizona, an icon of the Warren 
Court’s transformation of American criminal procedure,3 is teetering 
on the brink. On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court unleashed a 
firestorm that not only burned within the legal community, but ig-
nited the popular imagination as well. Watch any generic crime show 
on television and at some point in the drama, a world-weary cop will 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University Law School; Commissioner, 
United States Sentencing Commission. This article is dedicated to Akhil Amar, for his support; 
Paul Cassell, for his indefatigable work; Yale Kamisar, for his provocative scholarship on this 
subject; and, most of all, to Joseph Grano, without whose seminal scholarship this piece would 
not have been possible. I would also like to offer special thanks to Laird Kirkpatrick, Erik Jaffe, 
and my research assistants, Ghida Aljuburi and Danielle Giroux. The views expressed herein are 
my own. They do not reflect those of the United States Sentencing Commission, and thus any 
errors can be attributed solely to me. 
 1. The now-familiar warnings can be heard on any American cop show, circa 1966-
present; see also, Fred Inbau, Commentary: Over Reaction—the Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797 (1982) (discussing various formulations of the warn-
ings). 
 2. 2 Sam. 1:25 (King James). 
 3. A 1974 American Bar Association survey of lawyers, judges, and legal academics dis-
covered that Miranda was the third most notable decision of all time, trailing only Marbury v. 
Madison and United States v. Nixon in terms of notoriety. Amazingly, given the group that was 
surveyed, it even ranked ahead of Brown v. Board of Education. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, 
MILESTONES! 200 YEARS OF AMERICAN LAW: MILESTONES IN OUR LEGAL HISTORY vi-vii 
(1976). I daresay that were a survey taken of the public at-large, Miranda might rank even 
higher. 
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warn the hapless suspect that he has the right to remain silent, to ob-
tain counsel, and, if impoverished, to retain counsel on the state’s 
tab. Miranda has so permeated the popular culture that not even my 
word processor’s spell-checker picks it up. Of course, Miranda has 
not only invaded the popular culture; it has also been the fodder for 
political debate. Listen to any politician on the stump inveighing 
against the “coddling” of criminals, and some criticism of Miranda 
is almost sure to emerge. 
Despite its prominence, Miranda’s continuing vitality as a man-
datory rule of police procedure has been threatened. The threat? The 
unlikely resuscitation of a statute long believed dead: 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3501. Enacted by Congress in 1968 to replace Miranda’s compul-
sory warnings with the former “voluntariness” test, § 3501 has en-
joyed relative obscurity in the criminal practice world, but has long 
been a favorite of those bent on rewriting the Warren Court’s hand-
book on criminal procedure. Their efforts to revive the statute have 
recently paid off. In United States v. Dickerson,4 the Fourth Circuit 
resurrected this little-known curiosity of criminal procedure and held 
that it, not Miranda, governs the admissibility of confessions.5 
The fact that the Fourth Circuit relied on § 3501 to determine a 
confession’s admissibility is not half as interesting as why that statute 
languished in purgatory for so long. How could a statute, duly en-
acted by Congress to overrule a controversial decision, signed by the 
president and upheld (more or less) on several occasions, sink almost 
without a trace? This article will discuss Miranda’s jurisprudential 
roots and will trace the odd journey of § 3501—the statute that even 
prosecutors could not quite bring themselves to love.6 In so doing, I 
will revisit Miranda’s oft-debated constitutional status and examine 
Congress’s institutional authority to alter rules designed to safeguard 
constitutional guarantees. 
For example, the Miranda Court itself suggested that the now-
familiar prophylactic warnings were not compelled by the Fifth 
Amendment, and even went so far as to invite attempts to implement 
other approaches that would protect criminal suspects’ rights. How-
ever, the Court never explained how it could purport to exercise su-
 
 4. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999). 
 5. See id. at 692. 
 6. As I write this piece, the Solicitor General’s Office has reversed long-standing Justice 
Department policy and joined the defendant in Dickerson to challenge § 3501’s constitutional-
ity. 
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pervisory authority over state courts—a power the Court has recently 
recognized it does not possess. Similarly, it is interesting to observe 
that Congress did precisely what the Supreme Court challenged it to 
do; namely, it devised an alternate means of protecting suspects’ 
rights. In light of the furor surrounding Miranda, and the harsh po-
litical criticism brought to bear on the Court in the decision’s wake, 
it is worth asking why the statute purportedly overturning Miranda 
was virtually ignored for well over a quarter century. 
In Part II, this article examines the path leading to Miranda, fo-
cusing on the Supreme Court’s early reliance on the voluntariness 
test for determining the admissibility of confessions and the Court’s 
subsequent abandonment of that test in favor of restraints on police 
investigatory practices. Part III then discusses the Miranda opinion 
itself, bringing to light what the Warren Court said, and did not say, 
in that landmark decision. Part IV describes congressional reaction to 
Miranda, recounting the Senate hearings into the decision and de-
tailing the floor debates surrounding § 3501’s enactment. Despite 
Congress’s sometime inflammatory rhetoric, it is interesting to note 
that far from “overruling” the Court, Congress instead artfully in-
corporated the Miranda warnings into a scheme that offered sus-
pects considerably more protection than they had enjoyed prior to 
Miranda, while simultaneously balancing the suspect’s rights against 
law enforcement’s legitimate needs. Part V canvasses the statute’s cu-
rious litigation history, starting with the Johnson Administration’s 
tepid support for the legislation and ending with the Clinton Ad-
ministration’s outright hostility towards it. Part VI revisits recent 
congressional efforts to reawaken interest in the statute, chiefly by 
grilling Justice Department officials about their support for the legis-
lation and initiating calls for the statute to be enforced. Part VII dis-
cusses § 3501’s treatment in the Supreme Court. Finally, Part VIII 
concludes with some general observations on the constitutional is-
sues swirling around the statute. 
I conclude that, while § 3501 survives constitutional scrutiny, it 
nevertheless raises several important issues demanding judicial resolu-
tion, the chief of which involves the role Congress plays in constitu-
tional interpretation. Although the Supreme Court has long domi-
nated the field of “saying what the law is,” both legislators and 
executive branch officials must interpret constitutional provisions in 
fulfilling their responsibilities. This careful balance creates room for 
Congress, in enforcing constitutional norms, to use its institutional 
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advantages to carve out a role for itself in generating procedural rules 
designed to safeguard substantive constitutional guarantees. It is my 
claim that the Miranda warnings are grounded not in the Fifth 
Amendment, but are instead designed to be a type of anticipatory 
remedy for potential constitutional violations. As such, though the 
warnings serve to secure constitutional rights, they are not them-
selves constitutionally guaranteed. Where the Court has constructed 
its “pre-remedy” around predictive facts, as opposed to present facts, 
Congress may rely on its own institutional superiority for fact-
gathering to reject the Court’s assessment of predictive facts and to 
modify the Court’s anticipatory remedy—at least so long as Con-
gress’s proposed remedy is sufficient to protect the threatened right. 
II. THE ROAD TO MIRANDA 
If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, then so is the 
path to contemporary restrictions on police interrogation. Courts 
have long sought to strike a balance between the state’s need to in-
vestigate criminal activity and the individual’s right to privacy and 
personal autonomy. Throughout history, governments have pursued 
those suspected of wrongdoing and questioned them about their 
conduct. This is hardly novel. One does not have to be Sherlock 
Holmes to understand that the interrogation of suspects generally 
has been considered the best way—indeed, sometimes the only 
way—to obtain information about criminal activity.7 In the United 
States, however, this desire to ferret out crime has been tempered by 
an understanding that police interrogation methods, however laud-
able, might nonetheless lend themselves to abuse. After all, the desire 
to obtain a confession provides an incentive for investigators to press 
suspects. As a result, the framers of the Bill of Rights adopted a pro-
 
 7. Justice Jackson once observed that the “interrogation of those who know something 
about the facts is the chief means to the solution of crime.” Stein v. New York, 364 U.S. 156, 
184 (1953). Similarly, Justice Felix Frankfurter once explained that “offenses frequently oc-
cur . . . [in which] nothing remains—if police investigation is not to be balked before it has 
fairly begun—but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions.” Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961); see also Fred Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the 
United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. (Northwestern University) 442, 447 (1948) 
(noting that even the best police departments depend on interrogations and confessions to 
solve many criminal cases); cf. LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 
92 (1959) (stating that “[p]revailing opinion seems to be that police interrogation is the 
method most effective under contemporary American conditions for fastening guilt on the sea-
soned lawbreaker”). 
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vision, by then already popular in the several states, that no person 
shall “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.”8 The Fifth Amendment’s provision against compelled self-
incrimination, however, was generally construed as applying only to 
the introduction of the defendant’s confession at trial. Hence, while 
it may not have been a Fifth Amendment violation for police to co-
erce a suspect’s confession outside of court, it might well have run 
afoul of the Constitution if prosecutors had attempted to introduce 
that statement at the suspect’s trial. 
A. The Process of Interrogation 
Interestingly, the aggrieved party often conducted early criminal 
investigations.9 Under common law practices, the private prosecutor 
would bring the suspect before a judicial officer for questioning.10 
The judicial officer would then conduct a preliminary examination to 
uncover salient information to be used at trial.11 As intermediaries of 
the state, judicial officers were subject to various formal (and infor-
mal) constraints. The nineteenth century, however, witnessed the 
development of professional police forces, which marked the transi-
tion from judicial to police interrogation. Police officers, while 
cloaked with the state’s authority, were not subject to the same re-
strictions placed upon magistrates. Unlike magistrates, their investi-
gations were not subject to public scrutiny; indeed, police investiga-
tions routinely took place out of the public view, often behind the 
closed doors of the station house.12 Police inquiries were thus more 
efficient in uncovering information than those conducted by judicial 
officers. As a consequence, pretrial judicial inquiries all but disap-
peared. 
This transition from pretrial judicial inquiries to police inquiries 
went largely unchallenged. No specific constitutional provision con-
fers the power of interrogation on the government. This power, as 
Thurgood Marshall observed (while serving as Solicitor General) 
during oral argument in Westover v. United States13 (one of 
 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 9. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good (draft on file 
with the author). 
 10. See MAYERS, supra note 7, at 16, 86-87, 100-02, 223-24. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See generally id. 
 13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Miranda’s companion cases), “is inherent in the investigatory proc-
ess. . . . I don’t think it has ever been questioned.”14 Broad as this 
power may have been, the police exercised this authority for the 
most part without close supervision or any particular judicial over-
sight. Granting police such authority was generally thought to be 
“indispensable to crime detection.”15 
B. Confessions and Crime Solving 
Confessions have long been crucial to the successful resolution of 
criminal cases. However obtained, confessions generally have been 
considered to be a reliable form of evidence.16 A confession, quite 
unlike most forms of evidence, is capable of supplying “ways of veri-
fying itself,” and, like a statement against interest, provides powerful 
evidence of guilt. Confessions are so powerful, in fact, that courts 
have been careful to scrutinize the process by which they are ex-
tracted. Courts have been concerned not only about the potential 
harm to the confessor, but also about possible taint to the judicial 
system from admitting unreliable evidence. A confession obtained by 
torture is, of course, unlikely to be reliable: a threat to remove one’s 
toenails may induce even the most stalwart soul to say whatever a 
grand inquisitor might want. 
A confession obtained as a result of simple deception, however, 
presents quite a different matter. The reliability of such a confession 
might not be compromised if the interrogators do nothing to over-
come the suspect’s will. For example, in the justly famous Christian 
Burial case, Brewer v. Williams,17 there was little chance that the con-
fession was erroneous. In that case, a little girl was missing and pre-
sumed dead. A suspect, Robert Williams, turned himself into police. 
Although instructed to not interrogate Williams, the police officers 
played upon the suspect’s religious inclinations, asking him to con-
sider the poor, lifeless little girl lying out in the harsh elements. Such 
 
 14. RICHARD J. MEDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA: THE ANATOMY OF A 
SUPREME COURT DECISION 134 (1966). 
 15. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961); cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 
49, 58 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that in cases in which no external evidence 
exists, the alternative to interrogation is “to close the books on the crime and forget it with the 
suspect at large”). 
 16. See Watts, 338 U.S. at 58 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 17. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
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a little girl, the officers opined, deserved a “Christian burial.”18 Wil-
liams relented and led the officers to the girl’s body.19 Such tactics by 
the officers, while doubtless designed to elicit some sort of response 
from Williams, likely would not have resulted in a false confession. 
After all, only the guilty party would likely have known where the 
body was. A confession can thus be a particularly trustworthy device 
for separating the guilty chaff from the innocent wheat.  
C. Voluntariness as a Proxy for Credibility 
The Supreme Court, like the public at large, was not particularly 
troubled that certain suspects might erroneously believe that they 
were obligated to cooperate with the police. If police questioning 
was to be effective, suspects ought to believe they had a duty to co-
operate. After all, it was not the investigating officer’s duty to pro-
vide the suspect with unsolicited free legal advice, but to interrogate 
him. Explaining to a suspect her constitutional rights would thus be 
contradictory to the state’s purpose in permitting custodial interro-
gation.20 In light of this understanding, the Court did not feel the 
need to burden the government with any particular duty to inform 
the suspect that she need not cooperate with police. As long as the 
confession was freely offered, and hence likely to be credible, the 
process used to obtain it was of little concern. When police did, in 
the odd case, choose to advise a suspect of his right to silence, the 
suspect’s knowledge was traditionally considered a factor contribut-
ing to the “voluntariness” of the confession.21 Conversely, the ab-
sence of such counseling might weigh against the confession’s admis-
sibility given the “totality of the circumstances.” 
Understood, if not embraced, was the notion that some pressure 
upon the suspect was both inevitable and indispensable to the inves-
tigatory process.22 For example, confronting a suspect with evidence 
 
     18. Id. at 393. 
 19. See id. at 390-93. 
 20. Professors Inbau and Reid, authors of the first influential work on police interroga-
tion methods, noted that “in the absence of a statutory provision specifically requiring a crimi-
nal interrogator to warn a suspect or accused person, it is unnecessary to do so.” FRED INBAU 
& JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 163-64 (1962). 
 21. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958). 
 22. Professor Fred E. Inbau, in his textbook on interrogation for law enforcement offi-
cers, captured the judicial, as well as the popular, sentiment when he asserted that criminal sus-
pects must be dealt with “in a somewhat lower moral plane than that in which ethical, law-
abiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs.” FRED INBAU & JOHN REID, 
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of her guilt was not an infrequent means of obtaining a confession. 
Such techniques were, of course, far more effective if the suspect did 
not have counsel by her side. Consequently, the pre-Escobedo Court 
considered the denial of counsel to a suspect who had requested 
counsel or who had even retained counsel as but one factor among 
the “totality of the circumstances” used to determine whether the 
confession would be excluded as a violation of due process. The Su-
preme Court realized that counsel’s presence “would effectively pre-
clude police questioning—fair as well as unfair,”23 and “would con-
strict . . . [police ability] to solve difficult cases.”24 
Of course, the police were not granted unbridled discretion in 
questioning suspects. The confession’s reliability was of obvious im-
port.25 With the movement towards police, as opposed to judicial, 
interrogation, came the alleged use of so-called “third degree” tactics 
by police officers.26 The problem with such tactics is that while they 
may have done an excellent job of producing a confession, they 
could not always be counted on to produce a reliable confession. 
Pretrial investigatory practices thus came to be judicially scruti-
nized, at least in part, because courts were concerned about the reli-
ability of confessions. In federal cases, the preferred means of scruti-
nizing such conduct became the Fifth Amendment.27 Although the 
Fifth Amendment’s compelled self-incrimination clause appeared to 
pertain strictly to the trial setting, the Supreme Court soon deployed 
it to examine pretrial interrogations. Before the Court invoked the 
Fifth Amendment to scrutinize state cases, it relied upon the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The process due the 
criminal suspect, it seems, extended to a “fair” interrogation. How-
 
LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 196-97 (3d ed. 1948); see also Larson, Pre-
sent Police and Legal Methods for the Determination of the Innocence or Guilt of the Suspect, 16 J. 
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 252 (1925). 
 23. Crooker, 357 U.S. at 433. 
 24. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 509 (1958). 
 25. Even in the days when people believed in the existence of witches, there was some 
awareness that not all confessed witches were credible. For example, in 1672, in Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, John Broadstreet admitted to “having familiarity with the devil,” but the court 
was so unimpressed that they fined him for telling a lie and sent him home. K. ERIKSON, 
WAYWARD PURITANS 155 (1966). 
 26. Such abuses were the subject of the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness. WICKERSHAM COMM’N, NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW 
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, PUB. NO. 11, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 158-60 (1931). 
 27. See infra Part II.D. 
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ever, the focus on these cases was not so much on what the interro-
gators had done, but on whether the confession was the product of 
the suspect’s free will. 
D. Voluntariness and the Fifth Amendment 
Voluntariness has long been the touchstone for determining 
whether a confession violated the protection against compelled self-
incrimination. In one of its earliest interpretations of the Fifth 
Amendment, the Court in Sparf & Hansen v. United States,28 fo-
cused on whether the challenged confession was the product of the 
confessor’s free will. In Sparf, the second mate of an American sail-
ing vessel disappeared under mysterious circumstances. The captain 
of the vessel identified three suspects and promptly ordered them 
placed in leg irons and held below deck for the return voyage. Dur-
ing the suspects’ subsequent trial, the captain and two other crew 
members testified concerning an alleged confession made to them by 
one of the imprisoned defendants. The Court ruled that this testi-
mony was admissible on the grounds that the confession was volun-
tarily given—despite the apparently minor fact that the confessor was 
clamped in leg irons and held in the brig.29 In dicta, the Court sug-
gested that the confession would have been involuntary, and thus in-
admissible, only if it had been adduced by violence, the threat of 
punishment, or false promises of mercy.30 Absent such specific pres-
sures deisgned to overcome the suspect’s will, a confession would be 
deemed voluntary. 
The Court subsequently refined the voluntariness test in Bram v. 
United States.31 In Bram the Court took a much more nuanced view 
of what would constitute compulsion. Bram, like Sparf before it, in-
volved murder on the high seas, specifically the murder of the cap-
tain, the captain’s wife, and the second mate. When suspicion fo-
cused on one Mr. Brown, a crew member, he in turn fingered Bram, 
the first mate. Bram was placed in irons and, when the ship reached 
port, turned over to police authorities.32 
 
 
 28. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
 29. See id. at 54. 
 30. See id. at 55-56. 
 31. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 32. See id. 534-37. 
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The police interrogation unfolded as follows: 
When Mr. Bram came into my office I said to him: “Bram, we are 
trying to unravel this horrible mystery.” I said: “Your position is 
rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office and he 
made a statement that he saw you do the murder.” He said: “He 
could not have seen me; where was he?” I said: “He states he was 
at the wheel.” “Well,” he said, “he could not see me from there.” I 
said: “Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the cap-
tain from all I have heard from Mr. Brown. But,” I said, “some of 
us here think you could not have done all that crime alone. If you 
had an accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of 
this horrible crime on your own shoulders.” He said: “Well, I 
think, and many others on board the ship think, that Brown is the 
murderer; but I don’t know anything about it.” He was rather 
short in his replies.33 
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting 
this testimony and thus reversed Bram’s conviction. Relying upon 
the Fifth Amendment, the Court explained that “the generic lan-
guage of the [Fifth] Amendment was but a crystallization of the doc-
trine [excluding involuntary] confessions.”34 What was the involun-
tary confession? The Court observed that Bram’s statement that 
Brown “could not see me from there,” might possibly be understood 
as an inadvertent admission of guilt.35 According to the Court, the 
police had secured this alleged “confession” by threatening Bram. 
How? Essentially, in reminding the defendant of Brown’s accusation 
against him, the police “produce[d] upon his mind the fear that if he 
remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and 
therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty 
person.”36 Despite the somewhat tenuous nature of this threat, it was 
clear that the Court was focused on the process of the interrogation as 
creating the Fifth Amendment violation. 
E. Due Process and Voluntariness 
Although the Court voiced a similar refrain when it embarked 
upon a review of confessions obtained in state courts, it lacked an 
 
 33. Id. at 539. 
 34. Id. at 543. 
 35. Id. at 562-64. 
 36. Id. 
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obvious vehicle to do so. As the Fifth Amendment had yet to be in-
corporated against the states, the Court instead relied on the Due 
Process Clause in Brown v. Mississippi.37 If ever a case cried out for 
review, it was Brown. At trial, a deputy sheriff admitted to beating 
the codefendant prisoners with a metal buckled leather strap and 
boldly claimed that if the decision had been his alone, he would have 
whipped them harder.38 The beating, he said, was “[n]ot too much 
for a negro.”39 
In unanimously reversing Brown’s conviction, the Court ex-
plained that the severe beatings, used to obtain confessions from the 
shackled defendants, made the confessions involuntary and thus de-
prived Brown and his codefendants of due process.40 Brown show-
cased the Court’s dual concerns about the means by which the con-
fession was obtained as well as the confession’s reliability. The means 
used, severe beatings, doubtless led to presumptively unreliable con-
fessions. As in Sparf, the issue turned on whether the external pres-
sures brought to bear on the defendant overcame the suspect’s abil-
ity to choose to confess freely. 
Only a few short years later, in Chambers v. Florida,41 the Court 
further explored the limits that Due Process placed on obtaining 
confessions. Following Isaiah Chambers’s arrest for the murder of an 
elderly man, the local sheriff threatened Chambers with the specter 
of mob violence and then took him to jail, purportedly for his own 
 
 37. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Brown was not the Court’s first confession case. Nearly 40 
years earlier, as discussed previously, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court 
utilized the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to reverse a federal convic-
tion. Even before Bram, the Court relied upon the common law rules of evidence prohibiting 
promises of leniency or threats to hold confessions inadmissible. The common law rule barring 
the admissibility of involuntary confessions emerged during the eighteenth century in England. 
Its development is chronicled in 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW  
§§ 817-820(C) (3d ed. 1940) and LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: 
THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968). In the United States, the Supreme Court 
first invoked the rule in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Reviewing a death sentence for a 
murder conviction in Hopt, Justice Harlan, without referring to any constitutional provision, 
concluded for a unanimous Court that the confession was voluntary and therefore admissible. 
See id.; cf. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (holding that the confessions 
of a person imprisoned and in irons, given under accusations of having committed a capital 
offense, are admissible in evidence if the confessions appear to have been made voluntarily and 
were not obtained by putting the suspect in fear or by making promises). 
 38. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 284. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 285-86. 
 41. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
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“safety.” At the jail, a barrage of officers questioned him continu-
ously for five days and an entire night before he made a “sunrise con-
fession.”42 A unanimous Court reversed Chambers’s conviction, ex-
plaining that the questioning occurred “under circumstances 
calculated to break the strongest nerves and the stoutest resis-
tance.”43 Essentially, because any person in Chambers’s position 
would likely have confessed, the Supreme Court determined that the 
confession was inadmissible. 
F. Policing the Police: Voluntariness as Fairness 
In both Bram and Chambers, the Supreme Court used “volun-
tariness” as the test for determining a confession’s reliability. If the 
confession was not the product of the suspect’s free will, it was likely 
not reliable. Of course, the Court could have chosen to permit the 
confession to have been adduced at trial and subjected to cross ex-
amination, but that may have undermined the suspect’s ability to rely 
effectively on the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 
While a voluntariness test made perfect sense in the Fifth Amend-
ment context, it perhaps translated less well to consideration under 
the Due Process Clause. What, under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
was the process due the suspect? Over time a subtle shift occurred. 
The voluntariness test evolved from a credibility determination into a 
means of assessing police interrogation practices. Voluntariness is a 
notoriously difficult concept to prove;44 whether the police misbe-
haved, however, is not. As a practical matter, the Court’s focus thus 
shifted from the defendant to the police—from whether the confes-
sion was reliable to whether the process employed to obtain the con-
fession was appropriate. For the Supreme Court, policing the police 
was a simpler task than trying accurately to assess the defendant’s 
state of mind. 
In Lisenba v. California,45 for example, the Court expressly 
stated that to meet due process requirements, the police would have 
 
 42. Id. at 235. 
 43. Id. at 238-39. 
 44. The test for determining voluntariness has been oft-criticized. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, 
Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570 (1984) (stating 
that in pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda days when the voluntariness test prevailed, “[a]lmost every-
thing was relevant, but almost nothing was decisive”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and 
the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867-78 (1981) (book review). 
 45. 314 U.S. 219 (1941). 
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to use methods that comported with concepts of fundamental fair-
ness to secure confessions.46 “The aim of the requirement of due 
process,” the Court explained, “[was] not to exclude presumptively 
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of 
evidence, whether true or false.”47 This marked a significant break 
with the past. If the confession was itself corroborated by evidence 
beyond the suspect’s statement, the reconstructed voluntariness test 
still enabled the Court to scrutinize police conduct and to suppress 
any resulting statement. The Court went so far as to proclaim in 
Rogers v. Richmond48 that the defendant’s statement must be evalu-
ated with “complete disregard of whether or not . . . [he] spoke the 
truth.”49 
The Court’s turn from credibility to process as the touchstone 
for voluntariness reached an apex in Spano v. New York,50 where the 
Court disapproved the police’s decision to use an officer, who was 
the accused’s longtime friend, to pressure him into confessing.51De-
fendant Spano allegedly shot a former professional boxer who had 
stolen his money and physically assaulted him. After the shooting, 
Spano disappeared, resurfacing only to call one Gaspar Bruno, a 
close friend of many years’ standing. In addition to being Spano’s 
friend, Bruno was also a fledgling police officer. According to 
Bruno’s testimony, Spano told him “that he took a terrific beating, 
that the deceased hurt him real bad and he dropped him a couple of 
times and he was dazed; he didn’t know what he was doing and that 
he went and shot at him.”52 Spano also informed Bruno that he in-
tended to get a lawyer and turn himself in. 
Spano was as good as his word, surrendering himself to the po-
lice the following day. Cautioned by his attorney not to talk, how-
ever, Spano repeatedly refused to answer the officers’ questions. Af-
ter it became apparent that Spano had listened to his counsel’s 
 
 46. See id. at 236. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
 49. Id. at 544. In Stein v. New York, , Justice Frankfurter wrote that judges must avoid 
being influenced by “the confirmation of details in the confession by reliable other evidence” 
or by a “feeling of certitude that the accused is guilty of the crime to which he confessed.” 
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 200 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 50. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 51. See id. at 323. 
 52. Id. at 317. 
ONE-FIN.DOC 5/20/00 7:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
198 
advice, the officers’ tactics changed. They called Bruno and in-
structed him to tell Spano that his earlier telephone call had gotten 
him (Bruno) “in a lot of trouble” with his superiors.53 Although 
Bruno thrice tried to get Spano to open up to him by telling him 
that his job was in jeopardy unless he confessed, Spano steadfastly re-
fused. Finally, on Bruno’s fourth try, Spano succumbed to his 
friend’s pleas to save his job and agreed to talk.54 
The Court’s opinion in Spano focuses both on the officers’ con-
duct (the repeated interrogation, the use of trickery) and Spano’s 
personal characteristics (his friendship with Bruno and his status as 
an immigrant). However, the Court concentrated more closely on 
the officers’ conduct in obtaining the confession than on whether 
Spano’s confession was credible.55 Spano, in one important respect, 
presaged Miranda. The Court disapproved of the officer’s interroga-
tion tactics, even though the credibility of Spano’s confession was 
never seriously questioned, the pressure on Spano was not inordi-
nate, and he did not seem to be an easily subverted defendant. 
G. Promulgating Rules of Engagement 
Since its first review of a state confession case in Brown, the 
Court increasingly patrolled police interrogation practices. The vol-
untariness test, based upon a review of the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the confession, enabled trial courts to scrutinize 
the process of obtaining confessions. Commencing with Haynes v. 
Washington,56 however, the Supreme Court began a steady drift away 
from the strict totality-of-the-circumstances test. In Haynes, the 
Court examined evidence of alleged police coercion in securing the 
defendant’s confession.57 The trial court had instructed the jury not 
to consider the fact that the police had not warned the defendant 
that he was under arrest, had a right to remain silent, or that he had 
a right to counsel in assessing whether the confession was volun-
tary.58 The trial court was not unreasonable in believing that volun-
tariness was quite independent of the defendant’s awareness of his 
 
53. Id. at 319. 
54. See id. 
55. Id. at 321-24. 
56. 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
57. See id. at 506. 
58. See id. at 514-15. 
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legal rights. The Supreme Court however, was not so sure and thus 
made perhaps its first stab at transforming police investigators into 
legal counsel. Although the Court did not find that the officers’ fail-
ure to warn the defendant of his rights created an independent 
ground for reversal, it did note that this omission raised a “serious 
and substantial question whether a proper constitutional standard 
was applied by the jury.”59 
If the Court was merely testing the waters in Haynes, it jumped 
in headfirst the following year in Massiah v. United States60 and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois.61 These cases became the ideological progenitors of 
Miranda. 
1. Massiah and the right to counsel 
Massiah turned on the admissibility of the defendant’s incrimi-
nating statements to a confederate who, without Massiah’s knowl-
edge, was cooperating with the police.62 Massiah made his state-
ments during an on-going investigation into a narcotics conspiracy in 
which he was deeply involved. Interestingly, Massiah made his slip of 
the tongue while on bail, after having retained counsel and pleaded 
not guilty to a narcotics offense.63 
The Supreme Court reversed his conviction despite the fact that 
Massiah suffered no (conventional) pressure and had no idea that he 
was speaking to a government informant. The Court explained that 
obtaining a statement in this manner violated Massiah’s right to as-
sistance of counsel.64 In effect, the Court created a rule that officers 
may not elicit information from a suspect represented by counsel if 
that counsel is not present. This was truly a remarkable decision. 
Aside from a reinterpretation (and extension) of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to assistance of counsel, it also marked the Court’s at-
tempt to craft rules of engagement for police. Taken to its logical ex-
treme, the Court’s decision in Massiah effectively prohibited the 
police from questioning represented parties. 
 
 59. Id. at 515. 
 60. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 61. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 62. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. 
 63. See id. at 202. 
 64. See id. at 207. 
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2. Escobedo and the erosion of the voluntariness test 
What Massiah did for the right to assistance of counsel, Escobedo 
v. Illinois 65 did for confessions. Escobedo is generally recognized as 
the beginning of the end for the voluntariness test. In Escobedo, the 
police questioned Danny Escobedo in connection with his brother-
in-law’s murder.66 Although the interrogation lasted for several hours 
before Escobedo’s attorney secured his release, he made no state-
ment. Shortly thereafter, the police learned from another suspect, 
one DiGerlando, that Escobedo had been the trigger man. The po-
lice again plucked Escobedo from the street and subjected him to in-
tense questioning. No fool, Escobedo asked to speak with his lawyer. 
In the meantime, unbeknownst to Escobedo, his attorney had un-
successfully attempted to contact him at the station where he was be-
ing held. When questioned, Escobedo declared that DiGerlando was 
a liar. One of the detectives challenged Escobedo to repeat that ac-
cusation to DiGerlando’s face and Escobedo agreed. When DiGer-
lando was brought in, Escobedo declared “I didn’t shoot Manuel, 
you did it.”67 Apparently ignorant of the concept of accomplice li-
ability, Escobedo’s statement implicated him in the murder. 
The Court’s reasoning in Escobedo departed significantly from 
previous cases in this area. The police had not used force or trickery 
to compel Escobedo’s statement; nor was Escobedo a “vulnerable 
victim.” Indeed, Escobedo had successfully resisted earlier attempts 
at questioning and had even retained counsel. In fact, the record 
showed that counsel had communicated to Escobedo what he 
“should do in the event of interrogation.”68 Thus, it could be argued 
that Escobedo had sage advice from counsel and had endeavored to 
follow that advice. In examining the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding Escobedo’s inculpatory statement, it would be difficult 
to find that the statement was, in the conventional sense, the prod-
uct of coercion. 
The Court nevertheless disagreed. In a five-to-four decision, the 
Court reversed the conviction and held the statement inadmissible: 
 
 
 65. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 66. See id. at 479. 
 67. Id. at 483. 
 68. Id. at 485 n.5. 
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We hold . . . that where . . . the investigation . . . has begun to fo-
cus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police 
custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends 
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has re-
quested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, 
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute con-
stitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied “the 
Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . .69 
By ignoring the actual circumstances surrounding the interroga-
tion and focusing instead on Escobedo’s ignorance of the law, the 
Court laid the foundation for the right to counsel during custodial 
interrogation and thus opened the door to Miranda. 
III. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA:70 DECISION AND MYTH 
A. The Confession 
Ernesto Miranda seemed to be an appropriate poster boy for 
championing individual liberties in the face of untoward police inter-
rogation tactics.71 He allegedly kidnapped and brutally raped an 
eighteen-year-old woman.72 Although Miranda’s alleged victim failed 
to identify him in a police line-up, the investigating officers used a 
bit of trickery to elicit a confession.73 When Miranda asked how he 
had done after the line-up, the police disingenuously replied “you 
flunked.”74 Believing (incorrectly) that the victim had positively iden-
tified him in the line-up, Miranda resignedly confessed not only to 
the rape for which he was arrested, but also to the robbery and at-
 
 69. Id. at 490-91. 
 70. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 71. So were any of the defendants in Miranda’s three companion cases, Vignera v. New 
York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). According to 
the Court, each of the four cases shared certain “salient features,” among them “incommuni-
cado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
445. Instead of receiving Miranda warnings, we could easily be discussing Vignera, Westover, 
or Stewart warnings. 
 72. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 12 (1983). In his excellent 
article on § 3501 and Dickerson, Paul Cassell describes, apparently for the first time, many of 
the details surrounding Miranda’s confession. See Paul Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 
U.S.C. 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 186-90 (1999). 
 73. See BAKER, supra note 72, at 12. 
 74. Id. 
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tempted rape of a second victim and to the attempted robbery of a 
third woman.75 Miranda hand-wrote a complete confession and then 
signed a prepared statement admitting that he had voluntarily con-
fessed “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any 
statement I make may be used against me.”76 No evidence suggested 
that the police in any way “forced” Miranda to respond to police 
questioning. 
Miranda’s confession readily complied with then-existing stan-
dards for voluntariness. Unlike the defendant in Bram,77 he was not 
tortured into confessing. One of the officers in fact testified that he 
told Miranda that he was not required to answer their questions.78 In 
contrast to Chambers, he was not held for hours or subjected to a 
barrage of questions by numerous law enforcement officers. Instead, 
Miranda was held for fewer than two hours and questioned during 
normal business hours by only two officers.79 He was subjected to 
none of the usual deprivations suffered by those who had been 
“compelled” to confess.80 Miranda’s confession thus did not seem a 
likely candidate for suppression. 
B. The Decision 
Why did the Court demand that Miranda’s confession be sup-
pressed? Because the Court implicitly found that a custodial confes-
sion was tantamount to a compelled confession. The Court stressed 
that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interroga-
tion . . . contains inherently compelling pressures which work to un-
dermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would otherwise not do so freely.”81 The Court’s concern 
was plainly not with so-called third-degree tactics, which were “un-
doubtedly the exception now.”82 Instead, the Court struggled with 
the very existence of custodial interrogation. “An individual swept 
 
 75. See id. at 13. 
 76. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (internal punctuation omitted). 
 77. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
 78. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491 n.66. 
 79. See id. at 518-19 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 80. Chief Justice Warren noted that “[i]n these cases, we might not find the defendants’ 
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms.” Id. at 457. 
 81. Id. at 467 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 447. Indeed, Justice Harlan furthered observed that “[p]eaceful interrogation 
is not one of the dark moments of the law.” Id. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by an-
tagonistic forces, and subjected to . . . techniques of persuasion,” the 
Court explained, “cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to 
speak.”83 To buttress this factual determination in which it equated 
custodial interrogation with coercion, the Court did little more than 
survey police manuals to paint a picture of police interrogation prac-
tices;84 trot out the then thirty-plus year old Wickersham Report, 
which described alleged third-degree tactics used by police in the 
1930s;85 and rehash anecdotal evidence gleaned from individual 
cases.86 While there is assuredly some common-sense truth to the ex-
istence of an inherently coercive atmosphere whenever the police 
question a suspect, the Court broke new ground with the breadth of 
its holding. “[N]ever,” as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent, 
has the Fifth Amendment “been thought to forbid all pressure to in-
criminate one’s self in the situations covered by it.”87 Nor had the 
Court ever found a confession produced during an unwarned inter-
rogation necessarily to be involuntary. 
Acknowledging that it might not have found Miranda’s state-
ments “to have been involuntary in traditional terms,” the Court ex-
plained that this did not obviate the need “for adequate safeguards 
to protect” the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination.88 And what were those “procedural safeguards?” Bor-
rowing a page from that champion of individual liberties, J. Edgar 
Hoover, the Court held that, prior to any custodial interrogation, 
the police must warn a suspect that “he has a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be used . . . against him, and 
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained 
or appointed.”89 Failure to abide by the warnings would result in the 
automatic exclusion of any statements obtained by the police: “the 
prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial in-
terrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of proce-
dural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
 
 83. Id. at 461. 
 84. See id. at 448-55. 
 85. See id. at 445, 447-48. 
 86. See id. at 445-47. 
 87. Id. at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 457. 
 89. Id. at 444; see also id. at 479, 483 n.54. 
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incrimination.”90 Rather than granting those warnings indispensibil-
ity, the Court-prescribed warnings were required only in the absence 
of “other fully effective means . . . devised to inform accused persons 
of their right to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it.”91 
The Court rendered entirely irrelevant a suspect’s personal traits. 
A serious criticism of the voluntariness test focused on the fact that a 
suspect who was unfamiliar with his rights as a result of inadequate 
education, inferior economic status, or emotional or mental instabil-
ity, was at a serious disadvantage with respect to the more sophisti-
cated criminal defendant.92 Consequently, the Court directed that 
the warnings be uniformly administered without any consideration of 
the accused’s age, status, experience, or any other criterion examined 
under the traditional voluntariness test.93 If the police neglected to 
inform the suspect of his rights prior to questioning, any statement 
secured thereafter would be held inadmissible.94 
The Court plainly viewed the arrested suspect from a different 
perspective than had commonly been held in the past. Earlier Court 
decisions had always envisioned—rightly or wrongly—an intelligent 
citizen-suspect, perfectly able to resist standard police questioning 
and unwilling, absent threats or fabricated promises of leniency, to 
falsely confess to the commission of a crime. The Court rejected this 
idealized conception of the criminal suspect as a hardy citizen. “No 
amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been 
aware of this right will suffice,” the Court declared.95 “Only through 
such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was 
aware of this right.”96 
That the warnings were more a remedy than a constitutional 
command is evidenced by the fact that the Court admitted, within 
certain parameters, that legislatures could develop their own rules to 
safeguard the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. “It is 
 
 90. Id. at 444. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 60 TUL. L. REV. 2195 
(1996); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize 
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987). 
 93. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 94. See id. at 493. 
 95. Id. at 471-72. 
 96. Id. 
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impossible,” the majority explained, “for us to foresee the potential 
alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by 
Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making 
capacities.”97 Apparently expecting some sort of legislative response, 
the Court thus refused to “say that the Constitution necessarily re-
quires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compul-
sions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.”98Un-
til such time as the legislature acted, however, it was up to the Court 
to devise a means of safeguarding the right because “the issues pre-
sented are of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by 
the courts.”99 The means the Court chose, of course, involved the 
warnings provision. Essentially, the Court adopted an anticipatory 
remedy to prevent the possible violation of the Fifth Amendment 
right. 
While Courts traditionally had balanced the individual’s right to 
privacy and personal autonomy against society’s general need for 
protection, the Miranda Court abandoned any such balancing no-
tion and assumed what was a radical posture: treating the self-
incrimination right as absolute and inviolable. Waivers of these 
rights, though permissible, were to be viewed with suspicion. “If the 
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a 
statement is taken,” the Court stressed, “a heavy burden rests on the 
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intel-
ligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to 
retained or appointed counsel.”100 If the suspect refuses to waive her 
rights, the police must halt questioning.101 
An important thread running through the Court’s opinion is that 
the warnings serve as a device that protects the underlying substan-
tive right. As Professor David Strauss has observed, Miranda “reads 
more like a legislative committee report with an accompanying stat-
ute” than a judicial decision.102 The Miranda majority in fact ac-
knowledged that its decision was a bit out of the ordinary and that a 
legislature might be a more appropriate authority to deal with the 
 
 97. Id. at 467. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 490. 
 100. Id. at 475 (citation omitted). 
 101. See id. at 474-77. 
 102. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 
(1988). 
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problem confronting the Court: “[i]t is . . . urged upon us that we 
withhold decision on this issue until state legislative bodies and advi-
sory groups have had an opportunity to deal with these problems by 
rule-making.”103 To this challenge, the Court responded: 
We have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require 
any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against 
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the 
States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so 
long as they are fully as effective as those described above in in-
forming accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a 
continuous opportunity to exercise it.104 
In other words, the Court admitted that, within certain parame-
ters, legislatures could develop their own rules to safeguard the self-
incrimination privilege. For, as the Court explained, “[w]here rights 
secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-
making or legislation which would abrogate them.”105 These some-
what cryptic, seemingly self-contradictory statements have fueled the 
debate about whether the Court believed the warnings were them-
selves compelled by the Fifth Amendment. 
I think it is fair to say that while the Court did not consider the 
specific set of warnings it adopted as constitutionally compelled, it 
anticipated that some prophylactic device would be legislated to deal 
with the problem. Miranda is best viewed as having adopted a 
means of enforcing the privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
in the face of repeated violations. Essentially, the Court simply 
adopted a practical, easily administered means of safeguarding the 
right: 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of 
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning 
as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to 
inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his 
rights without a warning being given.106 
Because the warnings were not themselves constitutional guaran-
tees, the Court could clarify that Miranda “in no way creates a con-
 
 103. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490-91. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 491. 
 106. Id. at 468. 
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stitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, 
nor is it intended to have this effect.”107 As opposed to thinking it 
had rendered the final word on the subject, the Court wanted to en-
courage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search 
for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individ-
ual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.108 
The sole caveat was that “unless we are shown other procedures 
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their 
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it, the following [Miranda] safeguards must be observed.”109 
C. The Loyal Opposition 
Each of the three dissenting opinions took a slightly different 
view of the case. Justice Clark, who dissented in part and concurred 
in the result of one of the cases, took issue with the Court’s replace-
ment of the traditional voluntariness test. He questioned the Court’s 
evidence relating to the inherently coercive nature of police ques-
tioning, believing that the Court had not “fairly characterized” po-
lice officers’ efforts.110 Justice Clark, who was not joined by the other 
dissenters, merely advocated that the courts continue to adhere to 
the voluntariness test.111 
Justice Harlan was more resolute in his dissent. He offered that 
the Court’s decision “represents poor constitutional law and entails 
harmful consequences for the country at large.”112 As constitutional 
law, Harlan explained that the Court’s decision broke with past in-
terpretations of the Fifth Amendment and failed to establish any 
principled basis for extending that Amendment to police interroga-
tions.113 He further assailed the opinion as having a necessarily dele-
terious effect on law enforcement and being based on precious little 
solid evidence.114 He chided the Court for not allowing legislatures 
time to consider various solutions, noting that “legislative reform is 
rarely speedy or unanimous . . . but [has] . . . the vast advantage of 
 
 107. Id. at 467. 
 108. See id. at 467. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 111. See id. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 113. See id. at 506-15 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 114. See id. at 515-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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empirical data and comprehensive study, [ ] would allow experimen-
tation and use of solutions not open to courts, and [ ] would restore 
the initiative in criminal law reform to those forums where it truly 
belongs.”115 
Justice White, too, challenged the decision’s historical footings, 
arguing that neither the text nor the tradition of the Fifth Amend-
ment provided any basis for the Court’s decision: “[T]he Court’s 
holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by 
the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and 
English legal history, and involves a departure from a long line of 
precedent . . . .”116 While Justice White had no problem with the 
Court “legislating” rules on the basis of purely speculative facts, he 
did believe that the “advisability of its end product” demanded ex-
ploration.117 And in his view, that product was found wanting. He 
dissected the Court’s determination that all custodial interrogations 
were necessarily coercive, and found it irrational.118 He pointed out 
that “if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question 
such as ‘Where were you last night?’ without having his answer be a 
compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to 
the question of whether he wants to consult . . . counsel . . . ?”119 He 
also observed that “for all the Court’s expounding on the menacing 
atmosphere of police interrogation procedures, it has failed to supply 
any foundation for the conclusions it draws or the measures it 
adopts.”120 Justice White explained: 
I see nothing wrong or immoral, and certainly nothing unconstitu-
tional, in the police’s asking a suspect whom they have reasonable 
cause to arrest whether or not he killed his wife or in confronting  
 
 
 
 
 115. Id. at 524 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan noted in summary: “The foray 
which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise and farsighted words of Mr. Justice 
Jackson . . . ‘This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and 
the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.’ ” Id. at 526 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., 
separate opinion)). 
 116. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. (White, J., dissenting). 
 118. See id. at 532-37 (White, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting).  
 120. Id. (White, J., dissenting). 
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him with the evidence on which the arrest was based, at least where 
he has been plainly advised that he may remain completely silent.121 
In concluding that the warnings represented poor public policy, 
Justice White predicted that “[i]n some unknown number of cases 
the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the 
streets . . . to repeat his crime whenever it pleases him.”122 
D. Untangling Miranda 
Despite the Court’s solemn pronouncement that Miranda 
touched upon fundamental constitutional principles, a mere week af-
ter the decision was handed down, the Court ruled in Johnson v. New 
Jersey123 that both Miranda and Escobedo were to have prospective 
application only.124 The theory uniting these decisions was based 
upon the Court’s conclusion that Miranda had not supplanted the 
voluntariness test (at least with respect to trials pre-dating Miranda), 
but had simply furnished additional protections to “guarantee full 
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.”125 Miranda 
was thus not viewed as a repudiation of the voluntariness test, but 
simply as a refinement of that test. “[T]he nonretroactivity of these 
decisions,” the majority noted, “will not preclude persons whose tri-
als have already been completed from invoking the same safeguards 
as part of an involuntariness claim.”126 A defendant may not have 
been entitled to invoke Miranda per se, but could nonetheless argue 
that the absence of Miranda warnings tended to make his confession 
involuntary. 
This conception of Miranda warnings as prophylactic rules 
rather than rights is echoed in Davis v. North Carolina.127 In Davis, 
the petitioner was convicted of a rape and murder.128 The Court rec-
ognized that “[t]he sole issue presented for review is whether the 
confessions were voluntarily given or were the result of overbearing 
 
 121. Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 122. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). 
 123. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
 124. See id. at 721. 
 125. Id. at 729. 
 126. Id. at 730. 
 127. 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 
 128. See id. at 738. 
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by police authorities.”129 Observing that Miranda did not apply due 
to the nonretroactive nature of the decision, the Court explained 
that whether comparable warnings were given “is a significant factor 
in considering the voluntariness of statements later made.”130 Upon 
its examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
confession, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s confession was 
not voluntary, but the product of police coercion.131 
The Court’s decision in Davis highlighted the fact that the 
Miranda warnings were not exactly a constitutional mandate, but in-
stead served as a pragmatic safeguard to protect the defendant’s con-
stitutional rights. In part, these cases presaged the Court’s later hold-
ings that, for example, a confession taken in violation of Miranda, 
but nevertheless not involuntary, could be used for impeachment 
purposes.132 More will be said about this later. Let us turn now to 
Congress’s reaction to Miranda. 
IV. CONGRESS RESPONDS: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 
Justice White’s ominous prediction in Miranda turned out to be 
prescient. Escalating crime rates became the byword for the 1968 
presidential election.133 Politicians latched on to the fact that fear of 
crime elects candidates with tough-on-crime agendas. As a political 
sop to quiet the cries of those clamoring for federal action on the 
crime problem, President Lyndon Johnson, in February 1967, pro-
posed a legislative package authorizing substantial federal grants to 
state and local governments to improve law enforcement efforts.134 
Although loaded with plenty of vote-getting pork, the President’s 
proposed legislation did not propose any significant legal reforms. 
Those were to come later. 
 
 129. Id. at 739. 
 130. Id. at 740. 
 131. See id. at 739, 752-53. 
 132. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 226 (1971). 
 133. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report reported that from 1958 to 1964 “the incidence 
of crime had been growing six times faster than the American population.” BAKER, supra note 
72, at 39. 
 134. See ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT 1-3 (1970); 
RICHARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 15-20 (1969). 
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A. The Legislation 
Whether Miranda had truly contributed to spiking crime rates, 
Congress accepted the Court’s gracious invitation to “develop [its] 
own safeguards for the privilege.”135 As a result of presidentially-
sponsored crime reports calling for increased assistance to state and 
local law enforcement,136 Congressman Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) in-
troduced President Johnson’s legislation in the House to provide 
federal assistance grants to law enforcement.137 This bill was immedi-
ately referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which changed the 
bill’s name to the “Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Act,” a 
foreshadowing of events to come.138 Although the House bill signifi-
cantly expanded federal monetary assistance to local law enforce-
ment,139 it did not contain any of the provisions relating to Miranda 
(or, in fact, to any of the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure cases). 
At roughly the same time, Senator John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) in-
troduced the corresponding Senate version of the bill.140 It, too, 
lacked the Miranda provisions. The House bill, unencumbered by 
legal reforms and spurred on by parochial interests to subsidize local 
law enforcement, was the first to emerge from floor debate and was 
referred to the Senate. 
 
 135. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). 
 136. The Executive Branch sponsored three influential crime reports that, at least in part, 
spurred Congress to enact crime-control legislation. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRIME 
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT (1966); FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT—CRIME IN 
THE UNITED STATES—1967; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT—THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 
(1967). Although the reports called for greater federal assistance in local crime control, none 
deduced a link between rising crime rates and Supreme Court decisions affording criminal de-
fendants greater protection. One report, in fact, disavowed any “satisfactory proof of a causal 
relationship between the increasing crime rate and restraints on police interrogation.” 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 613 (1966). The 
National Report, however, stated that “it is too early to assess the effect of the Miranda deci-
sion on law enforcement’s ability to secure confessions and to solve crimes.” THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, quoted in BAKER, supra note 72, at 203. Several on the Com-
mission nevertheless urged that further study be devoted to determining whether such a link 
existed.  
 137. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-5037 (1967), reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 3113 (1967). 
 138. See Safe Streets, Gun Control Bills Stalled, 25 CONG. Q. 2380 (1967). 
 139. The House legislation was designed to significantly expand the reach of the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-197, 79 Stat. 828 (1965), as amended by 
Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-798, 80 Stat. 1506 (1966), repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-
83, 87 Stat. 207 (1978). 
 140. See S. REP. NO. 90-917 (1967), reprinted in 113 CONG. REC. 2886 (1967). 
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Senator McClellan supported the President’s bill, agreeing that 
“[p]rograms to better train and equip our police personnel are 
needed.”141 He did not, however, believe that the President’s bill was 
an adequate response to the rising tide of crime: 
The war on crime must be waged on many fronts. . . . Court deci-
sions that . . . protect and liberate guilty and confirmed criminals to 
pursue and repeat their nefarious crimes should be reversed and 
overruled. 
. . . 
. . . [N]o matter how much money we appropriate for local police 
departments, we will not have effective law enforcement so long as 
the courts allow self-confessed killers to go unpunished. The confu-
sion and disarray injected into law enforcement by such decisions 
as . . . Escobedo . . . and Miranda . . . are deplorable and demoraliz-
ing.142 
To shore up the President’s bill, Senator McClellan introduced 
what was to become Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 
Senate Bill 917, an act devoted to govern the admissibility of evi-
dence in federal courts.143 This bill was referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary as a separate bill challenging the Supreme 
Court’s Miranda decision by directing the federal courts to admit 
confessions pursuant to the voluntariness standard.144 Pursuant to 
the McClellan bill, whether a person had been advised of her rights 
prior to questioning was to be considered by a court in determining 
a confession’s voluntariness, but was only one of a number of factors 
to be weighed.145 The proposed legislation also contained a provision 
removing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases involving a confes-
sion’s voluntariness.146 
 
 
 141. 114 CONG. REC. 11,200 (1968). 
 142. Id. at 11,200-01. 
 143. Senator McClellan had introduced several anti-crime measures, several of which 
were ultimately incorporated into the Omnibus package approved by Congress. See Hearings 
on S. 674, S. 917, et. al., Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 2-3 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et. al]. 
 144. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123-24. 
 145. See id. at 47, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2123. 
 146. See id. 
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McClellan’s proposal, which was not without controversy, was 
insufficient to appease certain senators, however, because some 
members (led by Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.)) banded together to 
cosponsor a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment: 
[t]o provide that the voluntary admission of the confession of the 
accused in a criminal prosecution shall be admissible against him in 
any court sitting anywhere in the United States, and that the ruling 
of a trial judge admitting an admission or confession as voluntarily 
made shall not be reversed or otherwise disturbed by the Supreme 
Court . . . if such ruling is supported by competent evidence. . . .147  
Senator Ervin sponsored the amendment because, while he “fa-
vor[ed] the substance” of McClellan’s bill, he doubted whether 
Congress could, by “a simple legislative enactment,” alter the Su-
preme Court’s criminal procedure rulings.148 The other members’ in-
tentions are not clear. The mere fact that an amendment was pro-
posed might suggest that at least some in Congress may have 
believed that such was required to alter the Court’s decision. It is 
equally possible, however, that supporters simply wanted to be 
viewed as “correcting” the Court in a high profile manner. 
Shortly after introducing the resolution, Senator Ervin decided 
there was an even more “direct route” to “rectify the problem” cre-
ated by the Supreme Court’s imaginative criminal procedure juris-
prudence: simply remove the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases in-
volving the admissibility of confessions.149 Senator Ervin thus 
introduced a bill to remove federal courts’ jurisdiction to reverse or 
otherwise modify district courts’ decisions admitting voluntarily 
given confessions.150 The legislation further prevented the Supreme 
Court from disturbing the judgment of a state’s highest tribunal that 
had declared a confession to have been made voluntarily.151Regard-
less, with a proposed constitutional amendment and several distinct 
pieces of legislation before it, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws and Procedures conducted a hearing to 
evaluate the various proposals.152 
 
 147. 113 CONG. REC. S628, S636-39 (1967).  
 148. Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et. al, supra note 143, at 4. 
 149. See id. at 5. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 4. 
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B. The Senate Subcommittee Hearings 
Senator McClellan took the lead at the subcommittee hearings 
by remarking that he was “unequivocally convinced . . . that some-
thing must be done to alleviate the baleful effects of the Supreme 
Court’s 5-4 Miranda decision.”153 Senator Ervin echoed Senator 
McClellan in identifying the Supreme Court’s recent criminal proce-
dure decisions as culprits in escalating crime rates: “[T]here is no 
question that these decisions have resulted in the freeing of multi-
tudes of criminals of undoubted guilt and have unduly hampered le-
gitimate law enforcement activities. The situation must be rectified 
and the duty to do so devolves rightly upon the Congress.”154 
Contrary to claims that the Senate was merely playing on crime 
fears, the Committee had before it some evidence that Miranda had 
adversely affected criminal law enforcement. Then Philadelphia Dis-
trict Attorney (now Senator) Arlen Specter revealed the startling re-
sults of a study conducted by his office to assess Miranda’s effects, 
reporting that “[f]or a period after Miranda, out of 5,220 suspects 
arrested for serious crimes, 3,095 refused to give a statement.”155 
 This translated into only “41 percent” of suspects willing to 
make statements in the wake of Miranda and Escobedo, which repre-
sented a “49 percent” decrease since the latter case was decided.156
 Charles E. Moylan, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore, similarly 
reported “we used to get . . . [confessions] in 20 to 25 percent of 
our cases, and now we are getting . . . [them] in 2 percent of our  
 
 
 153. Id. at 3. 
 154. Id. at 4. 
 155. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 42 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128. 
 156. Id. Aaron Koota, the District Attorney for Kings County, New York, and Frank S. 
Hogan, the New York County District Attorney, reported a similar decrease in confessions. Id. 
at 42, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128-29. The Subcommittee, of course, was not 
tethered solely to the testimony presented during the hearing; the Subcommittee also gleaned 
much of its information from the “mass of evidence . . . much of which is printed in the tran-
script of hearings.” Id. at 46, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132. In fact, the Sub-
committee reported that: 
Instance after instance are documented in the transcript where the most vicious 
criminals have gone unpunished, even though they had voluntarily confessed their 
guilt. The transcript and subcommittee files contain testimony and statements from 
District attorneys, police chiefs, and other law enforcement officers in cities and 
towns all over the country, demonstrating beyond doubt the devastating effect upon 
the rights of society of the Miranda decision. 
Id. 
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cases. The confession as a law enforcement instrument has been vir-
tually eliminated.”157 
A great deal of statistical information was presented to the Sub-
committee on both sides of the issue; but by far the greater weight 
of testimony suggested that Miranda (and Escobedo) had seriously 
hampered law enforcement efforts.158 Moreover, the Committee had 
testimony demonstrating that the Court’s vision of custodial interro-
gation did not remotely reflect reality.159 Although it is true that the 
hearing was tilted in favor of the law enforcement community, this 
was in part a result of the Subcommittee’s need to collect informa-
tion about Miranda’s effect on law enforcement efforts. Who better 
to ask than those in the law enforcement profession? But the sub-
committee did not limit itself merely to live testimony. In addition, 
the Subcommittee sought letters and supplemental information from 
various sources to complete the record and, with respect to the con-
stitutionality of the Miranda warnings, had before it the testimony 
of witnesses who plainly believed the warnings, or some variant 
thereof, were required. 
The Judiciary Committee thus attempted to fill the alleged gaps 
in the earlier presidential reports by establishing a link between the 
Supreme Court’s recent criminal procedure jurisprudence and the 
escalation in crime rates. Testimony adduced at the hearing sug-
gested that such a link existed. If indeed Miranda had frustrated law 
enforcement efforts, the next issue was whether Congress had the 
power to do anything about it. 
The Subcommittee took to heart the testimony of Chief Judge J. 
Edward Lumbard, of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. Judge Lumbard testified that: 
The legislative process is far better calculated to set standards and 
rules by statute than is the process of announcing principles 
through court decision in particular cases where the facts are lim-
 
 157. Id. at 46, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132.  
 158. See generally id. at 42-47, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128-33. Indeed, 
even some commentators who suggested that the Supreme Court’s criminal decisions had little 
effect upon law enforcement acknowledged the limitations of their study methodology. See, 
e.g., id. at 44, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2130 (“[W]e are not prepared to say 
that these decisions have not impaired the efficiency in law enforcement in areas which are at 
this moment not subject to accurate measurement.”) (citation omitted). 
 159. District Attorney Specter testified that “the so-called third-degree method deplored 
by the Supreme Court . . . is not a correct portrayal of what actually goes on in police stations 
across the country.” Id. at 47-48, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2134. 
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ited. The legislative process is better adapted to seeing the situation 
in all its aspects and establishing a system and rules which can gov-
ern a multitude of different cases. 
Judges seldom have before them all those who are the best in-
formed regarding practical problems and the difficulties in living 
with any proposed change in the law. Judges usually are advised 
only by the parties in the case; the parties want to win in the case 
and do not always care about general principles of wider applica-
tion. 
. . . [I]t is because the Congress and the legislatures of the states 
have taken so little action in the field of criminal justice that the 
courts have more and more chosen to lay down rules which have 
the force of law until changed, and which all too frequently come 
to us in the form of new constitutional principles which then can 
be modified only by constitutional amendment.160 
The implication, at least to some senators, was that the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncements were not grounded in the constitution, but 
were instead predicated on the need to establish remedies for the 
violation of constitutional rights. When pointedly asked, however, 
whether the Court’s invitation in Miranda, which “encourag[ed] 
Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increas-
ingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while 
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws,”161 “open[ed] 
the door for legislation which would permit our avoiding the consti-
tutional amendment process,”162 Judge Lumbard replied: “No, I 
don’t think it permits you to do that.”163 However, he qualified his 
denial by acknowledging that Congress could enact legislation that 
was a “suitable substitute for the requirements laid down by the Su-
preme Court.”164 The full exchange between Judge Lumbard and 
Senator McClellan respecting this point warrants consideration: 
Senator McClellan: If they [a majority of the Justices] base the 
Miranda decision strictly on constitutional issues, I don’t under-
 
 160. Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et al., supra note 143, at 184 (statement of Chief Judge 
J. Edward Lumbard, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). 
 161. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 162. Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, et al., supra note 143, at 195.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 196. 
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stand how you could write a statute that did not do everything the 
Court has said must be done. And if you do that, you destroy eve-
rything that you seek to attain anyhow. 
Judge Lumbard: Unless you find some suitable substitute for the 
requirements laid down by the Supreme Court. . . 
Senator McClellan: They [a majority of the Justices] wouldn’t ac-
cept it as suitable unless it accomplished the destruction that this 
decision does. They say it is based on the Constitution. I don’t 
know how you can do it. They say you have got to do these things. 
Well, how can you do less if the Constitution requires this be 
done?165 
Senator McClellan plainly grasped the important point: if the 
warnings were themselves constitutionally required, Congress could 
not modify them. Judge Lumbard, in contrast, appeared to suggest 
that provided Congress established warnings that were a “suitable 
substitute,” Congress was free to alter the Miranda warning. While 
the “devil is in the details” of what constituted a suitable substitute, 
the two men do not appear to have been at cross purposes in their 
understanding of the Court’s decision. In responding to a question 
from Senator Hugh Scott, Judge Lumbard tried to clarify his under-
standing of what Congress could, and could not achieve without re-
sorting to the amendment process: “No; I don’t think [Miranda’s 
language encouraging Congress to establish other procedures safe-
guarding Fifth Amendment rights] permits you to [overturn 
Miranda without initiating the amendment process], but there cer-
tainly is a wide area which obviously the Court has not covered in its 
opinion in the Miranda cases.”166 He elaborated that Congress could 
legislate with respect to: 
the matter of questioning before a person is in custody . . . the 
manner in which the defendant or suspect is handled while he is in 
custody . . . . The way in which the warning is given, the record 
that is made, the presence of other people . . . these are obviously 
the next questions that are going to be raised in contested cases.167 
 
 
 165. Id. at 196-97. 
 166. Id. at 195 
 167. Id. at 195-96 
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Though the implication of Judge Lumbard’s testimony is that 
some sort of warnings were constitutionally required, even he 
seemed to acknowledge room for congressional action. 
Judge Alexander Holtzoff ’s testimony was more direct, eschew-
ing the notion that Congress could legislatively modify the 
Miranda’s warnings: 
Of course, the Escobedo and Miranda cases are in a different class 
[than the McNabb-Mallory line] in one important respect. They are 
based on the Constitution. They hold that the Constitution re-
quires these warnings. Therefore, it would take a constitutional 
amendment, unless the Supreme Court overrules itself, whereas, 
the Mallory rule being purely a procedural rule, can be changed by 
legislation.168 
Judge Holtzoff therefore believed that Miranda could be over-
ruled only by constitutional amendment. 
Of course, even Judge Holtzoff did not testify that Congress was 
bound by the precise rules laid down by the Court, or that, even if 
warnings of some sort were required, failure to follow those warnings 
to the letter would necessarily demand the exclusion of otherwise 
admissible evidence. 
In the end, the Subcommittee maintained that Congress, better 
positioned to gather a broad variety of facts, could modify the rules 
established by the Court without trenching upon the Court’s consti-
tutional theory.169 California Attorney General Thomas C. Lynch 
elaborated on this understanding: 
The bill under consideration sets out factors bearing on the volun-
tariness of confessions. If findings of fact are made by Congress 
that demonstrate the relevance and importance of these factors, and 
their superiority over the rules laid down in Miranda, it would 
seem that the Court would have little choice but to defer to the 
expert judgment of Congress. Accordingly, I consider the bill con-
stitutional . . . .170 
If, as Judge Lumbard had suggested, courts were merely filling 
the gaps created by inattentive legislators, it was time for those same 
elected representatives to act. And act they did. 
 
 168. Id. at 264. 
 169. See id. 
 170. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2133. 
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C. The Judiciary Committee Report 
Informed by the Subcommittee hearing, the Judiciary Commit-
tee ultimately abandoned the more radical path of pursuing a consti-
tutional amendment to “discipline” the judiciary. Instead, the 
Committee consolidated the Senate Bill affecting the Court’s juris-
diction and criminal procedure decisions with the House-passed 
crime legislation providing financial assistance to local law enforce-
ment into a single omnibus package. The attraction of such a pack-
age, especially in the Senate, was to link the more controversial pro-
visions affecting the Court with the hugely popular sections 
providing additional funding for state and local law enforcement. 
Upon voting out the omnibus crime package, the Judiciary Commit-
tee published a lengthy report on the bill, explaining that: 
[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals who have 
voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere technicali-
ties. The traditional right of the people to have their prosecuting 
attorneys place in evidence before juries the voluntary confessions 
and incriminating statements made by defendants simply must be 
restored.171 
In other words, Miranda’s days as an exclusive anticipatory rem-
edy were numbered. The Committee Report cited the “rigid and in-
flexible requirements” established in Miranda and decried them as 
“unreasonable, unrealistic, and extremely harmful to law enforce-
ment.”172 The Committee refused to give constitutional status to the 
Miranda decision. Recognizing Miranda as “an abrupt departure 
from precedent extending back at least to the earliest days of the Re-
public,” the Report sought to return the sole test of admissibility to 
one of a “totality of circumstances.”173 In the Committee’s view, the 
decision’s radical break with the past could not possibly be constitu-
tional mandate. 
The Committee was not entirely dismissive of the Court’s con-
cerns in erecting the Miranda safeguards, however. Mindful of the 
need to protect individual liberties, the Report explained that the 
Committee “is of the view that the [proposed] legislation . . . would 
 
 171. Id. at 37, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2123. 
 172. Id. at 46, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132. Numerous studies were 
cited demonstrating Miranda’s harmful effect on the prosecution of crime. See id. at 39, 42, 
45, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2125, 2128, 2131-32. 
 173. Id. at 48, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2134. 
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be an effective way of protecting the rights of the individual and 
would promote efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”174 “[A] 
civilized society,” the Report commented, “could not be more fair to 
persons accused of crime, as the constitutional rights of defendants 
in criminal cases would be fully protected and respected by the safe-
guards in this proposed legislation.”175 How would this be accom-
plished? At least in part by incorporating the Miranda warnings into 
the statute itself. The Committee Report thus refused to dismiss the 
warnings out of hand. Rather, those same warnings, while not dispo-
sitive, remained important indicators of a confession’s voluntariness. 
The Committee, moreover, was sufficiently sanguine to recog-
nize that “a few have expressed the view that legislation by Congress 
restoring the voluntariness test to the admissibility of confessions and 
incriminating statements would be declared unconstitutional, on the 
ground that the provisions do not measure up to the rigid standards 
set forth in Miranda.”176 Miranda’s constitutional status was thus an 
issue of considerable debate. Both sides pounced upon language in 
the opinion to buttress their arguments. In testifying before the Ju-
diciary Committee, one of the original bill’s cosponsors, Senator Er-
vin, explained: 
Although I favor the substance of [what became Title II] and 
strongly feel it is preferable to the present situation, I do not be-
lieve the problem can be rectified by such a simple legislative en-
actment. It is true that the Miranda opinion invites legislative ac-
tion on the subject of police interrogation practices. However, the 
restrictions set forth in that decision and the Escobedo decision are 
said to be required by the Constitution, and hence any legislative 
enactment might be deemed by the Supreme Court to be unconsti-
tutional to the extent that it failed to embody rules of police con-
duct at least as restrictive as those favored in the Miranda and 
Escobedo decisions.177 
Ervin articulated what came to be the minority view: that the 
Constitution required the Miranda warnings and Congress could 
not dispense with them short of a constitutional amendment. Any-
thing else, dissenters argued, risked judicial invalidation. A majority 
 
 174. Id. at 51, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137. 
 175. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137. 
 176. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137. 
 177. Hearings on S. 674, S. 970, et al., supra note 143, at 4. 
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of the Committee, however, was willing to take that risk given that 
four justices had dissented in Miranda and that “the overwhelming 
weight of judicial opinion in this country is that the voluntariness 
test does not offend the Constitution or deprive a defendant of any 
constitutional right.”178 The majority believed that the warnings 
simply were not constitutionally required. Exhibiting a good sense of 
real politik, the Report observed that “[n]o one can predict with any 
assurance what the Supreme Court might at some future date decide 
if these provisions are enacted.”179 However, “the Miranda decision 
itself was by a bare majority of one, and with increasing frequency 
the Supreme Court has reversed itself.”180 
In addition to offering its report, the Judiciary Committee took 
the unusual step of including a specially prepared brief in support of 
the legislation’s constitutionality.181 Although originally written to 
support a provision that sought to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction in 
confession cases, the Committee deemed the brief to apply equally 
well to the provisions limiting Miranda.182 
The supplemental brief argued that Miranda’s holding was 
predicated upon the Supreme Court’s factual determination that cus-
todial interrogation is inherently coercive and that prophylactic 
warnings of some sort are thus required to mitigate against that in-
herent compulsion. The Committee’s brief took issue with that fac-
tual assertion, however, explaining that the Court’s finding of coer-
civeness was based solely upon evidence contained in police manuals 
describing psychological techniques used to exploit a suspect’s weak-
nesses and to undermine his will to resist. The brief articulated the 
position that this information was too scant to support the Court’s 
adoption of specific warnings. Congress, the brief asserted, is in a 
better position to gather information necessary to enact broad rules, 
and as a consequence, may enact legislation adopting a contrary fac-
tual conclusion. The legislation’s purpose would be, in part, to in-
form the Court of its erroneous, or inadequate, factual finding that 
custodial interrogation was inherently coercive. Once this erroneous 
 
 178. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 51, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138. 
 179. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138. 
 180. Id., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138. 
 181. See Brief of the Legislative Reference Service in Support of Constitutionality of Bill 
Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Confession Cases, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 90-
1097, at 53-63 (1968). 
 182. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 53 (1968). 
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finding was corrected, the brief explained, the support for Miranda’s 
prophylactic warnings would be undermined. Essentially, the brief 
maintained that it was the Court’s factual finding with respect to co-
ercion, not the Fifth Amendment, which compelled the Miranda re-
sult. The Fifth Amendment therefore did not constitute a bar to 
congressional attempts to “mold constitutional policy” by “formulat-
ing a test of admissibility different from that of the court.”183 The 
proposed legislation avoided any constitutional conflict because its 
reaffirmation of the voluntariness standard would not “follow upon 
any attempt to change constitutional theory, but rather upon a quali-
fying of the factual basis of that policy.”184 
In support of this theory, the brief relied on Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan,185 a case that involved the constitutionality of § 4(e) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965. In Katzenbach, the Supreme Court upheld a 
federal requirement that prohibited states from using English literacy 
tests to prevent natives of Puerto Rico from voting.186 The Court 
had previously acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not itself prohibit states from conditioning the eligibility to vote on 
literacy tests.187 The Katzenbach Court did not reach the question of 
whether New York’s literacy requirement, as applied, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Instead, the Court upheld the federal en-
actment on the ground that the Court would defer to Congress’s 
factual determination that § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act was an 
appropriate means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.188 
The Judiciary Committee’s brief asserted that Katzenbach sup-
ported its claim because it involved a situation where the court pre-
 
 183. Id. at 60, 63. 
 184. Id. at 63. 
 185. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 186. See id. at 643 (upholding § 4(e) of Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
 187. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (finding that 
English language literacy requirement did not violate either Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ment). 
 188. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653-56. For a sampling of commentary on Congress’s 
§ 5 powers, see Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, 
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995); Stephen L. Carter, 
The Morgan “Power” and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 819 (1986); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Daniel O. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 
(1995); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 199 (1971). 
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viously made a constitutional decision, the validity of English literacy 
as a requirement for voting, on the basis both of constitutional the-
ory and of its appraisal of the facts that led the court to conclude that 
no invidious discrimination existed.189 With § 4(e), Congress did not 
change the constitutional theory; rather it made its appraisal of the 
facts and reached a different conclusion than the court had. Similarly, 
the brief argued, the Miranda court based its decision to require 
prophylactic warnings on a finding that custodial interrogation was 
inherently coercive. However, in rejecting that factual finding and 
substituting its own determination, Congress eliminated the need for 
the Miranda warnings, but did not alter the constitutional theory 
advanced by the Court. 
D. The Minority Responds 
The minority report, while supportive of the legislation generally, 
took exception to the anti-Miranda provisions.190 Mirroring Senator 
Ervin’s concerns, the minority report indicated that Miranda 
touched upon fundamental constitutional issues, and thus could not 
be altered by simple legislative fiat. Although acknowledging that 
Congress possesses the authority to enact rules of criminal proce-
dure, including rules governing the admissibility of confessions, the 
minority report explained that Congress had no authority to over-
turn Supreme Court decisions interpreting basic constitutional re-
quirements. “Congress has the power only to expand,” the minority 
report intoned, “not to contract or abrogate these basic guaran-
tees.”191 In the end, however, the Judiciary Committee voted out the 
proposed legislation as part of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act.192 
 
 189. See Brief of the Legislative Reference Service in Support of Constitutionality of Bill 
Limiting Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Confession Cases, supra note 181, at 53-63 (1968). 
 190. Senators Tydings, Dodd, Hart, Long (Missouri), Kennedy (Massachusetts), Bur-
dick, and Fong dissented from the majority’s report. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 147 (1968). 
 191. Id. at 150. 
 192. See 114 CONG. REC. S10,852 (1968). The original version of the bill as introduced 
by Senator McClellen was not limited to overruling Miranda in federal prosecutions, but also 
encompassed the ambitious plan of divesting federal courts of jurisdiction to review state court 
decisions admitting confessions and would have further abolished federal habeas corpus review 
of state judgments. See 114 CONG. REC. 11,189 (1968). Title II also contained provisions 
overruling the McNabb-Mallory line of decisions and the decision in United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218 (1967), which created a right to counsel at police line-ups. These provisions 
were ultimately enacted as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501(c) and 3502. 
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E. On the Senate Floor 
 The Senate engaged in roughly two weeks of debate over the 
bill. The bill’s supporters focused, not unsurprisingly, on the “confu-
sion and disarray injected into law enforcement” by Miranda.193
 Floor statements make it abundantly clear that the legislation’s 
object was to replace Miranda’s seemingly “absolute” requirement 
with a return to the broader voluntariness standard. Senator McClel-
len thundered that “[i]t is time for change—time for change in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The thrust of the Miranda rul-
ing, if it is not changed, will sweep us into the throes of anarchy and 
horror.”194 While the rhetoric of the debate was certainly emotion-
laden,195 that should not be confused with the substance of the legis-
lation that emerged from the Senate. Proponents of the legislation 
offered an important constitutional vision by rejecting the notion 
that the Court had grounded the Miranda warnings in the Fifth 
Amendment. These legislators understood the Miranda Court as 
merely prescribing rules governing the admission of evidence at trial, 
rules that Congress could alter unilaterally. 
Opponents of the bill, however, offered a competing view with 
equal hyperbole. They believed that the Court had promulgated the 
warnings pursuant to its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. As 
such, the rules were themselves a “part” of the Fifth Amendment, 
making it so Congress could not in any way alter them. Senator 
Morse remarked that “[t]he Senate is kidding itself if it thinks it can 
amend the Constitution or the Bill of Rights with this legislation.”196 
This sentiment was echoed by Senator Tydings, who opined that 
“[m]any of the provisions in title II, if not all, are little more than an 
 
 193. 114 CONG. REC. 11,201 (1968) (statement by Senator McClellan). 
 194. Id. at 11,206. 
 195. Senator Ervin, initially dubious about legislatively altering the Miranda warnings, 
launched himself into efforts to enact the bill: 
If you believe that the people of the United States should be ruled by a judicial oli-
garchy composed of five Supreme Court Justices rather than by the Constitution of 
the United States, you ought to vote against title II. If you believe that self-
confessed murders, rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought to go un-
punished, you ought to vote against title II. . . . [I]f you believe . . . that enough has 
been done [presumably by the Supreme Court] for those who murder and rape and 
rob, and that something ought to be done for those who do not wish to be mur-
dered or raped or robbed, then you should vote for title II. 
Id. at 14,155. 
 196. Id. at 11,595 (statement by Senator Morse). 
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attempt to amend the Constitution by an act of Congress.”197 If this 
statement were accurate, then even the bulk of the provision’s sup-
porters might have voted the legislation down. In truth, this debate 
reflected the larger issues surrounding the Warren Court’s expansive 
reading of the Bill of Rights. While some in Congress were con-
cerned that the Court’s newfound “activism” placed issues of con-
siderable import outside the political sphere, others welcomed this 
position. 
Critics of the legislation argued that it was a “rushed” piece of 
work. Senator Morse cautioned that “the bill was made pending 
business yesterday, though my office was told the printed report 
would not be available until the afternoon. I obtained a copy of the 
text of the committee bill only in the morning.”198 Although it had 
been claimed that “[f]ew Senators were familiar with the final version 
of the bill before it was reported on the Senate floor,”199 the truth 
was that the substance of the legislation had been the subject of a 
committee hearing and report, and the Senate had engaged in 
roughly two weeks of debate over the bill. For the Senate, this was 
hardly “rushed” legislation. Indeed, Senator Tydings, an opponent 
of the provisions designed to overturn Miranda, found sufficient 
time to write to law professors throughout the country and solicit 
their views with respect to the constitutionality of § 3501.200 
Predictably, the 108 scholars who responded unanimously 
agreed (if not uniformly on constitutional grounds) that enactment 
of § 3501 was unwise.201 
Moreover, the Senate did not leave the Committee’s work un-
touched. The bill reported out of the Judiciary Committee contained 
provisions for the withdrawal of jurisdiction from the federal courts 
to review state criminal cases involving confessions or eyewitness tes-
timony and to issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.202  
 
 197. Id. at 11,740 (statement by Senator Tydings). 
 198. Id. at 11,594. A Washington Post editorial similarly commented that “[a]lthough 
no printed copy of the bill is yet available, its complex assortment of restraints on freedom is to 
be presented to the Senate for consideration . . . . Why the hurry? . . . [S]ponsors of the bill 
know it will not bear scrutiny and want to rush it to enactment while hysteria is high.” Subvert-
ing the Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 1968, at A16. 
 199. Note, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act: A Study in Constitutional Conflict, 
57 GEO. L.J. 438 (1968).  
 200. See 114 CONG. REC. 10,888 (1968). 
 201. See id. 
 202. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 9-10 (1967). 
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Ultimately, while the bill’s supporters carried the day, they did not 
succeed on every provision debated on the floor. The Senate rejected 
the Committee’s jurisdiction-stripping measures and limitations on 
habeas corpus.203 A majority of the Senate opposed restricting the 
federal courts in this manner, approving a motion to strike this sub-
section by a 51-30 vote.204 While hardly conclusive, this does tend to 
demonstrate that far from being a leviathan moving through the 
Senate without proper consideration, the bill was subjected to seri-
ous analysis and debate. In the end, the Senate voted 72 to 4 for pas-
sage—a significant margin—and returned the bill to the House for 
consideration.205 
F. House Consideration 
Two weeks after the Senate had passed the amended crime bill, 
the House convened to consider it. Once the amended version of the 
bill returned to the House for passage, the Miranda provisions, 
which had not been treated in the original House version of the leg-
islation, became a magnet for debate.206 In truth, those provisions 
became the sole focus of the debate, as the House had previously 
considered and passed the other portions of the bill. The original 
sponsor of the House bill, Representative Emanuel Celler, con-
demned the Senate amendments as a “cruel hoax on citizens for 
whom crime and the fear of crime are facts of life.”207 He argued that 
“[a] general dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court is no basis for 
striking out blindly.”208 The battle lines were thus drawn. 
As had emerged during Senate consideration, both sides drew 
support for their positions from the Miranda opinion’s text. It was 
 
 203. See 114 CONG. REC. S6034-45 (1968). Senator Wayne Morse (D-Or.), who op-
posed Title II, said of the jurisdiction-stripping proposal: 
[W]e find in the bill . . . sections that withdraw jurisdiction over several of these is-
sues from the federal courts . . . . I find these the most repugnant sections of the 
whole bill. . . . [I]t smacks of a court packing scheme: When you do not like the de-
cision, change the judges. Or when you do not like the decision, withdraw the juris-
diction. 
114 CONG. REC. 11,596 (1968).  
 204. See id. at 14,181. 
 205. See 114 CONG. REC. S6292 (1968). 
 206. As initially passed by the House, the Omnibus Crime Bill did not contain Title II, 
which was later added by the Senate and adopted at conference. 
 207. 114 CONG. REC. 16,066 (1968). 
 208. Id. 
ONE-FIN.DOC 5/20/00 7:23 PM 
185] Undoing Miranda 
 227 
widely recognized during floor debate that the proposed legislation 
was intended to “overrule” Miranda209 and eliminate the automatic 
suppression of statements in which the interrogating officer had 
failed to warn the suspects of her rights.210 No one from either side 
of the debate (at least no one whose voice is heard in the record) 
challenged this understanding. 
Representative Rogers of Florida quoted the Supreme Court’s 
invitation in Miranda to continue its search to find ways to protect 
individual liberties while at the same time promoting efficient law en-
forcement. Representative Rogers, one of the House bill’s original 
cosponsors, applauded the Senate’s decision to include the provisions 
reforming Miranda.211 Others, however, such as Representative Eck-
hardt, while supportive of the legislation as a whole, railed against 
the anti-Miranda provision, observing that it “tends to undermine 
the constitutionally enunciated standards respecting the taking of 
confessions, of giving constitutional warning, and of affording fifth 
amendment protection.”212 However, Representative Eckhardt, mir-
roring the view of several members, also believed that it was better to 
send the bill, flawed as it was, to the president.213 
Similarly, Representative John Dow, although complaining that 
the bill was “saddled with amendments that threaten our liberties 
and may remain to haunt us,” nevertheless indicated that he would 
vote the legislation “out of deference to so many expressions from 
constituents in my district who regard protection in our streets as 
their paramount anxiety today.”214 
In response to the legislation’s doubters, supporters of the provi-
sion answered: “Section 3501 . . . merely returns the law . . . to what 
it was for more than 175 years prior to the Escobedo and Miranda 
cases.”215 Opponents rejoined, however, that “[i]nstead of carefully 
reviewing decisions of the Supreme Court and amending them by 
constitutional amendment where improvement is needed, the Senate 
 
 209. And Mallory and Wade as well. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, AT 38-51, reprinted in 
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2124-38. 
 210. See 114 CONG. REC. 16,274-75, 16,279, 16,280 (1968). 
 211. See id. at 16,274. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. Representative Eckhardt did note, however, that if the jurisdiction-stripping 
measures had remained in the bill, “I could not have voted for it under any circumstances.” Id. 
 214. Id. at 16,287. 
 215. Id. at 16,276 (statement of Rep. Anderson). 
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bill attempts in a patently unconstitutional way to set aside what the 
Court has declared the Constitution to be.”216 Original sponsor and 
House Judiciary Chairman Emanuel Celler warned that legislation 
appearing to overturn a Supreme Court decision was destined to be 
itself declared unconstitutional: “[i]t is built on false premises. Its 
promises are illusory.”217 Representative Kastenmeier echoed this 
sentiment when he observed that the bill “would presume to over-
turn three landmark supreme court [sic] cases, two of which were 
decided . . . on constitutional grounds and cannot be overruled sim-
ply by legislative fiat.”218 
Similarly, Congressman Schwengel expressed concern that Con-
gress was attempting to encroach upon judicial authority by over-
turning Miranda.219 He plainly did not consider § 3501 sufficient to 
safeguard individual rights, noting that: “If the Senate had provided 
a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule so that under certain 
conditions it would be possible to admit reliable evidence, even 
though constitutional rights were violated, I would not be as appre-
hensive [of the legislation].”220 Mr. Tenzer was even more forthright 
in his assessment of the legislation: 
The provisions relating to the admissibility of confessions and the 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony are an attempt to overrule de-
cisions of the U.S. Supreme Court—decisions which stand as inter-
pretations of the U.S. Constitution. 
I believe that . . . the U.S. Supreme Court will find this section of 
the crime bill unconstitutional. The Congress does not have the au-
thority to overrule the Supreme Court in this manner.221 
The House also debated the factual assertions underpinning the 
provisions altering Miranda. Representative Fraser, for example, 
took issue with the data presented to the Senate that the number of 
confessions had fallen since Miranda. “How then,” he asked, “could 
 
 216. Id. at 16,280 (statement of Rep. Reuss). 
 217. Id. at 16,066. 
 218. Id. at 16,284. 
 219. See id. at 16,289. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. Congressman Reid of New York offered a similar assessment of the bill’s consti-
tutionality, noting that “[t]he provisions . . . have been declared of dubious constitutionality 
by the deans and constitutional law professors of nearly every leading law school in the na-
tion.” Id. at 16,295. 
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an elimination of the sanctions for the failure of police to observe 
correct procedures lead to an increase in confessions unless increased 
numbers of confessions were to flow from such failures on the part of 
the police? Is that the aim of this legislation . . . to encourage abuses 
of procedures in order to increase the number of confessions?”222 
The bill’s defenders, however, pointed out that “ample safe-
guards” existed because the judge reviewing the confession’s volun-
tariness is required to review all the circumstances surrounding the 
confession, including whether warnings were given.223 Representative 
Pollock observed that the modifications to Miranda “do not give 
rise to a denial of constitutional or substantive rights, but rather at-
tack the particular procedural limitations which the Court has chosen 
to impose.”224 
Representative Machen further explained that the Court’s deci-
sions were illegitimate because it was “engaged in making law, not 
merely interpreting it.”225 His concern was that the Court, however 
noble its purposes, had “pretend[ed] . . . that each of its decisions 
was an interpretation of an existing law” rather than a new crea-
tion.226 This effort undermined the separation of powers and threat-
ened traditional legislative authority. In the end, the House debate 
informed those present of the significant issues of constitutional im-
port addressed by the legislation. The issues, by and large, appear to 
have been widely understood and fed into a larger debate that had 
been percolating for some time: whether it was appropriate for the 
Court to reinterpret the Constitution so as to “create” rights gener-
ally acknowledged not to have previously existed. Some opponents 
of the bill sought to have it sent to a House-Senate conference 
committee, where they hoped the offending provisions could be re-
moved. By sad historical coincidence, however, the legislation was 
returned to the House while the country was mourning Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination. Although the House vigorously 
debated the bill on the floor, it took the somewhat unusual step of 
passing the Senate bill as presented and forgoing a joint confer- 
 
 
 222. Id. at 16,293. 
 223. See id. at 16,296 (statement of Rep. Randall). 
 224. Id. at 16,298. 
 225. Id. at 16,285. 
 226. Id. 
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ence.227 Some cynically expressed that Senator Kennedy’s assassina-
tion was being exploited by those supporting the statute to ensure its 
passage. However, while Representative Ryan believed it “highly in-
appropriate for the House to use the time of the tragic murder of 
Senator Robert Kennedy as the occasion to enact an unwise meas-
ure” and “question[ed] whether we should be legislating at all on 
this dark day,”228 the will of the House was otherwise. 
G. What did Congress Do? 
The foregoing discussion is not an attempt to “divine” any sort 
of legislative intent with respect to the statute. It is exceedingly diffi-
cult to determine the “intent” of any large, deliberative body. These 
snippets of the congressional debate are reported to demonstrate 
that, far from being rushed through Congress without the opportu-
nity to debate its provisions, § 3501 was actually the product of con-
siderable debate and significant modification. Regardless of the po-
litical winds favoring its enactment, the best evidence of any 
“legislative intent” is that the legislation was enacted by a substantial 
margin on the vote of individuals who had been exposed to the rele-
vant constitutional arguments. Often lost in the debate over § 3501 
is what Congress actually achieved with the legislation. Far too often, 
the statute is merely dismissed as “overruling Miranda” without pay-
ing much attention to the statutory text.229 While perhaps some of 
this criticism can be attributed to the inflated rhetoric during the 
floor debate, it is important to read the statute to see what Congress 
enacted. While it is true that Congress replaced the “rigid require-
ments” of Miranda, it is interesting to observe that the legislation 
did so in a balanced and reasonable way. 
Professor Yale Kamisar has offered the view that § 3501 merely 
“repeal[s]” Miranda and, far from establishing a system equally pro-
tective of suspects’ rights, instead simply “reinstat[es] the due proc-
ess ‘totality of the circumstances’–‘voluntariness’ test for the admis-
 
 227. The House voted 317 to 60 against sending the bill to conference, and 368 to 17 
for final passage. See id. 
 228. Id. at 16,294. 
 229. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 76 (2d ed., 
1982) (“It is one thing to devise alternative safeguards and quite another to provide, as the 
1968 legislation does, that no safeguards are needed.”); Recent Statute: Title II of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (1969). 
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sibility of confessions.”230 As Kamisar has further explained, the Su-
preme Court recognized this previous test as flawed and thus had re-
placed it with the Miranda safeguards.231 However, as has been ex-
haustively detailed elsewhere, § 3501 in several important respects 
goes well beyond the pre-Miranda voluntariness test.232 One com-
mentator has noted, “parts of [§ 3501] would have been a progres-
sive expansion of suspects’ rights if Congress had passed it prior to 
Miranda.”233 
For example, § 3501(a) codifies the so-called Jackson v. Denno234 
hearing and requires that while the judge must admit voluntary con-
fessions, she “shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the con-
fession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.”235 
Such an instruction permits the defendant to place the confession 
within its proper context and to seek mitigation from the jury. The 
statute also codifies the basic Miranda warnings, which were not 
mandated prior to the decision, and specifically directs the trial court 
to consider whether the warnings were given.236 Congress thus took 
into account the testimony of hearing witnesses who indicated that 
warnings of some sort were required. 
Section 3501(b)(2) requires the suppression judge to consider 
whether the “defendant knew of the nature of the offense with 
 
 230. Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA 
L.J. 465, 469 (1999). 
 231. See id. at 471-72. 
 232. See Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. 
REV. 81, 129 (observing that § 3501 “does not wholly sweep aside Miranda” and stating that 
“the legislative enumeration of factors arguably gives them a special status . . . that did not 
necessarily obtain” before Miranda). 
 233. FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 324 (1970). 
 234. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
 235. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1999). 
 236. See id. Under Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968), the results under the 
statute or the voluntariness test may be similar. In Greenwald, the police questioned the defen-
dant for about an hour one evening and for fewer than four hours the next morning before he 
confessed. See Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 519-20. He had not received Miranda warnings but 
apparently had actual knowledge of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have coun-
sel. See id. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Despite his knowledge, the Court held that the ab-
sence of the warnings was strongly probative of involuntariness and that the defendant’s con-
fession was inadmissible under traditional standards. See id. at 521. The case had gone to trial 
before Miranda had been decided. Because the Court found the concession involuntary under 
the “totality of the circumstances” test, it did not have to apply Miranda to find the confession 
inadmissible. Id. at 521 n.*. Several other factors, such as the defendant’s physical condition, 
were also used to find involuntariness. Id. at 522. 
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which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of 
the confession.”237 This requirement goes not only beyond the law as 
it existed at the time Miranda was decided, but also extends current 
practice in which the Supreme Court has held that failure of the po-
lice to inform a suspect “of the subject matter of the interrogation 
could not affect [the defendant’s] decision to waive his Fifth 
Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant manner.”238 
Section 3501(b)(3) is also considerably broader than pre-
Miranda law in acknowledging a suspect’s right to remain silent dur-
ing police questioning and “whether or not such defendant was ad-
vised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and 
that any such statement could be used against him.”239 Though 
anathema to law enforcement officers, the statute also both recog-
nizes a statutory right to counsel and makes it relevant whether a 
suspect was advised of his rights and whether he “was without the 
assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confes-
sion.”240 Before Miranda, no general right to assistance of counsel 
existed during police interrogation. While the absence of any of the 
factors “need not be conclusive” on the issue of admissibility, the 
Court is free to read the statute as requiring courts to give “strong 
consideration” to the absence of warnings as a factor suggesting a 
confession was obtained involuntarily.241 
Essentially, Congress not only took the Supreme Court’s admo-
nitions in Miranda to heart, but sought to incorporate them in a 
reasonable, balanced fashion. Thus, the Miranda warnings would be 
preferred, and would be statutorily made a part of the “totality of the 
circumstances” evaluation, but no single item would be given pre-
sumptively greater weight. Congress did not merely toss out 
Miranda, instead it engaged in a reasoned legislative approach to 
craft procedural requirements that balanced the need for efficient law 
enforcement against a suspect’s constitutional rights. The balance 
was struck, not solely through the lens of a single case, but after 
hearing testimony from numerous interested parties and engaging in 
considerable debate. Congress thus provided suspects with greater 
 
 237. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(2) (1999). 
 238. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987). 
 239. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(3). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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protection than they enjoyed prior to Miranda, while simultaneously 
not entirely tying the hands of police. 
H. On to the President 
On signing the Crime Control Act242 into law on June 19, 1968, 
President Lyndon Johnson remarked that “[t]he provisions of Title 
II, vague and ambiguous as they are, can, I am advised by the Attor-
ney General, be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.”243
 And so it was accomplished. Miranda was undone. 
V. LITIGATING § 3501 
Or was it? One would think that prosecutors, armed with a fed-
eral statute enacted largely for their benefit, would lead an all-out as-
sault on Miranda. After all, despite certain misgivings, President 
Johnson had signed legislation teeing up a potential conflict between 
the Court and Congress. The anticipated battle didn’t take place  
 
 
 
 242. The legislation ultimately presented to the president contained two important sub-
sections. Subsection (a) provided that “in any criminal prosecution brought by the United 
States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1999). Simple enough. It was subsection (b) that 
posed the problem for Miranda afficionados: it provided that courts, in determining voluntari-
ness, 
shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the con-
fession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the de-
fendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, 
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was 
charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) 
whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to 
make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) 
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to 
the assistance of counsel, and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the as-
sistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. 
 
The presence or absence of any of the above mentioned factors to be taken into 
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of 
the confession. 
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1999). 
 243. Transcript of Johnson’s Statement on Signing Crime and Safety Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 1968, at 23; see also Statement of the President Upon Signing the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act of 1968, 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 983 (June 24, 1968) [hereinafter Statement by 
the President]. 
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until over thirty years later, however.244 In the sections that follow, I 
will trace § 3501’s tortured litigation history. 
A. The Johnson Administration: An Undeclared War On The Statute 
Much like Goldilocks’s search for the perfect porridge, prosecu-
tors have long struggled to unearth just the “right” case in which to 
test § 3501’s constitutionality. In part, this may have been a result of 
President Johnson’s antipathy towards the legislation. Although he 
had written to Senator Mike Mansfield and urged him to shepherd 
passage of the bill’s gun control and law enforcement block grant 
provisions, he requested that the Senator “not encumber the legisla-
tion with provisions [i.e., the section overturning Miranda] raising 
grave constitutional questions.”245 To avoid these questions, Presi-
dent Johnson announced that he would direct the FBI to continue 
its practice of informing suspects of their rights—a policy pre-dating 
Miranda itself.246 Attorney General Ramsey Clark took this directive 
even further, instructing federal prosecutors to offer into evidence  
 
 
 
 244. It is important to differentiate the different aspects of § 3501. Although the focus of 
this paper and recent efforts to enforce § 3501 involve the statute’s effect on Miranda, the 
statute has other consequences as well. For example, § 3501 sought to overturn Escobedo and 
United States v. Wade (which involved precedent from McNabb-Mallory and Massiah v. United 
States), and possibly Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The courts generally 
determined that Congress’s decision to re-write the rules governing pre-arraignment delay did 
not pose a constitutional problem, because those rules were based upon Rule 5 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405-06 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (citing § 3501 as applied to preindictment delay); United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 
1026, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); United States v. Keeble, 459 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 
1972) (presuming constitutionality of § 3501 as applied to preindictment delay), rev’d, 412 
U.S. 205 (1973); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68, 75 (10th Cir. 1972) (invoking  
§ 3501 in considering preindictment delay); United States v. Evans, 1995 WL 254422, at *1-
*2 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 1995); United States v. Wilbon, 911 F. Supp. 1420, 1425 (D.N.M. 
1995); United States v. Eltayib, 808 F. Supp. 160, 162-63 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (pre-arraignment 
delay); Velasco v. United States, No. CV-91-2743, 1992 WL 135029, at *6-*7 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 28, 1992) (same). But see United States v. Poole, 495 F.2d 115, 133 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (“In my view these are serious questions whether section 3501 can 
be sustained as a modification of the Mallory rule—questions of constitutional substance as 
indicated by the Miranda reference to the Rule.”). 
 245. President’s Letter to the Majority Leader of the Senate Regarding the Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 12,450 (1968) (statement of Sena-
tor Mansfield). 
 246. See Statement of the President, supra note 243, at 727. 
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only those confessions obtained in accordance with Miranda.247 To 
the extent prosecutors adhered to this policy, it would be difficult to 
test the statute. 
As a result, few early cases exist in which prosecutors litigated the 
salient provisions of § 3501.248 Even in cases where prosecutors 
chose to invoke the statute, courts found it either inapplicable or 
simply beside the point, since Miranda warnings had been given. In 
an early test of the statute, for example, the government relied on  
§ 3501(d) for the modest proposition that “Miranda . . . should not 
be applied to non-custodial interrogations.”249 This was hardly an ex-
treme position. The district court nevertheless rejected that argu-
ment, explaining the defendant was plainly in custody and “under-
went extensive interrogation.”250 The court also found it significant 
that the defendant was neither apprized of his rights nor informed of 
the nature of the investigation.251 As a consequence, the court con-
cluded: “it cannot be said that [the defendant’s] statements . . . was 
[sic] voluntary or that he knowledgeably waived his rights.”252 “Yet,” 
the court explained, relying upon Miranda, “this is precisely what 
the Constitution requires.”253 Typical of these early cases, the court 
failed to consider the issue of whether § 3501 supplanted Miranda 
because the government had made no such assertion. The court 
could well have considered the § 3501 issue sua sponte, but refused 
to do so. 
A similar refrain is heard in Reinke v. United States,254 in which 
the Ninth Circuit declined to reach the issue of § 3501’s constitu-
tionality, explaining “the trial in this case had already been com-
pleted when this statute was passed, and the Government in its brief 
concedes that the statute should have prospective application 
 
 247. See Daniel Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal Prosecutions: Implementa-
tion of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts, 63 GEO. L.J. 305, 311-12 
(1974). 
 248. In reconstructing § 3501’s litigation history, I focus only on those cases either offi-
cially reported or available through online research services. It is entirely possible, indeed likely, 
but difficult to unearth, unreported cases in which prosecutors raised § 3501. 
 249. United States v. Dickerson, 291 F. Supp. 633, 637 (N.D. Ill. 1968). 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. at 638. 
 252. Id. at 637. 
 253. Id. 
 254. 405 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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only.”255 As was to become typical of cases raising § 3501, the court 
observed that “the [defendant] was given the Miranda warnings, so 
the Government need not rely on the more relaxed procedures of 
section 701.”256 Little else of note involving § 3501 occurred during 
the Johnson Administration, probably because of Attorney General 
Clark’s instructions to federal prosecutors.257 
B. The Nixon Administration: Benign Neglect 
The prospect that § 3501 would have its day in court brightened 
considerably in anticipation of the Nixon Administration. After all, 
Candidate Nixon had lambasted Miranda as having “the effect of 
seriously hamstringing [sic] the peace forces in our society and 
strengthening the criminal forces.”258 It was thus not unreasonable 
to assume that once elected, tough-on-crime President Nixon would 
enforce § 3501. Despite his campaign rhetoric, however, Nixon pur-
sued a somewhat more cautious route in challenging Miranda. His 
Attorney General, John Mitchell, directed federal prosecutors and 
law enforcement officers to abide by the Miranda rules.Although 
this directive appeared to be a continuation of the Johnson Admini-
stration’s policy, it differed in at least two important respects. First, 
in contrast to Attorney General Clark, Attorney General Mitchell 
furnished prosecutors with some wiggle room to invoke § 3501 by 
indicating that prosecutors could raise the statute where only a mi-
nor deviation from Miranda’s requirements occurred, such as 
“where an agent inadvertently fails to fully explain the right to have 
counsel appointed for an indigent, or a written waiver is not ob-
tained.”259 Thus, in the event of such an insignificant Miranda viola-
 
 255. Id. at 230. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Fred Graham, Federal Lawyers Seeking to Soften Confession Curb, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 28, 1969, at 22 (reporting that Clark instructed prosecutors to offer evidence only in 
compliance with Miranda). 
 258. Richard M. Nixon, Toward Freedom from Fear (May 8, 1968) (position paper on 
crime), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 12,936-38 (1968); see also BAKER, supra note 72, at 248 
(detailing Nixon Campaign speeches criticizing Miranda). 
 259. United States Department of Justice, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 to the United States Attorneys, Memorandum No. 584, Supp. 3 (June 11, 
1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 23,236, Memorandum No. 584, Supp. 3 (1969). The 
Memorandum continued: 
Aside from any constitutional issues, therefore, it is impossible to predict how much 
weight a particular court will give to the absence of any one of the factors men-
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tion, prosecutors could seek admission of the confession pursuant to 
§ 3501. In truth, this represented a fairly small divergence from the 
policy articulated by his predecessor. A careful reading of Mitchell’s 
directive reveals that agents were still required to provide criminal 
suspects with full Miranda warnings. Only in those narrow instances 
in which a technical violation occurred would prosecutors be permit-
ted to invoke § 3501. The Department never satisfactorily clarified 
what constituted a “technical violation,” however, making it unlikely 
that prosecutors would employ the statute. 
Second, while the Johnson Administration had serious qualms 
about § 3501’s constitutionality, the Nixon Justice Department took 
the position that § 3501 was constitutional. In explaining the De-
partment’s § 3501 policy to the House Select Committee on Crime, 
Attorney General Mitchell testified that “[i]t is our feeling . . . that 
the Congress has provided this legislation, and, until such time as we 
are advised by the courts that it does not meet constitutional stan-
dards, we should use it.”260 
Despite the Nixon Administration’s support of the statute, the 
Justice Department apparently did not develop a coordinated strat-
egy to implement the statute. Instead, individual field prosecutors 
apparently sought to invoke § 3501 in select cases. Courts were thus 
forced to take notice of the statute. However, although prosecutors 
seemingly attempted to raise the statute, it appears the occasion to 
litigate the constitutional status of § 3501 did not arise. This is in 
large part due to the fact that federal agents, in compliance with the 
Justice Department’s long-held policy, continued to provide suspects 
with Miranda warnings.261 
 
tioned. For this reason, the only safe course for federal investigative agents, and for 
such United States Attorneys as may have occasion to talk with defendants, is to 
continue their present practice of giving the full Miranda warnings. 
 
  The area where we believe the statute can be effective and where a legitimate 
constitutional argument can be made is the situation where a voluntary confession is 
obtained after a less than perfect warning or a less than conclusive waiver . . . . 
Id. 
 260. The Improvement and Reform of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the 
United States: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Crime, 91st Cong. 250 (1969) 
(statement of Attorney General John Mitchell). 
 261. See, e.g., United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., concurring); Ailsworth v. United 
States, 448 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 377 (2d 
Cir. 1970); Gandara, supra note 247.  
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Certain opportunities did, however, present themselves. The first 
opening to enforce § 3501 presented itself in the Virgin Islands. In 
Virgin Islands v. Williams,262 the government sought to introduce a 
confession taken in violation of Miranda. In support of the confes-
sion’s admissibility, the government offered two arguments. First, it 
claimed that Miranda had not been offended. In the alternative, the 
government argued that § 3501 would permit the statement’s ad-
mission because a Miranda violation constituted but one of the 
grounds governing a statement’s admission. In applying the totality 
of the circumstances test, the government asserted that the confes-
sion should have been admitted regardless of any minor Miranda 
trespass.263 
The district court, however, declined to consider the § 3501 ar-
gument. The court explained that as this case arose in the Virgin Is-
lands, the statute could not be enforced unless the court of appeals, 
using its supervisory authority, so held.264 As the court of appeals had 
yet to pass on the matter, the district court determined that the ap-
pellate court’s “jealous concern for the rights of persons accused of 
crime” would likely not lead it “to exercise its supervisory powers 
and make applicable to Virgin Islands prosecutions the provisions” of 
§ 3501.265 
While this refusal to address § 3501’s constitutional status was 
not altogether uncommon, one provision of the statute—subsection 
(c), which involved pre-arraignment delay—did not go unnoticed 
during the Nixon Administration. In United States v. Halbert,266 for 
example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s interlocutory 
appeal of the district court’s decision to suppress the defendant’s 
confession.267 The district court, in a case of first impression, had 
concluded that state police officers’ failure to timely present the de-
fendant before a magistrate violated § 3501(c), which requires law 
enforcement officers to bring a suspect before a judicial officer within 
six hours of “arrest or other detention.”268 Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not expressly construe the Miranda provision of § 3501, it 
 
 262. 306 F. Supp. 1104 (D.V.I. 1969). 
 263. See id. at 1105. 
 264. See id. at 1106. 
 265. Id. 
 266. 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 267. See id. at 1227. 
 268. Id. at 1229. 
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did explore the statute’s legislative history and noted the constitu-
tional issue presented therein.269 Consequently, of all the statute’s 
provisions, the subsection involving pre-arraignment delay was the 
only one squarely to be addressed (and upheld).270 
Oddly, in two of the earliest (reported) mentions of § 3501, the 
defendants invoked the statute. This is perhaps not entirely surprising 
because defendants gained certain benefits that they did not enjoy in 
the pre-Miranda world. In Sheer v. United States,271 for example, the 
defendant raised the statute to argue that the district court had failed 
to hold a “voluntariness” hearing as § 3501 requires.272 The court of 
appeals rejected that claim, however, explaining that the statute 
could not retroactively be applied to the defendant’s case.273 
Similarly, in United States v. White,274 the defendant “assert[ed] 
the novel proposition that the government’s right to introduce evi-
dence . . . is even more narrowly circumscribed by the requirements 
for voluntariness of ‘confessions’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3501.”275 
“From this,” the court explained, the defendant “argue[d] that dis-
closures and evidence sufficiently voluntary to be admissible under 
Miranda nevertheless may be involuntary as a matter of law under 
[§ 3501].”276 The court dismissed that contention, however, observ-
ing that “neither the language of § 3501 nor its legislative history 
indicate that Congress intended to expand the protection of poten-
tial criminal defendants beyond the scope of protection established 
by the Miranda line of cases.”277 
Prosecutors doubtless pressed the § 3501 issue in other cases, 
but apparently without much success. A number of cases during that 
time period note, without resolving, the potential constitutional con-
flict between § 3501 and Miranda.278 By and large, the courts ap-
 
 269. See id. at 1231-37. 
 270. See id. at 1237. 
 271. 414 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 272. See id. at 125. 
 273. See id. 
 274. 417 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 275. Id. at 91. 
 276. Id. at 92. 
 277. Id. at 91-92. 
 278. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining 
“[w]e do not decide whether section 3501 intended to overrule Miranda or would be consti-
tutional if it did”) (citations omitted); United States v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir. 
1972) (noting that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality 
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peared to be cognizant of the issue, but generally declined to con-
sider it either because it was not raised or not quite on point. Con-
trary to having a dramatic impact on law enforcement, the statute 
was reduced to something of a fringe issue from the start. Like any 
policy not pursued with vigor and tended with care, § 3501 began to 
wither. 
C. The Ford Administration: Encouraging Signs on the Enforcement 
Front 
The Ford Administration’s position with respect to § 3501 
largely reflected that of its immediate predecessor. Early in the ad-
ministration, the Justice Department reiterated its position that the 
policies of the Mitchell directive “are still considered current and ap-
plicable.”279 As before, the Justice Department took the position that 
the statute was constitutional.280 
Career prosecutors invoked the statute in what was doubtless the 
most significant § 3501 case to be litigated until Dickerson: United 
States v. Crocker.281 In Crocker, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district 
court’s decision that § 3501 was valid and that, for a confession to 
be admissible, perfect compliance with Miranda was unnecessary.282
 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Michigan v. Tucker,283 “although not involving the provisions of 
section 3501, did, in effect, adopt and uphold the constitutionality 
of the provisions thereof.”284 Accordingly, the court concluded that 
“the trial court did not err in applying the guidelines of § 3501 . . . 
in determining the issue of the voluntariness of Crocker’s confes-
sion.”285 Oddly, however, the court went on to find that there was  
 
 
of these provisions [§ 3501]”); United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(Friendly, J., concurring); United States v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 574 n.18. (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (McGowen, J., dissenting) (observing that § 3501 “is subject to grave constitutional 
doubts” but notes that its effect on Miranda is not raised in this case). 
 279. Gandara, supra note 247, at 312 n.45 (quoting Letter from the Department of Jus-
tice to Daniel Gandara (May 15, 1974)) (on file with the Georgetown Law Journal). 
 280. See id. 
 281. 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975). 
 282. See id. at 1138. 
 283. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 284. Crocker, 510 F.2d at 1137 (citation omitted). 
 285. Id. at 1138. 
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“full compliance with the Miranda mandates,” implying that its dis-
cussion of § 3501 was dicta.286 
Crocker, far from being a lightening rod, neither took firm hold 
in the Tenth Circuit nor did it engender similar litigation in other 
circuits. One would think that in light of Crocker, the Tenth Circuit 
would have been inundated with cases relying upon § 3501. That is 
simply not the case, however. While a number of Tenth Circuit cases 
favorably cite § 3501 and Crocker,287 none relied upon the statute to 
trump Miranda until United States v. Rivas-Lopez surfaced in 
1997.288 
In most cases, federal agents continued to give Miranda warn-
ings. Hence, challenges involving § 3501 generally did not concern a 
question of admitting an un-Mirandized statement, but rather some 
larger issue of voluntariness.289 The Ninth Circuit, for example, 
noted in United States v. Gegax 290 that § 3501 directed trial courts 
“to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the giving of a 
confession . . . without regarding any as conclusive.”291 As a result, 
the court refused to overturn a district court’s denial of a suppression 
motion where the only claim was that the government failed to re-
peat the Miranda warnings it had given some thirty minutes ear-
lier.292 Once again, however, it is difficult to determine whether the 
court viewed the statue as supplanting Miranda because federal  
 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1583 (10th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 462 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462, 
1464 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1552 (10th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 
773, 775-76 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 666-67 (10th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 378 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shoemaker, 542 
F.2d 561, 563 (10th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211, 1217-
18 (10th Cir. 1978) (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
 288. See infra Part V.G. Interestingly, in United States v. Duncan, 857 F. Supp. 852 (D. 
Utah 1994), the district court both notes that § 3501(c) has “supplanted” the McNabb-
Mallory rule, id. at 860, and observes that “Miranda is not a constitutional right.” Id. at 859 
n.7 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) and New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 
(1984)). This case perhaps demonstrated the District of Utah’s openness to considering  
§ 3501 for the purpose of replacing Miranda. 
 289. See United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976) (relying on § 3501 to 
assess the voluntariness of Mirandized statements). 
 290. 506 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 291. Id. at 461. 
 292. See id. 
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agents had read the defendant his rights and had claimed that no 
Miranda violation had occurred. 
D. The Carter Administration: The Statute Goes Missing 
During the Carter Administration, § 3501 was all but a non-
issue. Although references to the statute appear frequently in re-
ported cases, it appears that for the most part courts sought to har-
monize § 3501 and Miranda. In United States v. Vigo,293 for exam-
ple, the district court, although relying on the voluntariness factors 
articulated in § 3501(b), nevertheless explained that  
[g]iven the importance the Supreme Court attached to the 
[Miranda] warning . . . this court will not assume that Congress in-
tended to authorize the admission of confessions where this warn-
ing is not given, at least in the absence of strong evidence that the 
defendant was otherwise aware of the consequences of waiving the 
privilege.294  
Of course, had the district court read the statute or paid any heed to 
the congressional debate, it would have understood that Congress 
had intended to do just that. Instead, the court held that the failure 
of the agents to warn the suspect of his rights, coupled with a lack of 
counsel and no evidence that the defendant otherwise understood 
his rights, meant the confession would need to be suppressed.295 
Similarly, in United States v. Crook,296 the Third Circuit stated 
that “[w]e cannot . . . disregard the congressional mandate of 18 
U.S.C. [§] 3501(a).”297 The court nevertheless noted that 
“[p]resumably, the constitutionally mandated requirements of the 
Miranda decision survive that enactment” and refused to use the 
statute to negate Miranda.298 
 
 293. 357 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also, United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 
299 (2d Cir. 1973) (declining to determine the constitutionality of § 3501); Ailsworth v. 
United States, 448 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1971) (same); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE 
OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL 
INTERROGATION, 73 & n.113 (1986) (stating that in most instances, including Vigo, the 
courts “either found it unnecessary to address” the constitutionality of § 3501 “or side-stepped 
the issue in some other way”) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY]. 
 294. Vigo, 357 F. Supp. at 1366. 
 295. See id. 
 296. 502 F.2d 1378 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 297. Id. at 1381. 
 298. Id. 
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The only reported instance of a judge questioning Miranda’s su-
premacy occurred, predictably, in the Tenth Circuit. In United States 
v. DiGiacomo,299 the Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit wrote in dis-
sent: 
The Supreme Court has not been called upon to rule on the consti-
tutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). To be sure, the Supreme Court 
is the final and ultimate arbiter of any constitutional issue raised in-
volving its applicability. That, however, is no reason for this court 
to “bury its head in the sand” in avoidance of the provisions of  
§ 3501 . . . . 
The Congress, in obvious recognition of society’s needs in the area 
of effective administration of the criminal justice system, enacted  
§ 3501, . . . in order to vitalize the “totality of the circumstances” 
rule which, in my judgment, is both common sensed and fair. It 
does not abolish the Miranda guidelines, but instead it places them 
in proper focus based upon the totality of all of the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the confession or admission against one’s 
Fifth Amendment interest. It avoids a mechanical, unrealistic appli-
cation of Miranda.300 
Quoting Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Brewer v. Williams, the 
dissenting Tenth Circuit judge continued: 
[I]n cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made 
without coercion, and hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment, 
but are obtained in violation of one of the Miranda prophylaxes, 
suppression is no longer automatic. Rather, we weigh the deterrent 
effect on unlawful police conduct, together with the normative 
Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression, against “the strong 
interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier 
of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which ei-
ther party seeks to adduce” . . . .301 
Despite these strong words from the court’s chief judge and the 
precedent established in Crocker, the Tenth Circuit did not revisit 
the § 3501 issue until considerably later. Neither did prosecutors 
litigating in the Tenth Circuit appear to exploit the earlier decision. 
 
 299. 579 F.2d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 1978) (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
 300. Id. at 1219. 
 301. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d at 1219 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974))). 
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E. The Reagan Administration: A Near Rebirth? 
It was not until the Reagan Administration that the Justice De-
partment contemplated mounting a coherent strategy to implement 
§ 3501.302 The Department’s Office of Legal Policy prepared a re-
port for Attorney General Edwin Meese arguing that federal prose-
cutors should “seek to persuade the Supreme Court to abrogate or 
overrule the decision in Miranda v. Arizona” by relying on  
§ 3501.303 As a result of this report, “the Attorney General approved 
this view of the constitutionality of the statute and instructed the 
litigating divisions to seek out the best test case” to overturn 
Miranda.304 
Prosecutors apparently had a difficult time unearthing just such a 
case, as there are but few examples of Reagan-era prosecutors using  
§ 3501 to gain the admission of un-Mirandized confessions. In fact, 
only one case stands out: in United States v. Goudreau,305 the Civil 
Rights Division relied on the statute to gain the admission of an er-
rant officer’s statement in a police brutality prosecution.306 The gov-
ernment argued that “under the terms of 18 U.S.C. [§] 3501, the 
defendant’s statement is admissible evidence regardless of whether 
Miranda warnings were required, because the statement was volun-
tarily made.”307 Although the district court rejected the govern-
ment’s argument and suppressed the defendant’s statements, the 
Eighth Circuit reversed.308 The Eighth Circuit’s opinion, however, 
did not cite § 3501 and instead ruled that federal officers had com-
plied with Miranda.309 
Similarly, in United States v. Caputo,310 the government argued 
that, pursuant to § 3501, the district court could not suppress the 
defendants’ statements if they were voluntary—even if taken in viola-
 
 302. Professor Paul Cassell has detailed efforts of the Reagan Justice Department to en-
force the statute. See Paul Cassell, supra note 72, at 200-02 and accompanying text. 
 303. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 293, at 96. 
 304. Cassell, supra note 72, at 201. 
 305. 854 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 306. See Brief for the United States at 19, United States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097 
(8th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5403).  
 307. Id. (citing United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975). 
 308. See Goudreau, 854 F.2d at 1099. 
 309. See id. at 1098. 
 310. 641 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
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tion of Miranda.311 The district court, however, declined to address 
the government’s argument because it deemed the statements to 
have been made in a non-interrogation setting and thus refused to 
apply § 3501.312 
A defendant again raised § 3501 in United States v. Abell,313 
claiming that it required a more stringent definition of voluntari-
ness.314 Without addressing the constitutionality of the statute, the 
district court concluded that, whatever its status, § 3501 did not ex-
pand the traditional Townsend v. Sain315 test.316 If anything, the court 
opined, § 3501 was intended to narrow the circumstances in which a 
confession could be excluded.317 
F. The Bush Administration: Continued Search for a Test Case 
The Bush Administration, although not perhaps as aggressively, 
continued the policies of the Reagan Justice Department with re-
spect to § 3501. Some years after leaving office, Attorney General 
William Barr explained in a letter to Congress that the Bush Justice 
Department “took the position that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was constitu-
tional as an exercise of Congress’s authority to control the admission 
of evidence before federal courts.”318 Attorney General Barr also 
stated that he had instructed one of his special assistants to find an 
appropriate case in which to raise the statute.319 
Prosecutors apparently were again frustrated in their efforts to 
find the right case, as no important litigation occurred during this 
period. The most significant reported case during the Bush Admini-
stration was United States v. Bordeaux,320 in which the court cited  
§ 3501 for the proposition that in determining whether a confession 
was involuntary, the court was required to consider “‘all the circum-
 
 311. See id. at 381. 
 312. See id. 
 313. 586 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Me. 1984). 
 314. See id. at 1422. 
 315. 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 540 U.S. 1 
(1992). 
 316. See Abell, 586 F. Supp. at 1423. Sain held that for a statement to be voluntary, it 
must be “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” Sain, 372 U.S. at 307. 
 317. See Abell, 586 F. Supp. at 1423. 
 318. Letter from Attorney General William P. Barr to Senator Strom Thurmond (May 
12, 1999) (on file with author). 
 319. Id. 
 320. 980 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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stances surrounding the giving of the confession, including the fac-
tors specifically listed in [§ 3501].’”321 As the Miranda warnings had 
been given in that case, however, it is difficult to determine whether 
the court would have relied on § 3501 in Miranda’s stead.322 The 
statute thus remained something of a dead letter. 
G. The Clinton Administration: Miranda Unraveled? 
 Curiously, much of the litigation surrounding § 3501 has oc-
curred during the Clinton Administration. That administration ini-
tially adopted, by inertia, the policy of its predecessors—a sort of 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy applied to a congressional statute. 
However, the Administration was not able to successfully hide be-
hind this policy because outside sources took up the cudgel. The 
Clinton Administration was thus forced to take a position on the 
statute—one that broke with past presidential administrations, if not 
quite in practice, then surely in theory. 
Unfortunately, the Clinton Justice Department got off to some-
thing of a rocky start. In United States v. Cheely,323 postal inspectors 
obtained voluntary, incriminating statements from a defendant who 
had sent a mail bomb to a witness instrumental in testifying against 
him in an earlier murder conviction.324 The district court, however, 
had suppressed the statements based upon a technical Miranda vio-
lation.325 In light of the crime’s severity and the importance of the 
defendant’s confession, the government decided to appeal the dis-
trict court’s suppression order. 
An internal Justice Department memorandum to the Solicitor 
General advised raising § 3501 as one of the four grounds on which 
to base an appeal.326 The memorandum noted that, in the author’s 
understanding, the Justice Department “[had] made arguments 
 
 321. Id. at 538-39 (quoting United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir. 
1990)). 
 322. Similarly, the district court in United States v. Carstens noted the government’s bur-
den of demonstrating voluntariness, but did not address the constitutional issue because the 
defendant had consulted with counsel before talking to the agents. United States v. Carstens, 
747 F. Supp. 528, 531 (N.D. Iowa 1989). 
 323. 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 324. See id. at 921-22. 
 325. See United States v. Cheely, 814 F. Supp. 1447, 1448-49 (D. Alaska 1992). 
 326. See Memorandum to the Solicitor General (Mar. 12, 1993) (citing Dep’t of Justice 
Doc.) (on file with author). 
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based on § 3501 to courts of appeals in the past.”327 In any case, Jus-
tice Department attorneys authorized an appeal on the basis of  
§ 3501, but after the intervention of political appointees, and by the 
time the brief was filed, the § 3501 claim was reduced to little more 
than a token argument.328 In the end, the government’s brief made 
only a passing reference to § 3501 without fully exploring the is-
sue.329 The Ninth Circuit upheld the suppression of Cheely’s state-
ments, but issued an order requesting briefing on the question of 
whether the issue merited en banc rehearing.330 The government, 
however, opposed further review of the decision.331 
United States v. Sullivan332 presented another significant oppor-
tunity for the government to litigate § 3501. In Sullivan, officers 
made a routine vehicle stop of Sullivan, a felon, and discovered a 
firearm.333 The government indicted Sullivan for being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, but, during the subsequent trial, the court 
suppressed his incriminating statement on the ground that the arrest-
ing officer had not informed Sullivan of his rights.334 In its suppres-
sion order, however, the court questioned whether the mechanical 
application of the exclusionary rule should remain the law.335 
The U.S. Attorney’s office subsequently invoked § 3501 in an 
appeal of the trial court’s decision to suppress Sullivan’s incriminat-
ing statements. The government argued that Sullivan was not in 
“custody,” hence no Miranda warnings were needed. 
Alternatively, prosecutors argued that even if Sullivan had been 
in custody, the statements were nonetheless admissible under  
§ 3501. Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger, whose office must 
approve all government appeals, withdrew the brief and submitted a 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Professor Cassell provides an interesting discussion of the background maneuvering 
with respect to this brief. See Cassell, supra note 72, 203-05. 
 329. See Brief of the United States at 20-22, United States v. Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-30257, 92-30504).  
 330. See Paul G. Cassell, Tossing Out the Law on Confessions, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 24, 
1995, at 26, 30.  
 331. See Memorandum of the United States Relating to the Question Whether to Enter-
tain Rehearing En Banc at 9, Cheely, 21 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (Nos. 92-30257, 92-
30504). 
 332. 138 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 333. See id. at 129. 
 334. See id. 
 335. See United States v. Sullivan, 948 F. Supp. 549, 551 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
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replacement that did not discuss § 3501.336 Although the Fourth 
Circuit granted the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) leave to 
file an amicus brief raising § 3501,337 it reversed the district court’s 
finding that Sullivan was in custody.338 Consequently, no Miranda 
warnings were needed and the § 3501 argument was rendered 
moot.339 Once again, the government affirmatively squelched any at-
tempt to raise § 3501. 
The Fourth Circuit, however, remained a focal point in efforts to 
raise § 3501 arguments. In United States v. Leong,340 for example, 
the Fourth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that the de-
fendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes at the time he 
made an incriminating statement.341 In response, the Justice De-
partment moved to dismiss the indictment. The Washington Legal 
Foundation, however, filed an amicus brief raising § 3501, prompt-
ing the court to order the parties to address the statute. The Justice 
Department argued that Miranda “is a rule that Congress cannot 
supersede by legislation,” so “it would not be appropriate for the 
lower courts . . . to apply § 3501 to admit a defendant’s statement in 
a case in which Miranda would require its suppression, or for the 
Department of Justice to urge the lower courts to do so.”342 
The Fourth Circuit, however, retained jurisdiction over the case 
and ordered the Department and Leong’s counsel to brief the  
§ 3501 issue.343 Doubtless to the defendant’s delight, the govern-
ment joined him in arguing that the statute violated the Constitu-
tion.344Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Janet Reno notified Con-
gress that the Department would not defend § 3501 in the lower 
 
 336. See Jody Tabner Thayer, The Exclusionary Suggestion?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 24, 
24; Paul G. Cassell & Paul D. Kamenar, Another Law Janet Reno Doesn’t Like, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 27, 1997, at A13. 
 337. Four members of the Senate also supported the WLF Brief: Senators Strom Thur-
mond, Jon Kyl, Jeff Sessions, and John Ashcroft—all Republican members of the Judiciary 
Committee. 
 338. See United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 339. See id. at 134 n.*. 
 340. No. 96-4876, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15480 (4th Cir. Jun. 26, 1997). 
 341. See id. at *11. 
 342. Government Won’t Defend 1968 Law Designed to Overrule Miranda Decision, 66 
U.S. L. WK. 2170 (Sept. 23, 1997). 
 343. See Order at 1, United States v. Leong, No. 96-4876, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15480 (4th Cir. Jun. 26, 1997) (No. 96-4876).  
 344. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 23, Leong (No. 96-4876). 
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lower courts.345 The Department’s Leong brief, however, reserved the 
right to argue § 3501 in the Supreme Court because that Court, 
unlike the lower courts, “is free to reconsider its prior decisions, and 
the Department of Justice is free to urge it to do so.”346 
The circuit court ultimately declined to hear the case, explaining 
that because an amicus had raised the issue for the first time on a pe-
tition for rehearing, it would only decide whether it was “plain er-
ror” for the district court to have suppressed the confession in the 
face of the statute.347 The court furthered explained that because the 
district court did not act in plain error, the Fourth Circuit would not 
consider the statute’s constitutionality on a rehearing petition.348 
The action surrounding § 3501 subsequently shifted to the 
Tenth Circuit, where the Utah district court upheld the statute in 
United States v. Rivas-Lopez.349 In perhaps the most important  
§ 3501 case since Crocker, the district court relied on the statute to 
admit a confession taken in violation of Miranda.350  
In Rivas-Lopez, state troopers stopped the defendant for a speed-
ing violation.351 After noticing what appeared to be drug residue, the 
troopers requested and received permission to search the rest of the 
vehicle.352 The troopers advised the defendant of his rights, following 
which the defendant twice responded that he did not wish to waive 
his rights; the officer later asked whether he would talk “out of 
Miranda,” the suspect agreed and made incriminating statements.353 
In resolving the subsequent motion to suppress, the district 
court focused on whether Miranda or § 3501 would apply.354 The 
troopers apparently violated Miranda, but the question of admissi-
bility under § 3501 was unclear.355 Although the government refused 
to press the issue, the district court accepted the argument of amicus 
 
 345. See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Hon. Albert Gore, Jr., President of 
the Senate 1 (Sept. 10, 1997) (on file with author). 
 346. Supplemental Brief for the United States at 7, Leong (No. 96-4876). 
 347. See Order at 4-6, Leong (No. 96-4876). 
 348. See id. 
 349. 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Utah 1997). 
 350. See id. at 1436. 
 351. See id. at 1426. 
 352. See id. 
 353. Id. at 1426-27. 
 354. See id. at 1429. 
 355. See id. at 1436. 
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Safe Streets Coalition and applied the statute.356 The district court 
stated that “[t]he validity of § 3501(a) and (b) therefore depends 
upon whether Miranda imposes constitutional requirements or is an 
exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers over the admini-
stration of criminal justice in the federal courts.”357 The court held 
that Miranda merely was procedural, declared § 3501 constitutional, 
applied § 3501 to the facts of the case, and ordered a new eviden-
tiary hearing to explore the relevant factors.358 
The district court further acknowledged the government’s “curi-
ous position” in agreeing with the defendant that § 3501 was uncon-
stitutional.359 The court, however, ruled that the Tenth Circuit had 
previously “squarely upheld the constitutionality” of § 3501 in 
Crocker and thus felt bound by circuit precedent.360 In questioning 
the government’s odd stance, the court commented that: 
The government implies that the Miranda jurisprudence since the 
Crocker case would undoubtedly persuade this circuit to alter its 
course if given the chance, but apparently the government does not 
want to give the Tenth Circuit that chance. Given the above review 
of the cases and post-Miranda decisions, this court declines to so 
speculate, and will and must follow the precedent set in this cir-
cuit.361 
Although Rivas-Lopez would have been an excellent vehicle with 
which to litigate the § 3501 issue, the case ground to a halt when 
the defendant jumped bail and disappeared.362 
H. Dickerson and Dicta 
It has since become clear why the Justice Department has broken 
with the past several administrations and chosen not to defend the 
statute: the Clinton Administration has taken the position that  
§ 3501 is unconstitutional. While this is certainly not an uncommon 
 
 356. See id. at 1430. 
 357. Id. at 1430. 
 358. See id. at 1434-36. 
 359. Id. at 1430. 
 360. Id. at 1435. 
 361. Id. 
 362. The District of Utah has since reaffirmed Rivas-Lopez’s holding that § 3501 sup-
plants Miranda. See United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1256 (D. Utah 
1999). 
ONE-FIN.DOC 5/20/00 7:23 PM 
185] Undoing Miranda 
 251 
view within the legal academy, it represents a departure from past 
administrations and former Justice Department policy. 
What no Justice Department had accomplished, and, under the 
Clinton Administration has even opposed, the private bar achieved. 
In United States v. Dickerson,363 the Fourth Circuit upheld § 3501 
against constitutional challenge.364 The case involved a serial bank 
robber whom federal agents had taken into custody and interviewed. 
At the suppression hearing, the agent in charge testified that he gave 
Dickerson his Miranda warnings and obtained a valid waiver.365Ac-
cording to the agent, Dickerson offered his incriminating statements 
after the waiver was obtained.366 Dickerson, unsurprisingly, testified 
that he gave his incriminating statements during the interview before 
he received his Miranda warnings.367 The district court, noting dis-
crepancies between the agent’s testimony and information written on 
the waiver of rights form, ruled in favor of the defendant and thus 
suppressed the confession.368 The defendant did not argue however, 
that his confession was in any way involuntary. Rather, he argued 
simply that a technical violation of his Miranda rights had occurred: 
that the warning had come after rather than before he had made his 
slip of the tongue.369 
The U.S. Attorney’s office filed a motion for reconsideration that 
included affidavits from several agents corroborating the testimony 
that Dickerson had received his Miranda warnings at the start, as 
opposed to the end, of the interrogation.370 The government also 
raised § 3501 as an alternative basis for admitting the statements.371 
The district court, however, declined to reconsider its ruling.372 The 
government subsequently filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit, 
arguing that the district court’s decision should be reversed.373 
 
 
 363. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 364. See id. at 671. 
 365. See id. at 675. 
 366. See id. 
 367. See id. 
 368. See id. at 675-76. 
 369. See id. at 675. 
 370. See id. at 676-77. 
 371. See id. at 676. 
 372. See id. at 677. 
 373. See id. at 677-78. 
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During this time, the Justice Department announced that it 
would no longer defend § 3501 in the lower courts.374 The govern-
ment’s brief in Dickerson duly noted that the Department now pre-
vented the government from raising § 3501 on appeal.375 Amid this, 
the Washington Legal Foundation filed an amicus brief arguing that 
§ 3501 was applicable, noting that the government had presented  
§ 3501 before the district court in its motion for reconsideration, 
rendering this issue cognizable before the court.376 The Fourth Cir-
cuit permitted the Washington Legal Foundation, as amicus, to de-
fend the statute during oral argument. 
Just over a year later, the Fourth Circuit announced its opinion, 
upholding § 3501 against constitutional attack. Specifically, the 
court held that “[w]e have little difficulty concluding . . . that  
§ 3501, enacted at the invitation of the Supreme Court and pursuant 
to Congress’s unquestioned power to establish the rules of proce-
dure and evidence in the federal courts, is constitutional.”377 How-
ever, the Court castigated the Department of Justice for “elevating 
politics over law” by refusing to defend the statute.378 
The court thus firmly held that “§ 3501, rather than the judi-
cially created rule of Miranda,” governs the admissibility of confes-
sions in federal court.379 The court explained that Congress had en-
acted the statute “with the express purpose of legislatively overruling 
Miranda,”380 and that Congress had the authority to do so only if 
the Miranda warnings were not constitutionally mandated.381 Rely-
ing on post-Miranda cases in which the Court referred to the warn-
ings as “prophylactic,”382 and “not themselves protected by the 
Constitution,”383 the court of appeals ruled: 
 
 
 374. See Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno, supra note 344.  
 375. Brief for the United States at 34 n.19, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 
(4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750).     
    376. Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant United States at 
12-13, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750). 
 377. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 672. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 671. 
     381. Id. at 672.  
     382. Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)). 
 383. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
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As a consequence, the irrebutable presumption created by the 
Court in Miranda—that a confession obtained without the warn-
ings is presumed involuntary—is a fortiori not required by the 
Constitution. Accordingly, Congress necessarily possess [sic] the 
legislative authority to supercede the conclusive presumption cre-
ated by Miranda pursuant to its authority to prescribe the rules of 
procedure and evidence in the federal courts.384 
The court noted the dissent’s contention that the Miranda 
warnings were necessarily constitutionally compelled, or they pre-
sumably could not have been applied to the states, but concluded it 
to be an “interesting academic question” that “has no bearing on 
our conclusion that Miranda’s conclusive presumption is not re-
quired by the Constitution.”385 The court then applied § 3501 to 
Dickerson, and determined that the confession should have been 
admitted. 
In dissent, Judge Michael argued that the court should not have 
reached the § 3501 issue because it had not been presented by the 
Department.386 After the decision was handed down, Dickerson filed 
a petition for rehearing en banc. In an unusual move, the Depart-
ment joined Dickerson in asking for the en banc review. The De-
partment claimed that the Fourth Circuit’s decision to rely upon  
§ 3501 was in “error, and that its holding deserves reconsideration 
by the full court of appeals.”387 The WLF filed a reply, defending the 
circuit’s decision. The WLF further argued that en banc review was 
not warranted in this case because the Department had always main-
tained that it might take a different position on § 3501 in the Su-
preme Court. The Fourth Circuit ultimately denied panel rehearing 
or en banc reconsideration. As of this writing, the Supreme Court 
has granted Dickerson’s petition for certiorari.388 The Department of 
Justice, however, has once again joined Dickerson and will argue 
that § 3501 is unconstitutional. 
 
 384. Id. at 690-91. 
 385. Id. at 691. 
     386.  Id. at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 387. Brief for the United States in Support of Partial Hearing En Banc, Dickerson v. 
United States, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750). 
 388. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999). 
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I. Litigation Redux 
The litigation history of § 3501 is a bit difficult to decipher. It is 
surprising that a statute potentially as significant as § 3501 could be 
so haphazardly enforced. Even presidential administrations that sup-
ported the statute in theory failed to adopt any coordinated effort to 
seek the statute’s enforcement. Although a number of possible ex-
planations for this failure exist—constitutional doubts, concerns 
about the Supreme Court’s composition and receptivity of the fed-
eral judiciary to the statute, prosecutors’ general unfamiliarity with 
the statute—none seems satisfactory. Perhaps the most important 
factor in the statute’s decline is that federal law enforcement officers, 
who had been giving Miranda-like warnings to suspects years before 
the Court made it mandatory, had little difficulty continuing that 
practice. Because warnings were given in the vast majority of cases, it 
may have been difficult for prosecutors both familiar with the statute 
and willing to use it to find a proper case. Yet, it remains difficult to 
believe that the search was particularly aggressive, as so many seem-
ingly “appropriate” test cases were identified during the Clinton 
Administration. 
In fact, courts have invoked the statute in a variety of other con-
texts.389 By far, the most common use of the statute has been with 
respect to subsection (c)’s limitation on pre-arraignment delay.390 
Cases confronting the Miranda issue, however, are few and far 
between. Even so, numerous courts have been willing to use the fac-
tors articulated in § 3501(b) to assess a confession’s voluntariness,391 
 
 389. The cases cited herein represent but a fraction of those in which § 3501 was raised 
in some fashion. A complete survey of federal cases addressing the statute is on file with the 
author. 
    390. A computer-assisted search of cases addressing 3501(c)’s provisions involving pre-
arraignment delay uncovered more than 300 cases, many of which are unpublished. See, e.g., 
United States v. Broeske, 178 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669 
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Pham, 815 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1993); United States v. Rivera, 750 F. Supp. 614 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Lukens, 735 F. Supp. 387 (D. Wyo. 1990); United States v. 
Yong Bing-Gong, 594 F. Supp. 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Arcediamo, 371 F. 
Supp. 457 (D.N.J. 1974). 
 391. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 1767 (1999); United States v. Delacorte, 113 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Clarke, 110 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cournoyer, 118 F.3d 1279 (8th Cir. 
1997); United States v. Solano-Godines, 119 F.3d 8 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion); 
United States v. Hornbeck, 118 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 
747 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hodrick, 81 F.3d 171 (9th Cir. 1996) (table opinion), 
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but they have, by and large, either read the statute and Miranda in 
harmony, or failed altogether to note the constitutional issue.392 
Some courts have acknowledged the constitutional controversy swirl-
ing around § 3501, but have avoided it by ruling on alternative 
grounds.393 Similarly, where prosecutors have argued on the basis of 
§ 3501, courts have deemed it inapplicable for a variety of reasons, 
largely involving whether the defendant was in custody when the 
confession was made.394 Other courts, while relying on the volun-
tariness factors articulated in the statute, have held that Miranda 
plainly trumps § 3501.395 
Interestingly, courts have also been willing to invoke § 3501 in a 
number of related situations that accrue to the defendant’s benefit. 
For example, courts have often relied upon § 3501 to ensure that a 
defendant receives a pretrial voluntariness hearing,396 or to instruct 
 
full text available at No.94-50549, 94-50554, 1996 WL 155147 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1996); 
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text available at Nos. 96-4569, 96-4586, 1997 WL 563148 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1997); United 
States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Brown, 999 F.2d 548 
(10th Cir. 1993), full text available at No. 91-6366, 1993 WL 261953 (10th Cir. June 29, 
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 393. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. 
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 394. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 984 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Kan. 1997); United States 
v. McNaughton, 848 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 395. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 871 F. Supp 988 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev’d, 87 F.3d 
927 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 396. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Gonzalez, 105 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 1997) (table opinion), full text available at No. 96-
3083, 1997 WL 7273 (10th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997); United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 
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the jury to give a confession such weight as it deems appropriate,397 
or both.398 
Until certain individuals picked up the baton dropped during the 
Clinton Administration, there existed no coordinated effort to press 
the statute. “Press” is used here as opposed to “enforce” because un-
til the Clinton Justice Department, while no Administration en-
forced the statute vigorously, all—save perhaps the Johnson Admini-
stration—considered it constitutional. But it was not until the private 
bar became involved that courts began taking § 3501 seriously. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT AND § 3501 
The Supreme Court has not been entirely oblivious to § 3501’s 
existence. The Court apparently first acknowledged the statute’s po-
tential importance in Lego v. Twomey,399 which involved the standard 
by which the government was required to prove voluntariness and 
whether, once proved, the issue still called for a separate hearing out-
side the jury’s presence. The Court did note § 3501, but found it 
“inapplicable here.”400 
Although the Court had occasion to cite to the statute over the 
years,401 it did not have the opportunity to consider the statute’s 
 
1142 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Lee, 16 F.3d 1222 (6th Cir. 1994) (table opinion), full 
text available at No. 91-3833, 1994 WL 20089 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1994); United States v. 
Iwegbu, 6 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Maxwell, 484 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Douchette, 979 
F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wayne, 977 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1992) (table 
opinion), full text available at No. 91-10547, 1992 WL 302183 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1992); 
Randall v. United States, 454 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cluchette, 465 
F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Som, No. CRIM.A.96CR243RSPGJD, 
CRIM.A.96CR244RSPGJD, 1998 WL 59462 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1998); United States v. De 
Yian, No. 94 Cr. 719 (DLC), 1995 WL 368445 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1995); United States v. 
Barnett, 814 F. Supp. 1449 (D. Alaska 1992); United States v. Stevens, No. 91 Cr. 0881 
(KTD), 1992 WL 30586 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1992); United States v. Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93 
(N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 397. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 114 F.3d 1190 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opin-
ion); United States v. Kaba, 999 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 398. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir. 1994). The following cases 
use § 3501 in jury instructions only: United States v. Goss, 484 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Robinson, 459 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Fromal, 733 F. 
Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
 399. 404 U.S. 477 (1971). 
 400. Id. at 486 n.14. 
 401. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986); United States v. Raddatz, 
447 U.S. 667, 678 (1980); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975); Keeble v. United 
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constitutionality. In large part, this was the result of the govern-
ment’s failure to press the issue before the Court. In United States v. 
Green,402 for example, the Court took the unusual step of initiating a 
discussion about the statute from the bench. In Green, the Court 
considered the admissibility of a defendant’s potentially incriminat-
ing statements. Although the government had failed to raise § 3501 
below, the Court raised it, sua sponte, during oral argument: 
QUESTION: Mr. Roberts [representing the United States], can I 
ask about a provision that I didn’t even know about? I’ve been lis-
tening to Miranda cases and Edwards cases and Minnick cases for 
seven terms now. Why has the United States never cited in any of 
those cases 18 USC Section 3501? Is there some reason? 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, I don’t know why it has never been cited. 
. . . 
QUESTION: It’s certainly very relevant to this case, very relevant 
to a lot of other cases. It has never been cited to us. 
MR. ROBERTS: Well, we didn’t rely on it below in this case, and 
so we’re not in a position to rely upon it here. 
. . . 
QUESTION: Well, but don’t—does the Government not feel any 
duty to call the statute to the attention of lower courts? 
QUESTION: Or to this Court? 
MR. ROBERTS: I’m not aware that we have relied on it at any 
point.403 
In short, the government was not prepared to address § 3501’s 
relevance. Thus, even when the Court presented the issue on the 
proverbial silver platter, the government seemed reluctant to raise 
the statute. Unfortunately, the Green Court did not have the oppor-
 
States, 412 U.S. 205, 207 n.3 (1973); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 n.14 (1972). 
 402. 504 U.S. 908, cert. dismissed, 507 U.S. 545 (1993) (certiorari dismissed after the 
death of respondent). 
 403. Transcript of Oral Argument in United States v. Green, No. 91-1521, 1992 WL 
687878, at *18-*20 (Nov. 30, 1992). 
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tunity to consider the statute’s applicability. It dismissed the case 
when the respondent died, postponing § 3501’s day of reckoning. 
The Court did consider the effect of § 3501(c), concerning pre-
arraignment delay. In United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,404 the Court 
identified without qualification § 3501 as “the statute governing the 
admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions.”405 There, the 
Court concluded that the provisions of § 3501(c), which require a 
suspect to be brought before a magistrate within six hours, were not 
triggered until there was an arrest by a federal officer.406 The Court 
therefore found it unnecessary to decide whether the statute replaced 
the Court’s so-called McNabb-Mallory rule requiring the suppression 
of a voluntary confession made during delay in presenting a suspect 
before a magistrate. The Justice Department had no trouble defend-
ing this part of § 3501 or explaining in its brief that the statute “re-
quires the admission” of voluntary statements.407 The Department 
neither suggested that § 3501(a) was unconstitutional, nor did it ad-
dress the severability question that would inevitably arise if the Court 
upheld one provision of the statute, but not another. While the con-
stitutionality of § 3501(a) was not at issue, it is worth noting that 
the government expressed no qualms about the statute when it had 
the chance. 
The government again had the opportunity to litigate the issue 
less than a year later. In Davis v. United States,408 the government 
was again asked by the Court to clarify its position with respect to  
§ 3501. Davis involved a federal court-martial in which the defen-
dant sought to use his ambiguous request for counsel as a means to 
suppress his subsequent statements implicating him in a murder. 
Davis did not contend that his statements were in any way “involun-
tary”; rather, he argued only that his request for counsel, however 
inarticulate, should have stopped further questioning. 
Despite an amicus brief from the Washington Legal Foundation 
raising the § 3501 issue, the Solicitor General’s Office asserted that  
 
 
 404. 511 U.S. 350 (1994). 
 405. Id. at 351. 
 406. See id. at 358. 
 407. Brief for the United States, United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350 (1994) 
(No. 82-1812). 
 408. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
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§ 3501 was inapplicable in the context of a court-martial.409 During 
oral argument, Richard Seamon, the Assistant to the Solicitor Gen-
eral was pointedly asked whether § 3501 had any bearing on the 
case. He declined even to express an opinion on whether it was rele-
vant to ordinary criminal prosecutions, however. The Court then 
grilled him on the government’s failure to take a position with re-
spect to the statute: 
QUESTION: I find it extraordinary that you don’t take a position 
on that and haven’t taken a position on that for many years. I can’t 
understand. The language of 3501 seems to squarely apply, and the 
Government just comes in time after time and doesn’t take any po-
sition on raising 3501, continues to argue Miranda as though 
there’s no statute specifically addressing it? 
MR. SEAMON [representing the United States]: I- 
QUESTION: Now, today the reason is that this is under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, which we’re going to interpret to be 
stricter on prophylactic results, contrary to everything else I’ve ever 
seen, than is civil or civilian criminal procedures. But it seems to me 
the Government ought to have a position on this. 
MR. SEAMON: You may well be right, Justice Scalia.410 
Although repeatedly pressed by the Court with respect to the 
government’s position on § 3501, Mr. Seamon stated: “We don’t 
take a position on that issue.”411 Despite the Court’s earlier prod-
ding, as in Green, the government was either ill-prepared, or unwill-
ing, to address § 3501. 
The Davis Court relied on Miranda to hold that police officers 
may continue to interrogate a suspect until he clearly and unambi-
guously requests counsel. It did not consider the effect (if any) of  
§ 3501; because the Department had not relied on § 3501, the 
Court would “decline the invitation of some amici to consider it.”412 
The government was not permitted to escape entirely unscathed, 
 
 409. See Brief for the United States at 18 n.13, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 
(1994) (No. 92-1949). 
 410. Official Transcript of Oral Argument in Davis v. United States, at 44-45, 512 U.S. 
452 (1994) (No. 92-1949). 
 411. Id. at 44. 
 412. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994). 
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however. Justice Scalia penned a concurring opinion devoted to  
§ 3501 in which he argued that the Court should in the future con-
sider the statute sua sponte if it is not raised by the parties: 
I agree with the Court that it is proper, given the Government’s 
failure to raise the point, to render judgment without taking ac-
count of § 3501. But the refusal to consider arguments not raised 
is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or constitu-
tional mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the 
contrary. As far as I am concerned, such a time will have arrived 
when a case that comes within the terms of this statute is next pre-
sented to us.413 
That time arrived five years later in Dickerson. But before we 
consider that landmark ruling, a review of more recent congressional 
action is in order. 
VII. CONGRESS REDISCOVERS § 3501 
Article II of the Constitution requires the Executive Branch to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”414 At times, this 
constitutional injunction creates tension between the executive and 
legislative branches. Ordinarily, the Executive Branch must enforce 
congressional acts.415 Although some scholars have argued that the 
Executive Branch is required to defend all such acts,416 it is more 
generally understood that the Executive Branch “has the duty to de-
fend an act of Congress whenever a reasonable argument can be 
made in support, even if the attorney general and the lawyers exam-
ining the case concluded that the argument may ultimately be un-
successful in the courts.”417 Controversy has erupted over whether 
this requirement to defend all “reasonable” acts extends to statutes 
which are of dubious constitutionality. Occasionally, the executive 
department has declined to enforce a statute it concludes is unconsti-
tutional. In such circumstances, Congress has statutorily required the 
 
 413. Id. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 414. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 415. Indeed, the Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]o contend that the obligation 
imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their 
execution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissible.” Kendall v. 
United States, 37 U.S. (1 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838). 
 416. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 306 
(1974); EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 79 (3d ed. 1948). 
 417. 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 25, 25-26 (1981). 
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Justice Department to inform the legislative branch when it declines 
to defend a congressional act.418 This issue never arose with respect 
to § 3501, partly because each administration deemed the statute 
constitutional, and partly because no Department had squarely liti-
gated the statute’s constitutionality. 
Congress, which appeared largely indifferent to the fate of  
§ 3501, rediscovered the statute in 1995, and ultimately forced the 
Clinton Administration to take a stand on the statute’s constitution-
ality. Shortly after taking control of the Senate, Republican members 
called upon the Justice Department to enforce § 3501 and intro-
duced a crime bill that included, among other things, a redrafting of 
§ 3501(a) to place the burden of proving “involuntariness” upon the 
defendant and limiting the effect of pre-arraignment delay on a con-
fession’s admissibility.419 Although nothing became of the legislation, 
the Senate took a keen interest in the statute, making it a focus of 
inquiry during the nominations hearings of several key Department 
officials. 
At first, the Clinton Administration took a cautious view of the 
statute. In response to a written question from Senator Orrin Hatch 
following an oversight hearing into the Department of Justice’s ac-
tivities, Attorney General Reno explained “[t]he Department of Jus-
tice does not have a policy that would preclude it from defending the 
constitutional validity of Section 3501 in an appropriate case.”420 
The Attorney General’s statement essentially mirrored that of her 
predecessors.  
When a seemingly appropriate case (Cheely) did arise, the De-
partment changed course. During an oversight hearing focusing on 
the Solicitor General’s Office, Senator Fred Thompson queried then 
Solicitor General Drew Days on the Department’s commitment to 
enforcing § 3501. Questions had arisen as to the Department’s en-
thusiasm to enforce the statute in light of its reversal of course in 
Cheely. Under Senator Thompson’s questioning, Solicitor General 
Days denied that the Department had adopted a policy of declining 
to enforce the statute.421 In fact, he emphatically stated: 
 
 418. 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994). 
 419. See S.3, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1995, § 507, 28 
U.S.C. § 994 (1995). 
 420. Department of Justice Oversight: Hearing on Focusing on the Administration of Justice 
and the Enforcement of Laws Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 52 (1995). 
 421. See Solicitor General Oversight: Hearing on the Operation and Activities of the Office 
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Let me make clear, Senator, that there is no policy in the Depart-
ment, and the Attorney General has already advised the committee 
of this fact, against raising 3501 in an appropriate case. Indeed, we 
have used some provisions of 3501. . . .  
 So I think it is really a question of our making the decision as 
prosecutors when we are going to raise these issues.422 
The Solicitor General’s response at the same time echoed that of 
other key Department officials, and predicted the Department’s fu-
ture position. 
Again in 1997, Attorney General Reno, when asked whether the 
Department would raise § 3501 in appropriate circumstances, prom-
ised “I’d do it if it’s right in an appropriate case.”423 This “appropri-
ate case” language seemed to make the rounds. In June of 1997, 
then-United States Attorney Eric Holder, during his hearing to be 
confirmed as Deputy Attorney General, promised to support the 
statute in an “appropriate” situation. “I would,” he declared, “sup-
port the use of Section 3501 in an appropriate circumstance.”424
 Foreshadowing events to come, he explained, however, that as 
U.S. Attorney, his “office has not invoked subsections (a) and (b) of 
Section 3501 . . . even though officers may not have complied with 
the dictates of Miranda.”425 “Nor . . . has my office invoked this pro-
vision during the tenure of my predecessors.”426 
The Department appeared reluctant to invoke the provision at 
all. In the wake of the Leong case, Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, and five additional members of that 
committee wrote Attorney General Reno and asked her to defend 
the statute: 
We believe that section 3501 is constitutional. While the Supreme 
Court has not passed in this question directly, we believe that the 
 
of Solicitor General Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 31-33 (1995). 
 422. Id. at 31; see also id. at 42 (answering question from Senator Biden that “with re-
spect to [§] 3501, as I indicated earlier, there is no Department policy against using 3501 in an 
appropriate case”). 
 423. Department of Justice Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 89-90 (1997). 
 424. Nominations of Joel I. Klein and Eric H. Holder, Jr.: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 124 (1997). 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
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court would uphold the statute. . . . The undersigned Members do 
not want to see guilty offenders go free to a technical error if the 
department easily can prevent such a miscarriage of justice by in-
voking the current law.427 
In that same letter, the Senators recounted the repeated assur-
ances they had received from Department officials that the statute 
would be defended in “an appropriate case.” They noted, for exam-
ple, the Solicitor General’s testimony concerning the decision of the 
Department not to pursue § 3501 in Cheely, pointing out that 
Mr. Days attributed the Department’s refusal . . . to pursue the is-
sue any further in the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Cheely 
not to doubts about its constitutionality-indeed he never suggested 
in the course of the hearing that the Department had any such 
doubts-but instead to various litigation strategy considerations. He 
specifically stated that the decision not to press the argument in 
those cases ‘doesn’t mean we won’t under other circumstances.’428 
In response to the Senators’ letter, the Attorney General notified 
Congress that the Department would not defend § 3501 in the 
lower courts.429 She explained that the Department reserved the 
right, however, to invoke the statute in the Supreme Court. Appar-
ently, the only “appropriate case” in the Justice Department’s view 
was one arising in the Supreme Court. Indeed, John C. Keeny, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, issued a 
memorandum explaining the Department’s decision not to defend 
the statute in Leong to all U.S. attorneys and department section 
chiefs. The memorandum communicated the Department’s position 
that “unless the Supreme Court were to modify or overrule 
Miranda . . . lower courts are not free to rely on Section 3501 to 
admit statements that would be excluded by Miranda.”430 Although 
the memorandum explained that the Department had not yet de-
 
 427. Letter from Senators Orrin Hatch, Strom Thurmond, Fred Thompson, Jon Kyl, 
John Ashcroft, and Jeff Sessions to Attorney General Janet Reno 3, 5 (Aug. 28, 1997) (copy 
on file with author). 
 428. Id. at 4-5 (quoting testimony of Solicitor General Drew Days). 
 429. Letter From Attorney General Janet Reno to the Honorable Albert Gore, Jr., Presi-
dent of the Senate 1 (Nov. 1, 1997); cf. 2 U.S.C. § 288 (1994) (requiring the Department of 
Justice to notify Congress when refusing to enforce statute). 
 430. Memorandum for All United States Attorneys and Criminal Division Section Chiefs 
from John C. Keeny, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division 2 (Nov. 6, 
1997). 
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cided whether it would ask the Supreme Court to “overrule or mod-
ify Miranda,” it required prosecutors to “consult[]” with the Crimi-
nal Division in any case involving the § 3501’s voluntariness provi-
sion.431 The difficulty, of course, was that if the Department refused 
to invoke the statute in the lower courts, it was unlikely but (as sub-
sequent events have shown), not impossible, for the Supreme Court 
ever to consider the statute. 
The Judiciary Committee later pressed the Department on its 
position with respect to § 3501. Some three months after receiving 
Attorney General Reno’s notification letter, Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Orrin Hatch asked Solicitor General nominee Seth Wax-
man whether he believed that the Fifth Amendment compelled the 
Miranda warnings. Rather than focusing on the Department’s view 
of § 3501, Chairman Hatch instead decided to uncover whether the 
Solicitor General nominee believed the Miranda warnings to be a 
constitutional mandate. Mr. Waxman responded: 
It is my understanding of Miranda . . . that the Miranda warnings 
themselves were not ever regarded as direct requirements com-
pelled by the Constitution. Rather, . . . the Court reached its hold-
ing in Miranda as one means of implementing the Fifth Amend-
ment’s protection against compulsory self-incrimination in the 
context of custodial interrogation. The Court itself recognized that 
Congress or the States might supplant the Miranda warnings if 
those bodies provided equally effective means of apprising suspects 
of their rights.432 
The crucial issue in this debate would therefore become whether  
§ 3501 satisfied Miranda’s holding, as an “equally effective” means 
of protecting suspects’ rights. 
The Committee’s exploration of this issue culminated with Sena-
tor Strom Thurmond’s examination of James Robinson, nominated 
to head the Criminal Division. During Robinson’s confirmation 
hearing, Senator Thurmond pointedly asked whether he believed  
§ 3501 to be unconstitutional.433 Mr. Robinson responded by ob-
serving “it is a difficult question. To use a law school analogy, . . . it 
 
 431. See id. 
 432. Nomination of Seth Waxman to be Solicitor General: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 101 (1997). 
 433. See The Nomination of James K. Robinson to be Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. 12 (1998). 
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is an essay question rather than a true-false question,” one that the 
Department had long struggled with.434 
And struggle the Department did. Following the Dickerson deci-
sion, Senator Hatch, joined by eight of his Senate colleagues, once 
again urged the Department to enforce § 3501. The Senators noted 
that Department officials had repeatedly pledged to defend congres-
sional acts where they could make reasonable arguments: “The 
Dickerson decision demonstrates beyond doubt that there are ‘rea-
sonable arguments’ to defend 18 U.S.C. 3501. In fact, these argu-
ments are so reasonable that they have prevailed in every Court that 
has directly addressed their merits.”435 Dickerson forced the Depart-
ment to take a stand. While Department officials had claimed that 
they would enforce the statute in an “appropriate case” and inti-
mated that they may choose to argue the case before the Supreme 
Court, they finally took the stance in Dickerson that the statute was 
unconstitutional. 
More recently, Senator Strom Thurmond chaired a subcommit-
ted hearing to examine the Justice Department’s refusal to enforce  
§ 3501.436 The hearing focused on three broad themes: first, whether 
previous administrations had supported § 3501’s constitutionality, 
and whether the Clinton Administration could refuse to enforce the 
statute; second, whether Miranda had adversely affected criminal in-
vestigations; and finally, whether Congress could, pursuant to its au-
thority to establish judicial rules of evidence and procedure, statuto-
rily supplant the now-familiar warnings. Witnesses affirmed the view 
that the Clinton Administration’s decision not to enforce the statute 
broke with long-standing Department precedent.437Similarly, the 
subcommittee heard testimony that Miranda had a substantial nega-
tive impact on criminal investigations.438 Unsurprisingly, the legal 
scholars who testified at the hearing sharply disagreed over  
 
 
 434. Id. 
 435. Letter from Senator Orrin Hatch and Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
to Attorney General Janet Reno, 1-2 (Mar. 4, 1999) (copy on file with author). 
 436. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary (May 13, 1999). 
 437. See id. at 8-9 (statement of Stephen J. Markman); id. at 39 (statement of Paul Cas-
sell). 
 438. See id. at 21-25 (statement of Gilbert G. Gallegos); id. at 67-83 (statement of Paul 
Cassell). 
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Congress’s authority439 to statutorily modify Miranda’s require-
ments. Regardless, the stage was set for the Court to intervene. 
VIII. A QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Dickerson has forced consideration of the issue of whether the 
Miranda warnings are constitutionally compelled or, like the rules of 
evidence, susceptible to modification. Instead of allowing the issue 
to percolate in the lower courts, the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari review in Dickerson and will soon consider § 3501’s constitu-
tionality.440 This issue has spawned considerable scholarly debate.
 Professor Paul Cassell has eloquently argued on behalf of the 
statute’s constitutionality.441 His arguments, which I find persuasive, 
build upon those originally advanced by Professor Joseph Grano in 
his seminal work.442 Those arguments rest largely on two premises. 
First, the claim is made that the Miranda Court expressly invited 
Congress and the states to draft new procedural protections “equally 
effective” in safeguarding suspects’ Fifth Amendment rights. If, it is 
argued, the warnings were constitutionally mandated, then why did 
the Supreme Court invite Congress and the states to craft their own 
procedures?443 
Second, regardless of what the Miranda Court may have in-
tended, since that decision, the Court has regularly characterized the 
warnings as “prophylactic” in nature and not themselves constitu-
tionally guaranteed. In Michigan v. Tucker,444 for example, the Court 
considered whether to admit testimony from a suspect about a wit-
ness who later incriminated that suspect at trial.445 The Tucker Court 
deemed it relevant to ask whether the challenged police interroga-
tion “directly infringed upon respondent’s right against compulsory 
self-incrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic 
 
 439. Compare id. at 26-34 (statements of Daniel C. Richman and George Thoma) with 
id. at 34-67 (statement of Paul Cassell). 
 440. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999). 
 441. See Paul Cassell, supra note 72. 
 442. See generally JOSEPH GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993); see also 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 293, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 437, 515 (1989). 
 443. See Cassell, supra note 72; GRANO supra note 442. 
 444. 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
 445. Id. at 436-37. 
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rules developed to protect that right.”446 The police had given the 
suspect incomplete Miranda warnings. The Court nevertheless up-
held admission of the contested testimony on the ground that the 
officers’ failure to provide adequate warnings “did not abridge re-
spondent’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards 
later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privi-
lege.”447 The Tucker Court stressed that Miranda did not “require[ ] 
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of 
the interrogation process.”448 In explaining that the warnings were 
not constitutionally guaranteed rights, the Court observed that 
Miranda styled them as “practical reinforcement” to protect the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination.449 
Subsequent to Tucker, the Court has continued to describe the 
warnings as “prophylactic” rather than as “compelled” by the Fifth 
Amendment.450 In Oregon v. Elstad,451 for example, the Court con-
sidered whether to exclude, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine, a statement not preceded by Miranda warnings that 
led to a later confession accompanied by appropriate warnings.452 In 
ruling that the confession was properly admitted, the Court clarified 
that the Miranda rule “sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amend-
ment itself. . . . Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy 
even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional 
harm.”453 “[A] failure to administer Miranda warnings” the Court 
declared, was not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment.454 A so-
called non-Mirandized confession was thus not tantamount to an 
“involuntary” confession. Because it refused to equate a Miranda 
violation with a Fifth Amendment violation, the Court had little 
 
 446. Id. at 439. 
 447. Id. at 446. 
 448. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). 
 449. See id. 
 450. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994); Duckworth v. Eagan, 
492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985). 
 451. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 452. Id. at 300. 
 453. Id. at 306-07; see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (stating that 
Miranda warnings are necessary to “reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to 
constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation”); United States v. Crocker, 
510 F.2d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1975) (suggesting constitutionality of § 3501). 
 454. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 n.1. 
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trouble in deciding that otherwise voluntary statements taken in vio-
lation of Miranda may nevertheless be used for impeachment pur-
poses.455 Presumably, if the warnings were Fifth Amendment re-
quirements, then the government would be forbidden from using 
statements taken in violation of Miranda. 
Similarly, in creating a public safety exception to Miranda, the 
court in New York v. Quarles456 described the Miranda warnings as a 
means for safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights, rather than rights 
protected by the constitution. Drawing a distinction between the 
warnings and the right against compelled self-incrimination, the 
Court explained that “the failure to provide Miranda warnings in and 
of itself does not render a confession involuntary.”457 The Court ef-
fectively rebuffed the Miranda majority’s conclusion that custodial 
interrogation is inherently coercive. In part, this seeming reversal of 
course may be a result of the Court’s differentiation between, as Pro-
fessor Grano has illustrated, “potential” compulsion and “inherent” 
compulsion. In other words, “jeopardizing Fifth Amendment rights 
is different from actually violating them; and assuring that Fifth 
Amendment rights are protected is different from concluding that 
they have actually been infringed.”458 Setting aside these core consti-
tutional issues for the time being, I would like briefly to explore sev-
eral other problems with which the Supreme Court will likely grap-
ple. 
A. If Everyone Agrees, Does a Case or Controversy Exist? 
At the outset, the Court must determine whether Article III 
“case or controversy” requirements are met. This question, normally 
self-evident in criminal cases, arises because the parties in interest—
Dickerson and the United States—agree that § 3501 is unconstitu-
 
 455. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 228 (1971). But see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (reaffirming its 
views that “a defendant’s compelled statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of 
Miranda,” may not be used even for impeachment purposes at trial). 
 456. 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). 
 457. Id. at 655 n.5 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)). 
 458. JOSEPH GRANO, supra note 442, at 180. Similarly, the so-called “cat out of the bag 
rule” applies when police initially failed to warn the suspect of his rights, subsequently realized 
the oversight, and then afford the suspect the opportunity to confess again after having re-
ceived proper warnings. The second confession is admissible provided that the first confession, 
even if taken in violation of Miranda, was voluntary. In fact, police need not even inform her 
that the initial confession was tainted. See Oregon v. Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985). 
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tional. As a consequence, the Court appointed an amicus to defend 
the judgment of the court below.459 To say this is odd is a bit of an 
understatement. If the parties in interest agree with respect to the 
statute’s constitutionality, and the Court is forced to rely on an ami-
cus to defend the judgment below, then does an Article III “case” or 
“controversy” exist? 
Article III limits federal courts to deciding “actual controversies 
arising between adverse litigants.”460 By adopting this limitation, the 
framers sought to confine federal courts to resolving only those dis-
putes that “are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution 
 
 459. The Supreme Court has since appointed Paul Cassell as amicus to defend the judg-
ment below. Although odd, it is not without precedent. In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 
614 (1998), for example, the Supreme Court appointed amicus to brief and argue in support 
of the decision below where the United States disagreed with the court of appeals’ analysis. 
Similarly, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982), the Court invited an 
amicus to file a brief and argue “in support of the judgements below” where the United States 
was not prepared to do so. Dickerson, of course, is a criminal case, which makes the appoint-
ment of an amicus to represent the court’s judgment below a trifle more controversial. Al-
though it is perhaps no more controversial than the United States’ unusual position in Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In that case, the United States actually took two seemingly op-
posing litigating positions before the Court. In a brief filed on behalf of the Attorney General 
and the Federal Election Commission, the government argued that the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act was a legitimate means of curbing corruption and did not run foul of the First 
Amendment. Brief for the Attorney General & Federal Election Comm’n, Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437).  In a separate brief filed on behalf of the Attor-
ney General as appellee and for the United States as amicus, the government took the position 
that certain aspects of the challenged statute may have infringed upon First Amendment values, 
but that the case was not sufficiently ripe for the Supreme Court to review. Brief for the Attor-
ney General as Appellee & for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437). In the second brief, the Attorney General was a named 
defendant; thus, as a party, the Attorney General joined only a portion of the brief. In addi-
tion, the Federal Election Commission filed a brief supporting the statute’s constitutionality 
and arguing on behalf of Congress’s authority to create an election commission. Brief of Fed-
eral Election Comm’n, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-437). 
 460. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911). Article III states in relevant 
part: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between 
two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between citi-
zens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under 
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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through the judicial process.”461 If a court purports to rule on an is-
sue that is not a case or controversy, it is performing a duty that is 
not “properly judicial,”462 and its opinion is merely advisory. The al-
leged problem in the Dickerson case stems from the fact that both 
the government and the defendant seem to agree that § 3501 is un-
constitutional.463 
Does this eliminate the Article III case or controversy require-
ment? Probably not. The Court long ago articulated the basic case or 
controversy requirements: 
By cases and controversies are intended the claims of litigants 
brought before the courts for determination by such regular pro-
ceedings as are established by law or custom for the protection or 
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of 
wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States takes such a form that the ju-
dicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case. 
The term implies the existence of present or possible adverse par-
ties, whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudica-
tion.464 
While the parties are not adverse with respect to the legal claim, 
if the statue is upheld, there will doubtless be “possible” adverse par-
ties in the future. Additionally, the application of a statute to a par-
ticular factual scenario plainly bespeaks a situation in which the judi-
cial power is capable of “acting upon” the legal issue presented. 
Fourth Circuit law in the post-Dickerson world states that § 3501 
controls the admission of voluntary statements. Although the Execu-
tive Branch has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional, and 
likely will refuse to raise it, lower federal courts are bound by circuit 
precedent to address it. This places the federal courts in an odd posi-
tion, one that involves a “pure” legal question the Supreme Court is 
particularly able to resolve. 
Unquestionably, the parties’ agreement about the construction 
of a particular law is not binding upon the courts. In Kamen v. 
 
 461. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). 
 462. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 352 (quoting Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792)). 
 463. In fact, the government refused to raise the statute either before the district court or 
the court of appeals and has now joined the defendant before the Supreme Court. 
 464. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 357 (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 
(N.D. Cal. 1887)). 
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Kemper Financial Services,465 the Court explained that “[w]hen an 
issue or claim is properly before the court,466 the court is not limited 
to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather re-
tains the independent power to identify and apply the proper con-
struction of governing law.”467 Unlike a factual finding, a legal inter-
pretation does not lend itself to stipulation. The Court had recent 
occasion to address this issue in a related context. In United States 
National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of Amer-
ica,468 a group of insurance agents challenged the Comptroller of the 
Currency’s decision to permit the bank to sell insurance. The district 
court granted summary judgment for the bank, ruling that 12 
U.S.C. § 92, which authorizes banks to act as insurance agents in 
towns with populations under five thousand, authorized the Comp-
troller’s decision. The insurance agents appealed, arguing that the 
district court had misapplied the statute. The D.C. Circuit, however, 
expressed some concern about whether the statute had been repealed 
and, on its own motion, directed the parties to brief the question of 
the statute’s continuing vitality. Despite the fact that the parties 
stipulated that § 92 remained in effect, the court of appeals con-
cluded that it had, in fact, been repealed, and thus entered judgment 
for the agents. In a concurring opinion to the denial of rehearing en 
banc, Judge David Sentelle explained: “[B]y declining to argue that 
Congress repealed the section, appellants cannot stipulate into exis-
tence a repealed statute.”469 The Supreme Court subsequently vindi-
cated the court of appeals’s decision to consider the statute sua 
sponte.470 The Court explained that the parties’ decision whether the 
 
 465. 500 U.S. 90 (1991). 
 466. While some have suggested that the Court lacked legal authority to address the con-
stitutionality of § 3501, an issue not raised below, it has been persuasively argued that the 
Court may give sua sponte consideration to the applicability of a statute, regardless of whether 
the parties raised it. See Eric D. Miller, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. §3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (comment arguing that courts can consider § 3501 sua sponte). 
Indeed, it has long been the case that “[t]he law . . .is a matter of which the courts of the 
United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.” Lamar v. Micou, 114 
U.S. 218, 223 (1885). Moreover, § 3501 is a directive to courts, not to prosecutors; thus it 
should make no difference whether the parties raised the statute—courts have an independent 
obligation to consider the applicability of relevant law. 
 467. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 99 (citation omitted) (footnote added). 
 468. 508 U.S. 439 (1993). 
 469. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (Sentelle, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 470. U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993). Al-
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statute was repealed could not possibly bind the federal courts. A 
contrary decision, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, would 
put the Court in the position of possibly construing, and applying, a 
non-existent statute.471 
The Court’s refusal to be bound by the parties’ construction of a 
statute is not of recent origin. The Court has long ignored the par-
ties’ understanding as to “the legal issues in the present case and 
those resolved by” precedent.472 In truth, the Court’s decisions are 
often predicated on legal theories neither propounded by the parties, 
nor raised in the courts below.473 The tradition of amicus curiae 
submissions stands as a testament to the Court’s ability and occa-
sional need to look beyond the parties’ understanding of the law.474
 Consequently, in cases where a legal theory the Court finds es-
sential to the decision requires further illumination, it has not hesi-
tated to order rebriefing and reargument.475 
Nor are there prudential reasons for the Court to fret about the 
case or controversy requirement. The court of appeals undertook its 
§ 3501 analysis openly and carefully. In no sense could the “losing 
party claim to have been ambushed.”476 Both the government and 
the defendant had “an opportunity to be heard” and “the opportu-
nity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues.”477
 Furthermore, the issue under consideration by the court of ap-
peals was a pure question of law, which appellate courts are particu-
 
though the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, it did so because it believed that the 
statute had not been repealed. Id. at 462-63. 
 471. See id. at 464 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 472. Sanford’s Estate v. IRS, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939). 
 473. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Kamen, 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990); Citi-
bank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660 (1990); McKesson v. Div. of Alcoholic 
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Separate 
opinions frequently set forth legal theories pressed by none of the parties. See, e.g., American 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Segura v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984). 
 474. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 37.1, 28.7; FED. R. APP. P. 29. 
 475. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 503 U.S. 928 (1992); 
McKesson v. Division of Alcohol Beverage and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1989); Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528 (1984), New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214 (1984); Alfred Dunhill of Lon-
don, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 422 U.S. 1005 (1975); Benton v. Maryland, 393 U.S. 994 
(1968). 
 476. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 42 n.2 (1992). 
 477. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). 
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larly well-situated to consider de novo.478 The only possible factual 
concern involves the timing of the Miranda warnings, but that is 
wholly incidental to whether § 3501 should apply or how the statute 
should be construed. Even if the “case or controversy” hurdle is suc-
cessfully cleared, several other interesting problems remain. It is to 
these questions I will now turn. 
B. The Problem of Miranda’s Application to the States 
Those advocating the Miranda warnings as being constitution-
ally required have persuasively argued that the Supreme Court could 
not have foisted the warnings upon the states unless those warnings 
were commanded by the Fifth Amendment. If, it is claimed, 
Miranda merely reflects a prophylactic procedural rule, how can the 
Court compel state courts to follow its terms? After all, the Court 
has expressly disavowed the power to impose supervisory rules on 
state courts.479 Rather, the Court’s power “is limited to enforcing the 
commands of the United States Constitution.”480 If Miranda reflects 
a procedural rule, the Court cannot easily justify its imposition of 
that rule on state courts. It can impose its will upon those courts 
only to the extent that federal constitutional issues are at stake. The 
warnings thus must be, it is claimed, a constitutional command. The 
Dickerson opinion acknowledges that Miranda’s application to the 
states is “an interesting academic question.”481 
Professor Cassell has offered perhaps the best answer to this per-
plexing question. He explains that Miranda “can be best understood 
not as a constitutional command, but as an exercise of the Court’s 
authority to improvise a remedy when it is presented with an issue 
implicating a constitutional right for which there is not at the time of 
the decision a constitutionally or legislatively specified remedy.”482 As 
 
 478. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 
(1991). 
 479. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (“Federal courts hold no su-
pervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of 
constitutional dimension.”). As Justice Stevens has observed, the “Court’s power to require 
state courts to exclude probative self-incriminating statements rests entirely” on the Court’s 
power to enforce the Constitution. Oregon v. Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 370-71 & n.15 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 480. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991). 
 481. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 691 n.21 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 482. Cassell, supra note 72, at 237. 
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such, Congress is free to alter the rule as it sees fit—provided, of 
course, that the remedial scheme enacted by Congress provides 
“meaningful relief” for any constitutional violation.483 
This explanation dovetails nicely with the Court’s persistent 
characterization of the warnings as “prophylactic.” If the Miranda 
warnings were in fact compelled by the Fifth Amendment then later 
cases such as Oregon v. Elstead484 and Michigan v. Tucker,485 in which 
the Court draws a distinction between Miranda violations and Fifth 
Amendment violations, cannot easily be explained. As Professor Cas-
sell has noted, “The judicially devised remedy may sweep more 
broadly than is strictly necessary to vindicate a particular constitu-
tional right,” but is itself not a constitutional command.486 As a con-
sequence of this line of reasoning, Congress is free to modify the 
Court’s chosen remedy. 
To understand, one must appreciate that the Miranda “remedy” 
is not really a remedy at all. Rather, it is a prophylactic device—an an-
ticipatory remedy—to ensure that no violation of the right, hence no 
future remedy, is needed. The Court has itself explained that “[t]he 
prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected 
by the Constitution,”487 but instead are merely “recommended pro-
cedural safeguards.”488 The implications of this understanding are 
important. In Miranda, the Court itself invited Congress to create a 
system as protective of the suspect’s rights as the Miranda warnings. 
This invitation aptly suits the claim that the particular formulation 
the Court laid down is not constitutionally required, but instead is 
an effort to prevent the violation of a right. 
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the Court considered the 
question of whether it had supervisory authority over state courts. It 
was not until considerably later that this issue was directly addressed 
by the Court, and even then, no party has squarely presented the  
 
 
 483. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988). Cf. Palermo v. United States, 
360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) (upholding statutory modification of court-created rule). 
 484. 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 (1985) (noting that “a simple failure to administer Miranda 
warnings is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment”); accord New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984). 
 485. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 486. Cassell, supra note 72, at 237. 
 487. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (internal quotation omitted). 
 488. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994) (internal quotation omitted). 
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issue of whether Miranda was a valid exercise of the Court’s supervi-
sory authority. 
If the Court decides that Miranda is merely a prophylactic safe-
guard, as Professor Cassell has argued, and upholds § 3501, an inter-
esting question presents itself. What will state courts do, when con-
fronted with a Fifth Amendment claim? After all, § 3501 applies by 
its own terms only to federal courts. Thus, it does not apply to the 
states. On the other hand, if Miranda is merely a supervisory rule, 
then it can’t be binding upon the states. But, if the warnings are un-
derstood as a means of enforcing the Fifth Amendment, then the 
Court’s decision makes sense. The Court disavowed that the states 
were forever prevented from structuring law enforcement interroga-
tions in a different manner. To assuage this “supervisory” problem, 
the Court explained that “the States are free to develop their own 
safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as 
those described above in informing accused persons of their right of 
silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”489
 Miranda therefore contemplates a role for the states in the 
elaboration of appropriate safeguards for the compelled self-
incrimination privilege. Presumably, the Miranda warnings will con-
tinue to bind the states, at least until the states pick up the cudgel 
and enact statutes that mirror § 3501, or Congress chooses to exer-
cise its enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
create similar rules for application in the states. 
C. Boerne and the Problem of Constitutional Interpretation 
Whether Miranda warnings are constitutionally required is only 
one side of the equation. Even if the Court declines to equate 
Miranda with the Fifth Amendment, it may nevertheless decide that 
Congress lacks the statutory authority to resurrect constitutional 
safeguards that the Court previously rejected as inadequate. After all, 
§ 3501 endeavors to recreate the “voluntariness” doctrine that ex-
isted prior to Miranda.490 However, it could be argued, any congres-
 
 489. Id. at 490. 
 490. The statute’s legislative history indeed confirms Congress’s objective to supersede 
that case. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 2137 (1968). The Senate Report explained that: 
[b]y the express provisions of the proposed legislation the trial judge must take into 
consideration all the surrounding circumstances in determining the issue of volun-
tariness, including specifically enumerated factors which historically enter into such a 
determination. Whether or not the arrested person was informed of or knew his 
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sional attempt to modify the Court’s constitutional judgment would 
run afoul of the fundamental principles enshrined in Marbury v. 
Madison.491 Otherwise, as the Court pointed out in City of Boerne v. 
Flores,492 “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitu-
tion and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment 
process contained in Article V.”493 I think this argument is mistaken. 
In Boerne, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as an improper encroachment upon the 
federal courts’ duty to construe the Constitution. The background 
surrounding Congress’s decision to enact RFRA offers an interest-
ing—albeit incomplete—parallel to that of § 3501. 
Before its decision in Employment Division v. Smith,494 the Su-
preme Court had applied a “compelling state interest test” to reli-
gious free exercise claims. In Smith, however, the Court replaced 
that test with one permitting laws of general applicability to be en-
forced without substantially burdening the state. The Court rea-
soned “[t]hat the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual 
of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability.’ ”495 The Smith majority thus qualified the compelling 
interest test’s applicability to free exercise claims that might reasona-
bly be restricted because they were geared to all citizens, not simply 
those espousing a religious belief. However, certain members of 
Congress (and a substantial coalition of interest groups) were con-
vinced that the compelling state interest test was imperative to safe-
guard the free exercise of religious beliefs. To this end, Congress en-
acted RFRA, at least in part, to “restore the compelling interest test” 
in assessing claims arising under the free exercise clause.496 Congress 
thus statutorily revived a judicially crafted test that the Court had re-
jected. 
 
rights before questioning is but one of the factors. . . . No one can predict with any 
assurance what the Supreme Court might at some future date decide if these provi-
sions are enacted. 
 Id. Comments on the floor of the House were similar. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 16,066 
(1968) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 114 CONG. REC. 16,074 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Corman). 
 491. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 492. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 493. Id. at 529 (striking down Religious Freedom Restoration Act on ground that Con-
gress had exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 494. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 495. Id. at 879 (internal quotation omitted). 
 496. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1993). 
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In striking RFRA down, however, the Court determined that 
Congress had violated the constitutional separation of powers by re-
quiring that courts use a standard of judicial review for free exercise 
cases that the Court had expressly rejected as inconsistent with the 
constitution. The Court explained that while Congress “has been 
given the power to ‘enforce’ ” it has not been given “the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”497 The Court 
concluded that “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed reme-
dial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive 
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”498 By resur-
recting a judicially rejected standard of review for a particular class of 
constitutional cases, the Court concluded that Congress had im-
properly encroached upon the judicial power. The Court cautioned 
that Congress’s attempt to impose the compelling state interest test 
on the federal courts amounted to a competing interpretation of the 
First Amendment. In other words, Congress was legislating the exer-
cise of judicial power with respect to a discrete class of cases. “When 
the Court has interpreted the Constitution,” the Court emphasized, 
“it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch,” a power 
constitutionally forbidden to the legislature.499 
At first blush, this is precisely the situation confronting the Court 
in Dickerson. Prior to Miranda, the Court analyzed the admissibility 
of confessions under a “totality of the circumstances” standard de-
rived from the Due Process Clause.500 Although it did not rewrite 
the standards governing the Fifth Amendment inquiry itself, 
Miranda altered the procedures governing the voluntariness deter-
mination by holding that no statements arising from a custodial in-
terrogation would be admissible at trial unless the suspect was first 
informed of her rights. In response to Miranda, Congress enacted  
§ 3501 to resurrect the former “totality of the circumstances” volun-
tariness test. 
The issue in Dickerson may therefore hinge on whether Congress 
endeavored in § 3501 to overturn the Court’s Fifth Amendment in-
terpretation of what constitutes “voluntariness,” or instead sought 
 
 497. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
 498. Id. at 532. 
 499. Id. at 536. 
 500. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1961); Crooker v. California, 
357 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1958). 
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merely to replace the Court’s prophylactic rules safeguarding the 
right with rules of its own creation. In my view, § 3501 can readily 
be distinguished from RFRA because Congress did not instruct the 
Supreme Court on how to interpret the compelled self-incrimination 
clause. Nor does it attempt to offer a competing definition of “vol-
untariness.” Rather, Congress simply adopted new procedural rules 
courts must use in determining whether a defendant’s statements 
should be admitted at trial. The ultimate question of whether a con-
fession is “voluntary,” for Fifth Amendment purposes, remains with 
the courts. This is not altogether different from Congress’s authority 
to promulgate the federal rules of evidence, many of which serve to 
protect constitutional rights. The Sixth Amendment, for example, 
affords defendants the right to “be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”501 The Court may define the legal effect of the con-
frontation clause, but Congress establishes the procedures by which 
witnesses are called and by which the relevance of testimonial evi-
dence is assessed. “This power,” the Court has observed, “rooted in 
the authority of Congress conferred by . . . the Constitution to cre-
ate inferior federal courts, is undoubted and has been frequently 
noted and sustained.”502 Thus, an evidentiary rule may have as its 
purpose the protection of a constitutional right, but Congress has 
the authority to modify that rule, within certain limits, even where it 
is forbidden to define the substantive right. 
Moreover, although the Boerne Court did not offer Congress the 
opportunity to engage in dialogue about the appropriate interpreta-
tion of the free exercise clause, the Miranda Court expressly invited 
Congress (and the states) to search for effective means to protect 
suspects’ rights. Indeed, the Miranda Court stressed that if it were 
“shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising 
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous 
opportunity to exercise it,” the Miranda warnings could be dis-
pensed with altogether.503 Certainly, the Court would not have solic-
ited legislative involvement of this sort if it were in fact construing a 
federal constitutional provision. If the Miranda warnings were con-
stitutionally compelled, then the Court would not—and if Boerne is  
 
 
 501. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 502. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1980) (citing cases). 
 503. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
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correct—could not have invited Congress and the States to modify 
them. 
To understand the Court’s decision in Boerne, it is worth consid-
ering United States v. Klein.504 There, Congress had provided for the 
recovery of private property the United States had captured during 
the Civil War, if the claimant could prove that “he [had] never given 
any aid or comfort to the . . . rebellion.”505 The Supreme Court sub-
sequently affirmed judgments against the United States for such 
property, based in part on the president’s decision to pardon certain 
individuals.506 Angered by what it deemed to be a misuse of the stat-
ute, Congress dictated that “any pardon . . . granted by the Presi-
dent . . . shall be taken and deemed . . . conclusive evidence that 
such person did take part in and give aid and comfort to the . . . re-
bellion.”507 Disgruntled claimants challenged the statute as an im-
permissible congressional interpretation of the legal effect of a presi-
dential pardon. Faced with a hostile Congress during a particularly 
difficult historical period, the Court nonetheless concluded that the 
statute breached separation of powers both with respect to the presi-
dent’s pardon power—by effectively nullifying it—and with respect 
to the judicial power, namely, by prescribing the legal effect of a par-
don. Congress, in effect, removed from the federal courts’ purview 
the construction of the pardon power and forced upon the courts a 
specific constitutional interpretation. 
Section 3501, by contrast, is not an effort to establish a binding 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, or to direct the legal out-
come of a case. If Congress had sought to dictate what constituted a 
voluntary confession for Fifth Amendment purposes, then it might 
be trenching upon judicial authority. Instead, Congress merely out-
lined the circumstances under which a “voluntary,” as defined by the 
Court, confession could be admitted into evidence. Had the Court 
not been adamant about Miranda’s status as a prophylactic rule, de-
signed to combat the effects of inherently coercive custodial interro-
gations, § 3501 might pose a problem. Unlike RFRA, which presup-
posed that the courts would reject the First Amendment claim or  
 
 
 504. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
 505. Id. at 131. 
 506. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131-33 (citing as an example United States v. Padle-
ford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870)). 
 507. Id. at 135. 
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defense as “without merit” as long as Smith remained intact, § 3501 
does no such thing. 
D. The Court’s Institutional Limitations 
The Miranda warnings are predicated on the ground that custo-
dial interrogations are inherently coercive and that any statements 
obtained during such an interrogation are necessarily “compelled” in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Before Miranda, the Court had 
struggled to fashion an effective test to determine whether a state-
ment was voluntarily given.508 In light of the “difficulty in depicting 
what transpires at [police] interrogations,”509 the Court could not 
reliably ascertain whether a suspect’s statement had been the product 
of a free will.510 Rather than engage in a likely fruitless factual in-
quiry, the Court instead concluded that bright-line rules would help 
“to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not be-
come but a ‘form of words,’ in the hands of government officials.”511 
The very existence of such a rule serves to underscore the Court’s 
limited institutional ability to assure, in the custodial context, the 
suspect’s right against compelled self-incrimination. 
As a result, the warnings serve to protect the right, in part by 
removing from courts the need to engage in a searching factual in-
quiry, but are not themselves constitutionally guaranteed. While 
functionally significant, the warnings are nothing more than a non-
constitutional anticipatory remedy. They are “anticipatory” or “pro-
 
 508. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). The line between 
proper and permissible police conduct and techniques, and methods offensive to due process 
is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is necessary to make 
fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the 
mind and will of an accused. See id. The critical inquiry was whether the physical or the psycho-
logical coercion was of such a degree that “the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he 
confessed.” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). 
 509. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). The Court explained that “[t]he 
difficulty in depicting what transpires at such interrogations stems from the fact that in this 
country they have largely taken place incommunicado.” Id. The Court also noted that 
“[p]rivacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact 
goes on in the interrogation rooms.” Id. at 448; see id. at 470 (arguing that presence of attor-
ney will enhance trustworthiness of subsequent testimony regarding interrogation). 
 510. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court in Miranda described the difficulty in 
making “[a]ssessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed” as to the right to remain 
silent. Id. at 468. In addition, the Court noted the “evils” present in the interrogation atmos-
phere. Id. at 456. 
 511. Id. at 444 (quotation omitted). 
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phylactic” because they do not cure a present violation; rather, they 
serve to avert a potential violation. Of course, whether a suspect (or 
a class of future suspects) was coerced into confession is necessarily a 
factual question.512 It is one thing, however, for the Court to make a 
factual determination based upon a case presently before it, and quite 
another for the Court to predict the facts of a case that may come 
before it at some future date. Conclusive presumptions that antici-
pate future factual scenarios are “designed to avoid the costs of ex-
cessive inquiry where a per se rule will achieve the correct result in 
almost all cases.”513 The Miranda Court explained that pursuant to 
the conclusive presumption it established, “we will not pause to en-
quire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his 
rights without a warning being given.”514 Such presumptions “re-
quire the Court to make broad generalizations . . . . Cases that do 
not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the 
judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important 
to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.”515 The 
Miranda Court essentially made a “predictive” factual determination 
that in future cases courts would have a difficult time discovering 
whether a confession was voluntarily communicated. If the problem 
sought to be remedied (inherently coercive custodial interrogations) 
does not exist, however, or if the Court’s “generalization” is incor-
rect as a factual matter, may Congress dispense with, or at least mod-
ify, the prophylaxis? I think so. 
Conclusive presumptions like the one Miranda sets forth are dic-
tated by convenience, not the Constitution. Congress, while refusing 
to quibble with the Court’s construction of the Fifth Amendment, 
nevertheless rejected the factual assertion underpinning the Court’s 
decision to mandate warnings; namely, that custodial interrogations 
are inherently coercive.516 Congress enjoys a significant institutional 
advantage over the Court in gathering facts. Unlike the Court, Con-
gress is not bound by the parties’ submissions; rather, it can conduct 
hearings, canvass constituents, and obtain information from a broad 
 
 512. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 515; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534. 
 513. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991). 
 514. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. 
 515. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977). 
 516. In fact, the Dickerson court recognized that Congress had “concluded that custodial 
interrogations were not inherently coercive.” United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 
n.22 (1999). 
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range of sources. As Thomas C. Lynch, then Attorney General of 
California, emphasized during the hearings on § 3501: 
Congress, with its vastly superior fact-gathering powers, is in a 
much better position than the Court to formulate standards most 
likely to result in a correct determination, in a given case, of the is-
sue of voluntariness of a confession. * * * If findings of fact are 
made by Congress that demonstrate the relevance and importance 
of these factors, and their superiority over the rules laid down in 
Miranda, it would seem that the Court would have little choice 
but to defer to the expert judgment of Congress.517 
In assessing the evidence before it, Congress concluded that the 
Court’s factual basis for creating an anticipatory remedy for all cus-
todial interrogations was unsound. During the subcommittee hear-
ings, for example, Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter 
pointed out 
that the so-called third-degree methods deplored by the Supreme 
Court and cited as a basis for their opinion in Miranda is not a cor-
rect portrayal of what actually goes on in police stations across the 
country. While there are isolated cases of police using coercive tac-
tics, this is the exception rather than the rule.518 
Buttressed by data collected from a broad range of sources, and 
after considerable deliberation and debate, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee concluded that “the Court overreacted to defense claims 
that police brutality is widespread.”519 While Congress could neither 
change the outcome of Miranda, nor alter the Court’s constitutional 
definition of voluntariness, it could, and did, reject the Court’s 
broader prediction that all custodial questioning is inherently coer-
cive and any statement resulting therefrom is involuntary. As a con-
sequence of this determination, the Committee Report explained 
that “the voluntariness test does not offend the Constitution or de-
prive a defendant of any constitutional right.”520 And how could it? 
The Court had not rejected the voluntariness test per se, rather, it 
had simply drafted bright line rules to make the voluntariness deter-
mination easier to assess. 
 
 517. See 1S. REP. NO. 90-1097, 47 (1968) (quoting Thomas C. Lynch, State of Califor-
nia Attorney General), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2133. 
 518. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, 47 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2134. 
 519. Id. at 48. 
 520. Id. at 51. 
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Critics may complain that Congress did not collect sufficient in-
formation or give thoughtful consideration to the information it ac-
quired. But Congress, by comparison, had considerably more infor-
mation at its disposal than the Court. By its own admission, the 
Miranda Court had little evidence that police brutality was wide-
spread at the time it rendered its decision. To support its conclusion, 
it relied principally upon the famed Wickersham Committee Re-
port,521 then more than thirty years old, as well as a number of anec-
dotal reports of police brutality. The Court’s perusal of various po-
lice interrogations manuals, none of which was demonstrated to have 
been used by any actual police force, hardly painted an irrefutable 
picture of interrogation procedures. As Justice White pointed out in 
dissent, “for all the Court’s expounding on the menacing atmos-
phere of police interrogation procedures, it has failed to supply any 
foundation for the conclusions it draws or the measures it adopts.”522 
The Court even recognized its inherent institutional limitations 
when it invited Congress to “search for increasingly effective ways of 
protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient en-
forcement of our criminal laws.” What constitutes an “increasingly 
effective way” is at base an empirical question. The Court has ob-
served that conclusive presumptions of this sort “should not be ap-
plied . . . in situations where the generalization is incorrect as an em-
pirical matter.”523 In truth, “the justification for a conclusive 
presumption disappears when application of the presumption will not 
reach the correct result most of the time.”524 Congress had the bene-
fit both of taking testimony regarding the pre-Miranda world, and 
testimony concerning the impact of Miranda upon law enforcement 
efforts. Based upon this information, Congress concluded the basis 
for Miranda’s conclusive presumption—that unwarned custodial in-
terrogations are inherently coercive—was incorrect as an empirical 
matter, and the presumption does not reach the correct result—
suppressing only involuntary confessions—most of the time that it is 
applied. According to the Subcommittee’s findings, the Judiciary 
Committee was able specifically to conclude that § 3501 “would be 
an effective way of protecting the rights of the individual and would 
 
 521. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in 
Law Enforcement (1931). 
 522. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
 523. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 (1991). 
 524. Id. 
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promote efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”525 The Court 
has traditionally permitted such a determination considerable defer-
ence because Congress “is far better equipped than the judiciary to 
amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative 
questions.”526 In an insightful dissenting and concurring opinion, 
Justice O’Connor criticized Miranda’s “presumption of coercion” 
not as an “impenetrable barrier to the introduction of compelled tes-
timony,”527 but rather as “leaking like a sieve.”528 
Congress, then, far from overruling the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the Fifth Amendment, instead merely rejected the 
Court’s factual predicate and the anticipatory remedy tailored to 
mend that predicate. Of course, critics may grumble that factual de-
terminations are a matter of degree. To some extent, every interpre-
tative decision is grounded in a construction of the facts. If Congress 
could simply substitute its own factual determination for that of the 
Court, it might be able to override any of the Court’s ultimate legal 
conclusions. Such a fear, however, does not imply that Congress can 
never substitute its fact-related conclusions for those of the Court. 
And the case favoring such congressional action may be particularly 
strong where the Court has expressly invited the legislature to con-
tinue searching for measures to safeguard fundamental rights. As part 
of that search, Congress must necessarily gather information and 
from that information, draw legal conclusions. 
As the Judiciary Committee had previously observed, Congress’s 
substitution of its own factual determination for that of the Court is 
not without precedent. In a thinly veiled effort to prevent certain 
non-English speaking minorities from voting, North Carolina en-
acted a statute that established English literacy as a voting prerequi-
site. The statute’s opponents challenged that literacy requirement as 
a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
Lassiter v. North Hampton Election Board,529 however, the Court up-
held the statute’s facial constitutionality. Congress, however, differed 
with the Court’s conclusion. Finding, as a factual matter, that such 
 
 525. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 51 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137. 
 526. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 527. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 712 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 528. Id. 
 529. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
ONE-FIN.DOC 5/20/00 7:23 PM 
185] Undoing Miranda 
 285 
requirements did infringe upon equal protection interests, Congress 
passed § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that literary 
requirements could not be enforced against anyone educated beyond 
the sixth grade in state accredited schools. Shortly thereafter, § 4(e) 
was attacked as an improper encroachment upon the judicial power. 
Congress, it was argued, could not enact such a law unless it was first 
determined that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to 
be secured (or wrong to be abolished). Otherwise, there would be 
no right for Congress to enforce. Because the Lassiter Court had 
found no equal protection violation with respect to English literacy 
requirements, § 4(e) was alleged to be an unconstitutional en-
croachment upon the Court’s power to “say what the law is.” 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,530 however, the Court ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s implementation clause endowed Congress 
with broad discretion limited solely by the need for a causal nexus 
between the right sought to be enforced and the factual evidence be-
fore Congress. The issue in Katzenbach was whether § 4(e) could, 
consistent with the Constitution, prevent enforcement of a statute 
that the judiciary had not declared unconstitutional. Opponents 
claimed that Congress could not enact such a law unless it first de-
termined that the right to be secured (or wrong to be remedied) was 
somehow guaranteed by the underlying substantive provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Supreme Court had found no 
such right (or wrong) to exist with respect to English literacy re-
quirements in Lassiter, § 4(e) was alleged to be an unconstitutional 
encroachment upon the Court’s power to “say what the law is.” The 
Court nevertheless concluded that Congress had sufficient factual 
evidence before it to support a reasonable conclusion that § 4(e) was 
necessary to prevent a denial of equal protection. Congress’s factual 
determination, while different from that of the Court, was not con-
strued as trenching upon the judicial power—even though it had 
specific legal consequences. 
If Congress can substitute its own factual determination for that 
of the Court in concluding that a right is not being properly en-
forced, then presumably, the reverse is also true. In other words, if 
the Court, as a factual matter, predicts evil in certain circumstances, 
but Congress decides no possible evil exists, then Congress can sub-
stitute its own legislative determination, and corresponding prophy-
 
 530. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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laxis, for that of the Court. Congress could not legislatively dictate 
the admission of an involuntary confession because that would alter a 
judicial interpretation, but it may be able statutorily to fashion pro-
cedural rules whereby an otherwise voluntary confession would be 
admitted. Congress may, under this theory, alter the means for pro-
tecting any right the Supreme Court has identified, provided Con-
gress’s alternative mechanism adequately vindicates that right. If it 
has sufficient evidence, Congress may choose to secure the underly-
ing constitutional right in ways different from that of the Court.  
Contrary to what many in legal academia seem to believe, judges 
do not possess an exclusive monopoly on constitutional interpreta-
tion. Legislators and Executive Branch officials must also interpret 
the Constitution while performing their functions. While past judi-
cial interpretations may guide them, they are nevertheless free, 
within certain limitations, to enforce their own constitutional deter-
minations.531 For those troubled by such congressional power, it is 
worth noting that the Court is always free to reexamine congres-
sional efforts. 
In essence, this differs little from what the Court has encouraged 
Congress to do with respect to legislative findings pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez,532 for example, the 
Court invalidated the so-called Gun-Free School Zones Act on the 
ground that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause 
to reach activity that had a tenuous connection to interstate com-
merce.533 In reaching that decision, the Court insinuated that “to the 
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the 
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially af-
fected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect 
was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.”534 Properly 
drawn congressional findings can thus help support statutes the 
 
 531. See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 707, 747 (1985) (“Members of Congress have both the authority and the capability to 
participate constructively in constitutional interpretation.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221-27 (1994) 
(discussing shared power among legislative, judicial, and executive branches to “say what the 
law is”); Neal E. Devins, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 661, 662 (1986) (book review) (“Congress and the executive are undoubtedly author-
ized to interpret the Constitution.”). 
 532. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 533. See id. at 561. 
 534. Id. at 563. 
ONE-FIN.DOC 5/20/00 7:23 PM 
185] Undoing Miranda 
 287 
courts would otherwise invalidate on constitutional grounds.535Pur-
suant to Lopez, Congress’s failure to include legislative findings may 
diminish, though not completely eliminate, the deference accorded 
to its legislative product. In both the Commerce Clause and the 
Fifth Amendment settings, the Court seems to have acknowledged 
Congress’s authority to legislate within certain loosely prescribed pa-
rameters that may be adjusted on the basis of congressional findings. 
While Congress did not attach express findings to § 3501, it held 
hearings on the statute, filed a comprehensive report, and engaged—
both in the House and Senate—in considerable floor debate. To the 
extent particular legislative findings are necessary, they are laid out in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report and in the floor debate. 
Even so, meaningful differences may distinguish the legislative 
findings context in Lopez from that in Miranda. The issue in Lopez 
required the Court to demarcate the limits of congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause to infringe state interests. The existence 
of specific legislative findings provides some guarantee that Congress 
has properly considered whether it has constitutional authority to 
legislate in the area.536 The legislative findings serve to enable the 
Court to determine whether the legislation stayed within Congress’s 
Commerce Clause boundaries. 
In contrast, the real issue in Dickerson is how best to protect the 
right against compelled self-incrimination, given the need for effec-
tive law enforcement. In reviewing § 3501, the Court need not focus 
exclusively on whether the statute, viewed in isolation, satisfactorily 
protects the Fifth Amendment right, but whether in light of all the 
changes in federal law (and federal law enforcement) the right is be-
 
 535. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (requiring 
Congress to justify affirmative action legislation with specific findings because “classifications 
based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic, it is especially important 
that the reasons for any such classification be clearly identified”) (citation omitted); Perez v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57 (1971) (upholding congressional power to regulate loan 
sharking). 
 536. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-54 (1985) (not-
ing that structure of federal system provided inherent protections to state interests); see also 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 191-95 (1982) (developing view that Congress pro-
tects state sovereignty); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: In-
tergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 804-
960 (1982) (describing states’ role in federal system); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546-47 (1954) (describing role of states in selection and 
composition of Congress). 
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ing adequately protected. If Congress has provided a satisfactory al-
ternative to Miranda, not just in § 3501, but in the training of fed-
eral law enforcement officers, the creation of Bivens537 suits, etc., 
then the factual predicate for mandating warnings may no longer ex-
ist and the Court can simply dispense with the warnings. At a mini-
mum, Dickerson affords the Court with the opportunity to revisit the 
problem of protecting Fifth Amendment rights—a problem seem-
ingly in need of review. 
E. Is § 3501 Adequate to Protect the Right Against Compelled Self-
Incrimination? 
Aside from the myriad decisions suggesting that the Miranda 
warnings are but a prophylactic device to secure Fifth Amendment 
guarantees, the Court has also stated on occasion that the issues pre-
sented in Miranda are of “constitutional dimensions.”538 Miranda’s 
chief apologists often cite Withrow v. Williams,539 for example, to 
support the view that the warnings are constitutionally compelled, 
hence unalterable. In Withrow, the Court held that a state prisoner 
who alleges a Miranda violation states a constitutional claim that is 
cognizable on federal habeas review. Unlike the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exclusionary rule, which serves to protect constitutional pri-
vacy interests,540 the Court has squarely held that a police officer’s 
failure to comply with Miranda constitutes a violation of “federal 
law” or the “Constitution” for purposes of the habeas statute. The 
Court explained that “[p]rophylactic though it may be, in protecting 
a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 
Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right.”541 
What does the Court mean with its apparently conflicting state-
ments with respect to the Miranda warnings’ constitutional status? 
Essentially, prophylactic or not, the Miranda warnings are based 
upon the Court’s decision to create an anticipatory remedy to facili-
tate compliance with the Fifth Amendment. As such, the warnings 
serve to safeguard the right to be free from coerced confessions. 
 
 537. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 538. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). 
 539. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
 540. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976) (distinguishing Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule as one designed to deter illegal searches and seizures). 
 541. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Something, then, is needed to safeguard the right. The question is 
what that something is—and whether Congress is empowered to 
create it. In Dickerson, of course, the issue is whether § 3501 ac-
ceptably reflects Congress’s efforts to provide alternative safeguards 
to ensure that statements to law enforcement officers are voluntary. 
That question does not properly capture what the Court’s inquiry 
must be. Properly framed, the question is whether current safeguards 
exist, including, but not limited to § 3501, to protect Fifth Amend-
ment rights. 
Although academics have fretted about the inadequacy of the 
voluntariness test, none have demonstrated that it is an appreciably 
less effective means of protecting a suspect’s rights and balancing 
those rights against society’s interest in effective law enforcement. 
The Court assumed, without the benefit of careful inquiry, that un-
warned custodial interrogations necessarily produced coerced state-
ments. But the Court had no idea—other than a bit of speculation 
leavened by some common sense—that Miranda warnings would 
have their intended effect. However one may feel about the policy of 
Miranda, the Court was not necessarily in the best position to de-
termine the extent of police misconduct, to balance the interests of 
law enforcement and personal liberty, and to fashion a policy govern-
ing police interrogation. Of course, it really didn’t attempt to do the 
latter. Instead, it merely borrowed warnings previously devised by 
the Executive Branch. Perhaps the determination of whether § 3501 
will “work” as an alternative to mandated warnings simply can not 
be made until the statute is enforced.542 
I would venture to say that there is less police brutality now than 
in 1966, or certainly than in 1931, the year the Wickersham Report 
was published. Although the data are admittedly inconclusive, there 
is some evidence to suggest that law enforcement officials abuse sus-
pects’ rights far less than during the era preceding Miranda.543
 
 542. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Policy explained it this way: 
The Miranda decision has petrified the law of pre-trial interrogation for 
the past twenty years, foreclosing the possibility of developing and im-
plementing alternatives that would be of greater effectiveness both in pro-
tecting the public from crime and in ensuring fair treatment of persons 
suspected of crime . . . Nothing is left to the change in the future as long 
as Miranda remains in effect and perpetuates a perceived risk of invalida-
tion for any alternative system that departs from it. 
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 2933, at 99. 
 543. See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police In-
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 Doubtless, law enforcement agencies provide more, and better, 
training and almost certainly place greater stress on internal discipli-
nary procedures. The so-called educative effect of Miranda may even 
have run its course. Indeed, it might be argued today that Miranda 
warnings have become a shield for law enforcement. In other words, 
once the suspect has signed the waiver of rights card, the magistrate 
will look no further. The type of judicial scrutiny available in a 
“totality of the circumstances” test expands the cursory examination 
of the rights card to ensure that the signature is indeed the suspect’s. 
The legal landscape has also changed considerably since Miranda 
exploded onto the scene. First, it must be remembered that involun-
tary confessions, as opposed to “mere” Miranda violations, will al-
ways be excluded at trial.544 No revival of § 3501 will change that. 
Additionally, expanded criminal and civil penalties provide both a 
deterrent to police misconduct and relief to citizens whose rights 
have been violated. A federal civil rights statute that existed before 
Miranda criminalized the actions of anyone who “under color of any 
Law . . . willfully subjects any person in any state, territory, or Dis-
trict to the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”545Simi-
larly, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 prohibit conspiracies that violate 
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has itself only recently 
noted that, “[b]eating to obtain a confession plainly violates section 
242.”546 
Congress has also broadened criminal and civil liability for civil 
rights’ violations. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,547 the 
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Court held that individuals could sue government officials directly 
for constitutional injuries.548 Since Bivens, individuals can recover, 
contingent upon official immunity doctrine, for injuries arising out 
of coercive interrogations. And, the Court has clarified that viola-
tions of the right against compelled self-incrimination may constitute 
the basis for a Bivens claim.549 
In addition, Congress waived the federal immunity from such 
claims in a 1974 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act.550 In 
response to publicity surrounding several notorious raids by federal 
law enforcement personnel, Congress authorized suit under the 
FTCA for Bivens claims as well as for some intentional torts that are 
based upon acts or omissions of law enforcement officers.551Specifi-
cally, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress has made it pos-
sible for citizens to sue for claims arising “out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prose-
cution.”552 As a result, victims can now sue both the government and 
individual law enforcement officers for abusive interrogation tactics. 
In Dickerson, the Court’s responsibility will not only be to de-
termine whether § 3501 is adequate, but whether the legal landscape 
has so changed in the thirty-plus years since Miranda was handed 
down that sufficient alternative safeguards to Miranda warnings exist 
to ensure the voluntariness of statements and to protect the right 
against self-incrimination. So the question of whether § 3501, stand-
ing alone, is equally protective of suspects’ rights is beside the point. 
The real question for the Court to consider is whether, today, suffi-
cient means are in place to protect suspects, as well as to promote ef-
ficient law enforcement. As Professor Cassell has explained, “Taken 
together, the combination of criminal, civil, and administrative 
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remedies now available for coerced confessions—along with the Fifth 
Amendment’s exclusion of involuntary statements—renders 
Miranda’s prophylactic remedy overprotective and therefore subject 
to modification in § 3501.”553 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Although the politics surrounding this issue are complex, the is-
sue itself is not terribly complicated. The Fourth Circuit has ob-
served that if the Constitution mandates the Miranda warnings, 
then: Congress lacked the authority to enact § 3501, and Miranda 
continues to control the admissibility of confessions in federal court. 
If it is not required by the Constitution, then Congress possesses the 
authority to supercede Miranda legislatively, and § 3501 controls 
the admissibility of confessions in federal court.554 
The apparent simplicity of the legal issue, however, belies the 
complexity of the political debate and touches upon the appropriate 
role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Constitution, and of 
Congress in prescribing constitutional norms. Crucial to this deter-
mination is the degree to which Congress may rely upon its institu-
tional advantages to promulgate rules that serve to safeguard consti-
tutional guarantees. These are questions that extend well beyond 
Dickerson and will continue to be debated as the Court further in-
serts itself into the national political discourse, and Congress further 
hands difficult questions to the judiciary. I have tried to articulate a 
role for Congress in this ongoing constitutional dialogue. Far from 
being a bit player, Congress has an active role to play in securing 
rights. It is a role Congress must not abdicate. To the extent it does, 
our personal liberties will be compromised. 
Constitutional questions aside, however, the passage of time is 
not an insignification factor to consider. While past administrations 
have signaled their support for the statute, none has consistently 
sought to enforce it. As a consequence, Miranda has flourished 
while § 3501 has withered. Rightly or wrongly, Miranda has evolved 
into a symbol of the Warren Court, and its supposedly noble efforts 
to rewrite the Constitution to champion broadly defined individual 
liberties. Indeed, few decisions have entered the popular conscious-
ness quite so thoroughly. A number of participants in this on-going 
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debate privately concede that the Miranda warnings have little con-
tinuing value as a code of police procedure, but have argued instead 
that they symbolize a particular era, and with that era a method of 
constitutional interpretation. While a laches defense of some sort 
may be appropriate to consider, Miranda’s “symbolic” effect should 
not trump an otherwise constitutional act of Congress. Surely, had 
Miranda gone unenforced, legal scholars of the time would have 
howled. In this article, I have sought to revisit the congressional de-
bates surrounding § 3501’s enactment and to illuminate some of the 
constitutional issues implicated by Congressional efforts to rewrite 
the rules protecting the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Section 3501 has languished far too long in legislative 
purgatory.555 
 
 555. Of course, this determination in and of itself may unleash a new storm of protest—
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